



The Impact of Connected Automated Vehicles on the Insurance 
Sector: A comprehensive Analysis of Legal and Risk Factors  
 
Fabian Pütz (B.Sc., M.Sc.) 
Department of Accounting and Finance 
Kemmy Business School 
University of Limerick 
 
Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
Completed under the supervision of  
Dr. Finbarr Murphy (University of Limerick),  
Dr. Martin Mullins (University of Limerick), and  
Prof. Dr. Torsten Rohlfs (Cologne University of Applied Sciences) 
 






I herewith declare that this thesis has not been submitted to any other University or higher 
education institution, or for any other academic award. Any contribution made by other 
authors is explicitly acknowledged in the thesis. I also declare that I have obtained 
copyright permission for the published work and that the proper citations to the journals 
are provided.  
 
 
17/11/2019                                   
Fabian Pütz 
Kemmy Business School 






The PhD was a journey that I am glad to have begun, but that I am all the happier that it 
is coming to an end now. At the end of this journey, I look back at times of frustration 
and doubt but even more at moments of joy and deep appreciation, which became all the 
more pleasant because I could share them with the following people.  
 
First, I would like to sincerely thank my principal supervisor, Dr. Finbarr Murphy, who 
has accompanied me as a patient mentor over the last three years and whose guidance 
was vital for my personal and academic growth.   
 
I would also like to thank my supervisors Prof. Dr. Torsten Rohlfs and Dr. Martin Mullins 
for their continuous counsel and assistance they have offered me throughout the last years. 
 
In addition, I would like to thank all colleagues from our research group in the Department 
of Accounting & Finance (University of Limerick), and from the Institute of Insurance 
and Actuarial Science (Cologne University of Applied Science) and all co-authors for 
their valuable input and advice, which allowed me to finalise my research projects 
successfully.  
 
I would particularly like to thank my wife, my family, and my friends for their exceptional 
support and willingness to back me up, which has given me the freedom to successfully 
persevere this voyage of academic discovery.  
 
With deep gratitude, 
 
 
Fabian Pütz  





Ph.D. related PUBLICATIONS  
 
Peer-reviewed Journal Articles 
 
MURPHY, F., PÜTZ, F., MULLINS, M., ROHLFS, T., WRANA, D. & BIERMANN, 
M. (2019). The impact of autonomous vehicle technologies on product recall risk. 
International Journal of Production Research.  
doi: https://doi.org/10.1080/00207543.2019.1566651. 
 
PÜTZ, F., MURPHY, F. & MULLINS, M. (2019). Driving to a future without accidents? 
Connected automated vehicles` impact on accident frequency and motor insurance 
risk. Environment Systems and Decisions.  
doi: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10669-019-09739-x 
 
PÜTZ, F., MURPHY, F., MULLINS, M., & O` MALLEY, L. (2019). Connected 
automated vehicles and insurance: Analysing future market-structure from a 
business ecosystem perspective. Technology in Society, 59, Article 101182.  
doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techsoc.2019.101182. 
 
PÜTZ, F., MURPHY, F., MULLINS, M., MAIER, K., FRIEL, R., & ROHLFS, T. 
(2018). Reasonable, Adequate and Efficient Allocation of Liability Costs for 
Automated Vehicles: A Case Study of the German Liability and Insurance 








Pütz, Fabian (2018): “Die Auswirkungen vernetzter automatisierter Fahrzeuge auf das 
Geschäftsmodell der Kfz-Versicherung: Die Wirkung von Rechts- und 
Motivationsaspekten auf das Regressverhalten des Kfz-Versicherers”  
[translated: “The Impact of connected automated vehicles on the business model of 
motor insurance: Implications of legal and motivational aspects arising from 
recourse claims against vehicle manufacturers”]. Zeitschrift für 
Versicherungswesen (ZfV 22/2018).  
 
Pütz, Fabian (2019): “Partner on equal terms- How reinsurance companies and OEM 
groups can benefit from each other in the future motor market”. 
Versicherungswirtschaft 03/2019. 
 
Pütz, Fabian (2019): “Reinsurance aspects of connected automated driving: Product 
Liability and Product Recall”. Journal: Zeitschrift für Versicherungswesen (ZfV 
05/2019). 
 
Pütz, Fabian (2019): “Wer haftet für Unfälle eines automatisiert fahrenden 
Fahrzeugs” [translated: “Who is liable for accidents of an automated driving 
vehicle?”]. eMobilJournal 02/2019. 
 
Pütz, Fabian (2019): “Führt das automatisierte Fahren zu einer materiellen Verlagerung 
von Haftungskosten auf die Herstellerseite? Eine Analyse des bestehenden 
Haftungs- und Versicherungsrahmens” [translated: “Does the increasing 
automation lead to a material shift of liability costs to vehicle manufacturers? An 
analysis of the current liability and insurance framework”], Die 
VersicherungsPraxis 05/2019. 
 
Pütz, Fabian & Maier, Karl (2019): “Haftung und Versicherungsschutz bei Cyber-
Angriffen auf ein Kfz“ [translated: “Liability and insurance coverage for 





Conference Presentations and Proceedings 
 
Pütz, Fabian (2017): “Impact of CAV on (motor) insurance sector”, European Intelligent 
Transport Systems Conference, 20th June 2017, Strasbourg (France). 
 
Pütz, Fabian (2017): “The road to fully autonomous transport: Technical, Societal and 
Business Challenges and Opportunities for Research”, Presentation and Panel 
Discussion at VEHITS conference, April 2017, Porto (Portugal). 
 
Pütz, Fabian (2019): “Auswirkungen von vernetzten, automatisierten Fahrzeugen auf die 
Versicherungswirtschaft: Eine Bewertung aus rechtlicher und technischer 
Sicht” [translated: “Impact of connecteed automated vehicles on the insurance 
sector: An analysis of legal and technical aspects”). Proceedings to the 14. FaRis & 
DAV Symposium, 07.12.2018, Cologne University of Applied Sciences, Cologne 
(Germany).  
 
Pütz, Fabian (2019): “Allocation of liability costs between motor insurers and OEMs- 
Analysis of the current liability and insurance framework for automated vehicles”, 




Projects and Funding 
 
Contributions to the following European Union’s Horizon 2020 projects: 
 
VI-DAS (Grant no.: 690772; URL: http://www.vi-das.eu)  
This project targets to contribute to improved road safety by development and deployment 
of Advanced Driving Assistance Systems (ADAS). The research objectives are 
• To take a significant step forward in ADAS and therefore makes advances towards 
autonomous driving; 
• To obtain a more comprehensive analysis of a drivers’ situational context using a 
data fusion module; 
• To support drivers in accident avoidance and to mitigate the consequences of 
collisions; 
• To design and develop intuitive and personalisable HMI to warn and assist the 
driver in anticipating potentially critical events. 
 
Cloud-LSVA (Grant no.: 688099; URL: https://cloud-lsva.eu/)  
The objective of this project is to support the integration of large-scale big data, video 







The Impact of Connected Automated Vehicles on the Insurance 
Sector: A comprehensive Analysis of Legal and Risk Factors 
Fabian Pütz 
University of Limerick 
November 2019 
The introduction of connected automated vehicles (CAV) offers significant societal 
benefits and economic opportunities while similarly posing major challenges to society, 
businesses, research, and regulatory bodies. In addition to directly affected markets, such 
as the automobile manufacturing and transportation sectors, insurance is one of the core 
downstream sectors acutely sensitive to the adoption of this emerging technology. In fact, 
the adoption of CAV technology has the potential to profoundly affect existing business 
models of insurers with key triggers arising from changes to liability frameworks, a 
changing risk landscape and changes of customer interfaces and market structure induced 
by a shift of societal mobility approaches.  
Due to the facilitating role of insurers for the introduction of new technology, the strategic 
implications for this stakeholder have to be understood holistically and proactively to 
ensure a seamless introduction. Given that insurance as a subject of academic research is 
interdisciplinary by character and since the strategic implications emerging with CAV 
technology originate from both legal and risk factors, this thesis provides a 
multidimensional research approach linking different research disciplines and research 
methods. 
Using the current German liability and insurance framework as a case study, this thesis 
confirms that the methodology to allocate liability based on the strict liability of the 
vehicle owner is generally compatible with peculiarities of automated driving. However, 
adjustments to the existing framework are necessary to maintain an adequate level of 
claimant protection for accidents caused by automated vehicles. In addition, this thesis 
highlights that an adequate ultimate allocation of liability costs is potentially inhibited 
because of several barriers that hinder the shift of liability costs to the manufacturer side. 
This is particularly because the ability and motivation of motor insurers to conduct 
subrogation claims is negatively affected by a lack of required technical and engineering 
know-how and because market-wide conduction of subrogation claims would erode the 
business volume of motor insurance. 
In addition to legal challenges arising from existing liability and insurance frameworks, 
this thesis analyses data-driven use cases to present the access to in-vehicle data as 
another core CAV-related legal question from an insurance-perspective. Finding a status 
quo where OEMs begin to leverage their superior access to in-vehicle data for the 
expansion of their own business models, the analysis underlines that the increasing 
interconnection of modern automobile vehicles will have a significant strategic impact on 
insurance-related service offerings. However, by analysing this status quo from a business 
ecosystem perspective, it becomes apparent that taking the role of a physical dominator 
to extract maximum short-term value might be an obvious but not necessarily successful 
approach for OEMs on long-term. This is because the shift from a goods-dominant 
supply-chain perspective to a service-dominant perspective will also need a profound 
redefinition of OEMs´ supply-chain relationships. This finding supports the resolution of 
contrasting positions of OEMs and third-party providers and enables an unbiased and 
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farsighted approach of regulatory bodies to prevent that inadequate advantages of single 
actors result in market failure to the detriment of customers. 
For analysing the potential impacts of CAV technology on insurance-relevant risk-
factors, this thesis provides qualitative and semi-quantitative analyses of relevant drivers 
for motor insurance and automotive product recall risk. Referring to CAV technology´s 
impact on motor insurance risk exposure, the research concludes that automated driving 
vehicles indeed have the potential to significantly decrease the number of road accidents 
caused by human-error. However, as there is insufficient data available about the 
reliability of highly automated driving systems in real-world applications, reliable 
quantification of future accident risk exposure is inhibited. Therefore, assumptions of a 
sharply decreasing accident risk exposure are by no means straightforward nor 
statistically proven, especially as the provided analysis reveals risk-relevant peculiarities 
of every single level of automation. In addition, new risks such as the risk of automotive 
cyber-attacks are likely to emerge with the penetration of CAV technology which, in turn, 
introduce potential sources of yet unknown catastrophe-alike risk exposures to MTPL 
insurance.  
For the analysis of automotive product recall risk, this thesis couples the qualitative 
assessment of CAV-induced risk drivers from legal and technology-related sources with 
an analysis of historical product recall data from different product recall databases. With 
this approach, this thesis finds an increasing risk of product recalls induced by CAV 
technology, which is triggered by the increasing complexity of vehicle hardware and 
software and by an increasing legal and reputational risk in the case that CAV technology 
fails. 
With the provided multidimensional research approach, this thesis contributes to an 
improved understanding of legal frameworks regulating CAV technology´s introduction 
and enables regulatory bodies for a proactive and farsighted adaption of existing 
legislation. Particularly referring to the improved understanding of liability frameworks, 
the contribution to existing literature results from the fact that the provided in-depth 
analysis not only extends on liability law on a detached basis but considers important 
interdependencies resulting from motor insurance law and from motor insurers´ central 
role within the liability settlement process.  
In addition to the contribution to an improved understanding of legal factors, the analysis 
of CAV technology´s impacts on motor insurance risk characteristics contributes to an 
improved understanding of CAV technology´s inherent risk-factors. This is particularly 
useful as existing research and public expectations often seem to be biased and not 
sufficiently granular in the analysis of idiosyncrasies of single levels of automation. 
Furthermore, the presented research on CAV technology´s implications to product recall 
risk contributes to a comprehensive academic discussion of relevant risk-factors and 
serves as a cornerstone for academic research on a largely unaddressed aspect. 
From a business perspective, the findings of this thesis not only provide an holistic 
assessment of the impacts of CAV technology on the insurance sector enabling insurance 
entities to take proactive strategic measures for adapting existing business models to a 
probably changing business environment but also support stakeholders on the CAV 
technology supply side in implementing adequate risk management frameworks to cope 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
Technological progress has shaped human mobility for centuries. In fact, the exploitation 
of air and maritime space has not only enabled humans to outstrip the natural borders of 
endogenous human locomotion but has also revolutionised land mobility in terms of 
range, speed and personal availability of travel options. The first technological revolution 
of land mobility was heralded early in the nineteenth century, by the substitution of 
muscle-powered mobility with the mechanised locomotion of public railway 
transportation systems. This was followed by the 1886 introduction of Carl Benz’ 
automobile combustion engines. This innovation extended the scope of mechanical 
mobility from public transportation to individual movement, while Henry Ford´s 1908 
development of assembly-line processes rationalised the manufacture and massification 
of an affordable individually-owned vehicle. 
However, following this second wave of the land mobility revolution, the technological 
capability of automobile vehicles has advanced through evolutionary rather than 
revolutionary progress. That said, contemporary automobile and transportation sectors 
are on the cusp of profound changes arising from a number of factors which include 
increasing connectivity, automation, shared use, and the electrification of automobiles 
(McKinsey&Company 2019).1 While the specific time horizon of this development 
remains indeterminate, such driving forces have the potential to affect not only the 
technical infrastructure of the automobile vehicle itself but also the comprehensive traffic 
infrastructure and the future application of multi-modal mobility approaches (Bagloee et 
al. 2016) (Bunghez 2015). 
The phenomenon of automated vehicles on the roads is hardly a new sight. Indeed, horse-
drawn carriages share many characteristics with their automated vehicle counterparts, 
since horses are capable of performing certain driving decisions independent from human 
steering commands. Despite General Motors’ first conceptualisation of automated 
highway driving in the late 1950s (Rillings 1997), in which magnetised vehicles followed 
a steel cable embedded in test tracks, applications of automated driving vehicles to date, 
 
1 These driving forces are also summarised by the acronym “CASE” or “ACES” representing the 
respective sub-trends of Connectivity, Automation, Shared-Mobility and Electrification.  
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have remained limited to research projects and were largely perceived as the unfeasible 
and unreplicative realm of science-fiction. 
However, recent technological progress in the field of computer, communication, and 
sensor technology is expected to foster a new era of automation and interconnection of 
physical smart devices (Internet of Things). Reflecting this overall development to the 
automobile sector, it is anticipated that advances in the field of Advanced Driving 
Assistance Systems (ADAS) and automated vehicle (AV) technology will make 
automated driving vehicles a reality within the coming years or decades. Together with 
an increasing interconnection of these vehicles, this has a direct bearing on the automobile 
and transportation sectors, and the potential to change individual and societal mobility 
approach at a fundamental level. It is further held that the reality of automated vehicles 
on the roads will impact societal mobility demands by inducing a shift from possession-
based to service-based satisfaction. Finally, it is expected that this technology will inter 
alia enhance overall travel safety and comfort (Bunghez 2015), and will increase mobility 
options for the elderly or disabled (Harper et al. 2016a) (Fagnant and Kockelman 2015). 
 
1.2 Definition of levels of automation 
To provide a consistent nomenclature and to facilitate the comprehension of the later 
argumentation of this thesis, it is first necessary to define and differentiate between 
different levels of automated driving capability of road vehicles. For this, it is referred to 
the general definition of the Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE), which defines six 
levels of automated driving capability (SAE International 2016).  
By contrast, the German Federal Highway Research Institute (BASt) uses a similar 
definition approach by classifying five levels of automation (Federal Highway Research 
Institute Germany 2012). Indeed, this approach was published earlier and was used as a 
basis reference in SAE´s definition approach. Despite a high degree of similarities, SAE´s 
definition approach can be viewed as a more granular derivative, especially as it 
anticipates the level of “full automation” (SAE level 5) for vehicles, which do not require 
a (physical or remote) human driver at all. As this more granular assessment provides a 
better fit for the evaluation of driving responsibility and as it is commonly used in the 
international literature, this nomenclature will be used unless explicitly stated (e.g. see 
chapter 2).    
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SAE defines the six levels (level 0 to 5) of automation based on the specific role the 
human driver and the driving automation system2 take considering  
• the lateral (steering) and longitudinal (acceleration/deceleration) control,  
• the monitoring of the driving environment and  
• the performance of the fallback function in case that the automated driving 
system3 fails to properly fulfil the dynamic driving task.  
 
The dynamic driving task comprises the fulfilment of lateral and longitudinal motion 
control, the tactical maneuver planning and display of action (e.g. signalling) as well as 
the subtask of monitoring and responding to objects and events in the driving 
environment (object and event detection and response, OEDR). The resulting six 
different levels of automation are shown in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1: Six levels of automation of road vehicles.  The table shows the six different 
levels of vehicle automation defined by SAE. Source: “Taxonomy and Definitions for 
 
2 This term includes all „hardware and software that are collectively capable of performing part or all of 
the dynamic driving task on a sustained basis; this term is used generically to describe any system 
capable of level 1-5 driving automation.“  
3 This term includes all „hardware and software that are collectively capable of performing the entire 
dynamic driving task on a sustained basis; […] this term is used specifically to describe a level 3, 4, or 5 
driving automation system.”  
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Terms Related to Driving Automation Systems for On-Road Motor Vehicles (J3016)” 
(SAE International 2016) 
Generally, the six levels of automation can be classified into levels, in which the human 
driver still is in the position to always perform at least parts of the dynamic driving task 
(level 0 to 2) and into levels in which the automated driving system is capable to perform 
the entire dynamic driving task at least for limited use cases (level 3-5). 
In vehicles with “no driving automation” (level 0), the human driver performs the entire 
dynamic driving task and is not assisted by any driving automation systems. However, 
the human driver can be supported by driver assistance systems which either warn the 
driver (e.g. lane departure warning) or assist the driver without direct intervention to the 
vehicle's longitudinal and/or lateral control. These systems regularly only increase the 
manoeuvrability of the vehicle (e.g. anti-lock braking system (ABS), electronic stability 
control (ESC) or electronic power steering (EPS)) and interfere with the stabilisation level 
of the vehicle.  
Vehicles equipped with “driver assistance” (level 1) are capable of performing either the 
longitudinal or lateral motion control at least in a limited scope of use cases. The driver 
is responsible to perform the complementary motion control and has to constantly monitor 
the driving environment. An example of this level of automation is the implementation 
of adaptive cruise control (ACC), which not only considers the speed of the own vehicle 
but also adjusts speed based on the distance to a vehicle ahead, or automatic emergency 
braking (AEB).  
On the next level, vehicles with “partial driving automation” (level 2) are capable to 
perform the longitudinal and lateral motion control within limited use cases. As the 
system itself is not able to proactively recognize own limits of capability, the driver has 
to constantly monitor the driving scene to be ready to take over driving action if needed. 
Examples for partial driving automation applications are ACC systems coupled with lane 
keeping assistance (ACC+LKA), which couples the automated longitudinal motion 
control of ACC with the lateral motion control of the lane keeping assistance system, 
parking assistance systems, which not only fulfil the longitudinal but also lateral motion 
control, or traffic jam assistance, which performs the motion control of the vehicle in the 
limited use case of a traffic jam. 
Vehicles equipped with “conditional driving automation” (level 3) capability are able to 
perform the entire dynamic driving task within a limited scope of use cases, including 
monitoring of the driving environment. The human driver acting as the system´s fallback 
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has to be vigilant to intervene and take over the dynamic driving task in a timely manner 
if the automated driving system recognizes own limits of capability and requests human 
driver´s intervention. Hence, the human driver does technically not have to constantly 
supervise a vehicle in automated driving mode but has to keep up a minimum level of 
situational awareness. For instance, the application of the highway traffic pilot is 
classified as conditional driving automation, as the vehicle is capable of fulfilling the 
entire dynamic driving task in the use case of highway driving, but the driver still has to 
return to driving performance, if the system requests so.    
In contrast to this, vehicles with “high driving automation” (level 4) are also capable to 
perform longitudinal and lateral motion control within limited use cases but recognise 
own limits of capability and fulfil a minimum risk maneuver (e.g. parking the vehicle 
safely) in case that the human driver does not take over the dynamic driving task in a 
timely manner. The driver does not have to serve as the fallback of the automated system 
and does not have to monitor the driving scene during the automated driving mode. 
Vehicles equipped with “full driving automation” (level 5) capability are capable to 
perform the entire dynamic driving tasks within all use cases. Hence, a manually or 
remotely steering human is not required anymore. All vehicle occupants are passive 
passengers and only take the decision of strategic route planning. 
 
1.3 Relevance of the Research 
In addition to the automobile and transportation sectors per se, a number of downstream 
businesses will also be profoundly affected by the advances in connected automated 
vehicle (CAV) technology. Indeed, the insurance sector is one of the core downstream 
sectors and is acutely sensitive to the adoption of this emerging technology since it 
assumes both the individual and societal risks resulting from the use and production of 
motor vehicles. Since the insurance sector serves to protect individuals and businesses 
from the financial losses inherent in CAVs, it is a crucial requirement and facilitator of 
the introduction of new technology. Given this central role, relevant implications to this 
sector require comprehensive analysis to assess the capability and motivation of this 
stakeholder to support the introduction of CAV technology. In addition, as insurance also 
functions as a tool to indicate the financial value of inherent risks to businesses and 
society it also assumes a pivotal incentive and steering function.  
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Motor insurance is valued at € 137.5 bn (2017) and accounts for about 39 % of the total 
annual premium volume of European non-life insurance business (Insurance Europe 
2019). Measured by premium volume, it is the most important line of (non-life) insurance 
business. Therefore, any changes in the technical capability of automobile vehicles which 
influence inherent (accident) risk exposure and/or societal mobility behaviour and legal 
approaches to allocating liability, may fundamentally impact the motor insurance sector. 
As such, the strategic implications of CAV technology inter alia extend to the following 
aspects: 
• Allocation of liability: Does a shift of legal allocation of liability for accidents 
caused by automated vehicles lead to a significant shift of liability costs to vehicle 
manufacturers and consequently to a material decline of premium volume in 
motor insurance?  
• Future risk landscape: Does the expected increase in overall road safety lead to 
a sharp reduction of residual (financial) insurance risk?  
• Change of customer interfaces and market structure: Does a shift of societal 
mobility behaviour to a service-based mobility approach lead to a shift of 
customer interfaces in the (motor) insurance market?  
 
In addition to strategic questions for motor insurance, an holistic assessment of CAV 
technology impact incorporates aspects of product liability and automotive product recall 
risk. These are essential both as a means to achieve a comprehensive understanding of 
the potential impacts of CAV technology for the insurance sector, and to enable vehicle 
manufacturers and their suppliers to proactively implement adequate risk management 
approaches to cope with a changing risk landscape.  
Despite the central role of the insurance industry to the successful introduction of CAV 
technology and the extensive research needs of this stakeholder, the existing academic 
and practice-related literature on CAV technology from the insurance perspective is 
largely underserved. Nonetheless, the range of CAV academic research is constantly 
growing but currently obtains to the the following areas:  
• Aspects of ethics, dilemma-situations, and liability 
• societal and macroeconomic implications 
• impact on (intermodal) transportation systems and transportation policies 
• forecasts of societal acceptance and adoption of CAV technology 
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• accident research on the effectiveness of ADAS functionalities 
• engineering (e.g. vehicle-infrastructure, sensor) and software programming 
 
Not only is literature with a specific research focus on research needs of insurance entities 
conspicuously scarce but also is the existing academic research on CAV technology 
largely separated by the underlying research discipline. Since the impacts of CAV 
technology on insurance stem from triggers rooted in a diversity of underlying research 
disciplines, this obstructs a coherent evaluation of insurance-relevant implications.  
As the strategic aspects of CAV technology and insurance which are distinctly framed by 
separate academic research disciplines remain coherent from an insurance perspective, 
this thesis breaches the divide in the current literature by applying a multidimensional 
research approach that combines a variety of underlying research disciplines and 
methodologies. Traditionally, insurance-affiliated academic research disciplines are legal 
and actuarial sciences. While these continue to be relevant, supplementary analyses from 
such disciplines as accident research and production research can facilitate a more 
proactive assessment of CAV impacts on insurance risk. As underlying shifts in risk 
exposure and legal approaches directly affect the business model of (motor) insurance, 
the findings of these disciplines must then be assessed from a business economics and 
marketing perspective in order to devise suitable approaches for innovation and strategy. 
That said, an holistic and transparent picture of CAV technology implications for the 
insurance sector can only be construed from a proper synthesis of cross-doctoral research. 
In spite of this, the academic study of CAV technology remains fragmented to the specific 
underlying disciplines and has not been compiled from an insurance perspective so far, 
which is where this thesis contributes to the academic discussion with an holistic research 
approach.  
Much research on CAV technology´s impact on risk-factors such as accident risk has 
already been undertaken. This research is drawn up from accident research assessing the 
effectiveness of single ADAS functionalities which but mainly focusses on overall 
accident activity only (e.g. see (Avery and Weekes 2019) (Kusano and Gabler 2012) 
(Jermakian 2011) (Harper et al. 2016b) (Cicchino 2017) (Yue et al. 2018) (Blower 2014) 
(Grover et al. 2015) (Highway Loss Data Institute 2017)). Even when the perspectives of 
accident research and insurance overlap, divergent research needs arise from differing 
focus and risk metrics to evaluate CAV technology´s net risk impact. For instance, loss 
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scenarios contributing to major parts of insurance loss expenditures are not necessarily 
relevant to accident research focusing on road safety from the perspective of societal cost 
(i.e. the number of road traffic fatalities). This missing link between accident research 
and insurance-related analysis limits the exchange of research findings from accident 
research into insurance-related insights. This is especially problematic since (motor) 
insurers are the central stakeholders assuming financial risks resulting from CAV 
technology. A further limitation in the existing literature is linked to the fact that academic 
research on the effectiveness of CAV technology in reducing the number of accidents is 
generally limited to single ADAS functionalities with lower automation levels (i.e. 
Automated Emergency Braking and Lane Keeping Assistant). As such, extant research 
only presents findings for CAV technology already penetrated into the market but is not 
useful to reduce ambiguity in assessing the risk-factors of automated vehicles with higher 
levels of automation capability (Pütz et al. 2019). In this case, the existing literature to 
date remains at a very initial stage, using flat as unproven, and arguably biased 
assumptions of CAV risk-factors.  
Existing practice-related literature focusing on CAV risk-factors from an insurance 
perspective is dominated by publications from two author groups. On the one hand, 
consultancy firms introduced forecasts on the impact of CAV technology on motor 
insurance market premiums with a prediction of sharply decreasing premium volumes 
due to a significant expected decline in the number of road accidents (KPMG 2016) 
(Morgan Stanley and Boston Consulting Group 2016). On the other hand, insurance-
affiliated institutions, such as the German Insurance Association (2017) offered a more 
moderate projection which underlined the persistent importance and economic legitimacy 
of the motor insurance business model. However, as the used input-variables of the 
presented forecasts are flat and the calibrations of used models are not transparent for 
most of the existing practice-related publications, it is evident that such opposing 
projections are, at least partially, biased by the business interests of the publishing parties.  
Finally, while the existing discourse largely examines the probable impacts of CAV 
technology on the risk-factors of accident risk, it faults to address the possible 
implications for secondary risks. In particular, the possible impacts on the risk of 
automotive product recalls are not yet introduced to the academic discourse. This gap is 
especially problematic since product recalls present significant financial risk to 
automotive manufacturers and their suppliers (Murphy et al. 2019). Thus, the resulting 
intransparency of inherent risk exposure inhibits the implementation of adequate risk 
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management frameworks which, in turn, hampers the smooth introduction of CAV 
technology.  
In fact, the discourse on questions of liability for accidents caused by automated driving 
vehicles is a research field in which academic and practice-related literature is already 
firmly established, both internationally and with a specific focus on the German liability 
framework. However, the existing literature in this field is mainly limited to evaluations 
of existing liability frameworks on a conceptual level by analysing general challenges of 
the different existing liability concepts such as fault-based and strict liability schemes 
(Duffy 2013) (Lohmann 2016) (Schellekens 2015) (Bertolini et al. 2016) (Rapaczynski 
2016) (Schroll 2015). Thus, existing literature tends to evaluate liability frameworks on 
a detached basis and forego adequate consideration of the practical role of motor 
insurance. This is especially problematic as obligatory motor insurance is a central 
component within the claim settlement process of motor liability claims. Thus, it must be 
understood as an integral part when analysing the suitability of liability frameworks. 
Therefore, it is essential that liability frameworks are not only analysed on a conceptual 
level but also holistically analysed by considering aspects arising from the practical 
implementation via motor insurance. As such, the granular assessment of the German 
liability and insurance framework provided in this thesis addresses a significant gap in 
existing literature, advances a more sophisticated legal understanding of liability and 
insurance frameworks for CAV technology and contributes to adequate risk governance 
in this field.  
In contrast to the existing discourse on liability aspects of CAV technology, discussion 
of the access to in-vehicle data has not yet been introduced as a relevant field of academic 
research and can also not be found for other fields of application arising with data-driven 
services in an IoT-based business environment. The research that exists in this field 
mainly focusses on implications of individual freedom of choice, information overload 
and surveillance (Dotson 2012; Brey 2017) (Rickard et al. 2017) (Martínez-Béjar and 
Brändle 2018) but largely misses academic discourse on how effective regulatory 
frameworks determining the access to data from smart devices have to be designed to 
achieve regulatory objectives such as a fair and undistorted competition. So far, the 
strategic relevance of an adequate access to in-vehicle data from an insurance perspective 
has only been addressed by practice-related literature and achieved a degree of 
transparency through discussions on the C-ITS platform in which various (business) 
stakeholders debate the technical and legal frameworks necessary for access to in-vehicle 
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data. Such discussions merely underscore the competing economic interests of the 
involved stakeholders which inhibit a joint market solution (European Commission 2016) 
(European Commission 2017) (Barbero et al. 2018) (German Association of the 
Automotive Industry (VDA) 2016) (Insurance Europe 2016). The dearth of academic 
engagement creates the potential for regulatory bodies to base legislative action on 
incomplete and/or biased information. Thus, the introduction of this key regulatory 
question into the academic discussion is essential to tackle another important gap in the 
existing literature and further contributes to a more comprehensive understanding of the 
regulatory frameworks for CAV technology.  
 
1.4 Research Objectives and Research Questions 
Even at this early stage of its technical maturity, the wide-ranging societal, legal, and 
business impacts of CAV necessitate an assessment of the potential implications to ensure 
that the various stakeholders may confront the challenges and benefit from the 
opportunities afforded by technology. In response to the gaps identified in existing 
academic and practice-related literature, this research addresses the central role of 
insurance companies for the introduction and facilitation of CAV technology and presents 
an holistic analysis of the inherent strategic implications. Due to the central role of 
insurers in assuming risks on a societal level and robust interrelation of insurance with 
the underlying legal allocation of liability, this thesis is also of interest to supervisory 
bodies and safety experts. To this end, the present research contributes to a rigorous risk 
assessment and risk regulation framework of CAV technology to facilitate a smooth and 
efficient introduction. With this overarching contribution, this thesis specifically 
contributes to  
• a farsighted and proactive customisation of liability and insurance frameworks for 
accidents caused by CAV technology which considers an adequate level of 
protection for accident victims and a reasonable allocation of liability costs; 
• a farsighted and proactive design of legal frameworks which determine the access 




• a transparent and comprehensive assessment of CAV technology´s probable risk 
impacts to enable both insurance industry and regulatory bodies to base decisions 
on a firm and unbiased ground;  
• an holistic assessment of CAV implications for the insurance sector in order to 
support insurance entities to take proactive strategic measures to adapt business 
models to a changing competitive environment.  
 
Given this contribution to the proactive strategic planning of insurance entities, certain 
strategic pathways may not be uniformly valid across the entire insurance sector. On the 
contrary, it is necessary to consider that various insurance entities have different 
characteristics (e.g. regarding know-how, risk-bearing capacity, customer groups, …). 
This implies that a differentiated assessment of the potential impacts to the specific 
market participants has to be conducted as the different characteristics induce divergent 
strategic positions, adaptivity, and courses of action to cope with chances and risks 
resulting from CAV technology.  
As required by the various underlying research disciplines, each chapter of this thesis 
applies a relevant methodology to elucidate the aforementioned research objectives. In so 
doing, this thesis contributes to the academic and practice-related discussion of CAV 
from a liability and insurance perspective by engaging with and answering the following 
research questions:  
Research Questions regarding legal aspects of CAV (aspects of liability):  
• How is liability for road accidents of automated vehicles allocated based on the 
current legal provisions? To which extent do liability costs shift to the automotive 
supply chain? 
• To what extent does the resulting allocation of liability costs lead to an adequate 
incentive function for stakeholders (preventive function of liability law)?  
• Does the current liability and insurance framework ensure an adequate level of 
claimant protection (compensation function of liability law)? 
• What changes to the current liability framework are necessary with CAV 
penetrating the market? 
 
Answers to these research questions derived from an in-depth analysis of the current 




Research questions regarding legal aspects of CAV (access to in-vehicle data):  
• How is access to in-vehicle data legally regulated today?  
• How are in-vehicle data already used and monetarised in the automotive and 
insurance market? Which use-cases for in-vehicle data exist and/or will evolve 
with the penetration of CAV technology? 
• What changes to the regulation determining the access to in-vehicle data are 
necessary to protect legitimate interests from the perspective of consumer-
protection and competition? 
 
These research questions are answered in Chapter 3 of this thesis, providing an analysis 
of the current European regulatory framework, which also integrates an assessment of 
existing use-cases and data-driven business models in insurance-related mobility services.  
 
Research questions regarding insurance-related aspects of CAV (motor insurance):  
• How will changes to future risk exposure impact the business volume of motor 
insurance?  
• How will the risk characteristics of a motor insurance portfolio change in terms 
of frequency, severity, and volatility of losses?  
• How will a possible change in societal mobility behaviour induce a shift of 
customer-interfaces in the motor insurance market? 
• How will the progressing penetration of CAV impact the competition of the motor 
insurance market? How are the single market-players strategically positioned? 
 
Chapter 4 of this thesis provides guidance on these specific research questions by 
coupling analysis of the risk-relevant peculiarities of the single levels of automation to 
accident risk with an analysis of probable implications to motor insurance risk 
characteristics. 
 
Research questions regarding insurance-related aspects of CAV (product recall 
insurance): 
• How will CAV impact the risk of automotive product recalls in the future?  
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• What risk characteristics do automotive product recall events show regarding 
frequency, severity, and volatility of losses?  
• How can product recall risks be efficiently mitigated between the involved parties 
of the insured entities and insurance companies in an holistic risk management 
framework?  
 
These research questions are answered by the research delineated in Chapter 5. This  
combines a qualitative analysis with that of historical product recall statistics to identify 
triggers of product recall risk emerging with CAV technology. This overall analysis is 
used as a basis to provide guidance on effective risk-mitigation avenues on both a 
production and financial level.   
Given the research objectives and questions outlined above, this elaboration is especially 
beneficial to the early stage strategic business planning process undertaken by insurance 
companies. Furthermore, the extensive and farsighted analysis of legal aspects, such as 
liability for CAV technology and the access to relevant in-vehicle data, supports the 
evaluation of this issue from the perspective of legislative bodies on a national and 
international level. Finally, the assessment of the potentially changing risk exposure is 
also beneficial to the implementation of proactive corporate risk management measures 




1.5 Thesis Structure 
This thesis consists of four discrete academic research papers exploring the impact of 
CAV technology from different perspectives and contributing to the single research 
objectives as outlined in the previous section. Each article has been published in a peer-
reviewed academic journal in the fields of legal studies and risk regulation, production 
research or journals dedicated to the interdisciplinary discourse of the impact of 
technological change on society. The collective thesis contributes to the academic 
discussion of legal and risk governance of CAV technology while providing strong links 
to the insurance industry as a key stakeholder. For this, the first part of the thesis (chapter 
2 and 3) focusses on legal aspects such as liability for automated vehicles and the access 
to in-vehicle data. The second part of the thesis (chapters 4 and 5) focusses on risk-related 
aspects and provides analyses of CAV inherent motor insurance and product recall risk. 
The sequencing of the chapters is designed to support the robust interrelations between 
aspects of liability and regulation of CAV technology on the one hand and aspects of 
CAV insurance risk on the other. Since the inherent liability risk exposure to insurance 
companies basically depends on the design of the underlying liability and insurance 
schemes, aspects of liability regulation are analysed first to form a basis for the deduction 
of relevant risk implications in subsequent chapters. Chapter 2 analyses the current 
German liability and insurance framework for (automated) vehicles resulting from 
different sources of law, namely the German Road Traffic Act, German Civil Code, 
Product Liability Act, and relevant motor insurance law. This chapter is based on the 
paper “Reasonable, Adequate and Efficient Allocation of Liability Costs for Automated 
Vehicles: A Case Study of the German Liability and Insurance Framework” published in 
the European Journal of Risk Regulation (EJRR). Based on an in-depth analysis, this 
article delineates societal and insurance business-related implications and addresses the 
shortcomings of the current framework. In particular, the research considers not only the 
central role of motor insurers for processing of motor liability claims but also the 
interdependencies between current liability and motor insurance law.  
The central objectives of a functioning liability and insurance framework are on the one 
hand to ensure that damaged third parties are sufficiently compensated for losses they 
suffer from malicious action of the responsible party (indemnity function). On the other 
hand, the imposition of liability also assumes an important preventive function since the 
risk of being obliged to compensate for losses should incentivise an adequate level of 
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caution. Thus, the imposition of liability is an instrument to achieve a balance between 
the level of independent and free individual action and the level of reasonable caution 
when exposing risks to society (Shavell 2007) (Faure et al. 2016). The analysis provided 
in this chapter uses both functions as guiding principles to evaluate the current 
framework´s suitability for automated driving vehicles.  
In referring to the inherent level of claimant protection, the research concludes that the 
building blocks of strict liability of vehicle owners and obligatory motor insurance 
coverage are largely capable of covering peculiarities of CAV technology. However, a 
potential reduction of claimant protection compared to today´s level results from the fact 
that strict liability of the vehicle owner is only limited and also arises from inconsistencies 
between this liability limit and obligatory minimum sums to be insured. Referring to the 
framework´s ability to reasonably allocate liability costs, the research deduces several 
barriers that hinder the efficient shift of liability costs from the owner of the vehicle to 
the manufacturer´s side. This is mainly due to motor insurers´ central role within the claim 
settlement process and the fact that the ability and the motivation to conduct subrogation 
claims could be negatively affected by a lack of technical and engineering know-how and 
because market-wide conduction of subrogation claims would erode the business volume 
of motor insurance.  
Given the focus of existing literature on higher level conceptual aspects of liability 
frameworks for CAV technology, the provided in-depth analysis integrating both 
conceptual liability and processual insurance aspects offers important insights to the 
academic discourse. This is especially because this research approach takes the  
motivational aspects of motor insurers as key stakeholders into consideration. The 
conclusions of this analysis demonstrate that prevailing opinions which maintain that 
liability costs would be fairly balanced between the owner and manufacturer of the 
vehicle by the way of subrogation claims may be overly optimistic. In addition, this 
analysis invalidates prior research positions which neglect the relevance of questions 
about the ultimate allocation of liability costs, as liability costs would flow back to the 
owner of the vehicle anyway, either by paying the insurance premium or an additional 
price component when purchasing the vehicle. Here, the analysis shows that the adequate 
allocation of cost-inflation risk is tied to ensuring an adequate incentive function of the 
liability scheme. Through these findings, this thesis contributes to an enhanced legal 
understanding of liability and insurance frameworks for CAV technology and to adequate 
risk governance in this field. Even if the provided analysis is based on the German liability 
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and insurance framework, it is also contributing to improved risk governance in the 
international context. Existing frameworks can generally be separated into schemes that 
impose strict liability to the driver/owner of the vehicle (e.g. Germany or France) and into 
schemes which allocate liability based on fault of the (human) driver (e.g. the UK). 
Stating this, especially liability frameworks (only) based on human driver´s fault are 
exposed to shortcomings when applying them to accidents caused by automated driving 
vehicles as fault would not be attributable to the human driver anymore. With an unaltered 
preservation of this approach, third-party claimant protection would potentially be eroded 
as no party would be obliged to compensate losses. In consideration of this weakness, the 
UK legislator has introduced the “Automated and Electric Vehicles Act” including 
liability of manufacturers into the scope of regular motor insurance (UK Parliament 
2018). Even when using a different nomenclature and methodology compared to the 
German legislator, the result of this approach implies the same rationale of providing a 
one-stop shop and clear path of compensation with the motor insurer as the central 
institution within this compensation process. Thus, the provided analysis in this thesis 
aids the definition of a blue-print framework which could also be used in other 
jurisdictions. This is especially important due to the need for an amalgamation of law in 
the international context as this is required to ensure a consistent level of claimant 
protection in cross-border traffic situations and to increase the transparency of legal risk 
for manufacturers distributing products in several jurisdictions. 
In addition to liability aspects, the access to in-vehicle data is an equally essential legal 
question arising with CAV technology penetrating the market and which potentially 
impacts the business model of motor insurance. Therefore, Chapter 3 analyses the legal 
and technical status quo which determines access to in-vehicle data and describes current 
approaches and legal conditions for market participants to establish digital business 
ecosystems for offering mobility- and telematics-based (insurance) services. The chapter 
is based on the paper “Connected Automated Vehicles and Insurance: Analysing Future 
Market Structure from a Business Ecosystem Perspective” as published in the journal 
Technology in Society. Insurance-related use cases are utilised to illustrate the technical 
and legal asymmetry of data access for OEMs and third-party providers and to indicate 
the strategic implications for both sides as well as the consequences for the regulatory 
objectives of an adequate level of competition and sufficient variety of service-offerings. 
This research finds that motor insurers´ ability to integrate themselves in business 
ecosystem platforms built around CAV is currently disadvantaged due to a lack of 
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adequate access to the in-vehicle data required for telematics-based services. However, 
the research also indicates that the shift of the vehicle to an interconnected smart device 
makes it necessary that automotive manufacturers (OEMs) open their business ecosystem 
platforms for third parties to maximise own value propositions. As this awareness does 
not yet appear to be reflected in adequate proactive action of OEMs, the regulatory 
objective of fair and undistorted competition is probably not achieved by market self-
regulation.  
With these findings, this chapter enriches the scope of existing academic literature on the 
legal factors of CAV technology as this mainly focuses on questions of liability only. This 
is a substantial contribution as the research indicates significant spillover effects on 
customer interfaces and the competitive environment of motor insurance. Utilising 
insurance-related use cases in the field of mobility services, the research also serves as a 
cornerstone of a broader discussion about access to data from connected smart-devices in 
an era where IoT-driven business models are significantly gaining importance. With the 
finding that a proactive opening of data access enables OEMs also to increase own value-
propositions on long-term this research supports the resolution of contrasting positions of 
key stakeholders of CAV technology. Moreover, such a finding enables unbiased and 
farsighted legislation of regulatory bodies in this field which is required to prevent that 
inadequate advantages of single actors result in market failure to the detriment of 
customers. Finally, this chapter also shows strong links to liability aspects delineated in 
the previous chapter as the analysis shows that the current legal approach of allocating 
the obligation to maintain motor third party liability insurance with the vehicle owner 
could potentially have significant spill-over effects on customer interfaces if the status of 
the vehicle owner would shift from many individuals to few commercial fleet providers. 
Based on the analysed allocation of liability in an era of automated driving vehicles, it is 
equally important to assess the future risk exposure resulting from CAV technology. As 
the insurance sector not only covers financial risks from the use of motor vehicles through 
motor insurance but also those from the production through product liability and product 
recall insurance, a comprehensive analysis of the future risk exposure has to consider 
both.  
With regard to motor insurance risk-factors, Chapter 4 comprises an analysis of the 
potential shifts of the volume and inherent characteristics of motor insurance risk induced 
by a progressive interconnection and automation of motor vehicles. This chapter is based 
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on the paper “Driving to a Future without Accidents? Connected Automated Vehicles’ 
Impact on Accident Frequency and Motor Insurance Risk” published in the Environment 
Systems and Decisions journal. Most apparently, an expected increase in road safety 
induced by CAV has a direct impact on the overall number of road accidents. If effective, 
the decreasing number of road accidents, ceteris paribus, decreases the overall loss 
expenses and, given the strong competition, would also reduce the overall premium 
volume of the motor insurance business. However, this development is by no means 
straightforward or statistically proven, and the analysis provided in this thesis emphasises 
the risk-relevant particularities of every level of automation.  
With the provided research approach, this thesis contributes to a more accurate discussion 
of CAV risk-implications which is not always conducted in a sufficiently granular and 
objective manner. In addition, the holistic assessment of the net alteration of the inherent 
risk exposure also needs to consider emerging risks such as the risk of remote cyber-
attacks or software/hardware failure of the vehicle system. Especially due to these 
emerging risks, the risk profile of the motor insurance industry could be reshaped 
particularly if cyber-attacks introduce a source of catastrophe-alike accumulation risk to 
motor third-party liability insurance. This finding broadens the scope of existing literature 
of CAV impacts on motor insurance risk from a one-dimensional forecast of overall 
premium volume with an additional perspective on possible shifts of risk characteristics 
of (residual) risk exposures. In addition, this article delineates important analyses of the 
impact of a changing societal mobility approach from a possession-based to service-based 
mobility on risk-factors and customer interfaces of the motor insurance market. Here, the 
research concludes that this shift would have a profound impact on customer-interfaces 
and the market structure as it would shift the demand-side from a business-to-customer 
polypoly (retail mass-market) to a business-to-business oligopoly market. This would 
particularly impinge on insurers focusing on private retail motor insurance, leading to 
significant strategic risks of their business model. With these findings, the research 
contributes to a proactive and farsighted strategic adoption of motor insurance business 
models and supports a more rational academic and public discussion of the potential 
benefits of CAV technology, thereby enabling an informed and evidence-based decision-
making approach by regulatory bodies and business entities.  
However, to aid a comprehensive risk-governance in the field of CAV technology, the 
analysis of motor insurance risk only represents part of the relevant risk exposure. Even 
if motor insurance is the most important line of (non-life) insurance business also other 
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business lines are potentially affected by shifts in the underlying risk landscape. This is 
especially important as adequate mitigation of (liability) risks resulting from the 
production process is acutely relevant to foster innovativeness of the automotive supply 
side. As the analysis of liability and insurance framework (chapter 2) in this thesis already 
presents strong links to this risk assessment by providing a legal analysis of inherent 
product liability risk, the following, Chapter 5 complements risk analysis by offering an 
analysis of CAV technology´s impact on the risk-factors of automotive product recall 
events. This chapter is based on the paper “The Impact of Autonomous Vehicle 
Technologies on Product Recall Risk” published in the International Journal of 
Production Research (IJPR). Considering relevant drivers from legal and technology-
related aspects, the research identifies a potentially increasing risk of product recalls 
induced by CAV technology due to the increasing complexity of vehicle hardware and 
software and an increasing legal and reputational risk if CAV technology fails. With this 
finding, the research introduces an important aspect of CAV´s inherent risk exposure into 
academic discourse, which contributes to a comprehensive academic discussion of 
relevant risk-factors. In addition to the relevance of this perspective for a transparent risk 
assessment of insurance entities, this finding also supports the proactive implementation 
of risk management frameworks for manufacturers of CAV technology. This finding is 
crucial, as the analysis of inherent risk characteristics reveals high financial and temporal 
tail-risks of product recall events. As the manifestation of extensive product recall events 
could also hamper innovation on the supply-side, the research contributes to a seamless 
introduction of CAV technology by providing risk-mitigation avenues to set-up efficient 





1.6 Description of Research Methodology 
As a discipline of academic research, insurance can be divided into several sub-disciplines 
which traditionally inter alia include: 
• mathematics and actuarial studies (e.g. for the purpose of insurance premium 
pricing)  
• legal studies (e.g. for the assessment of liability or the definition of insurance 
contract wordings)  
• business economics and marketing (e.g. for strategy and innovation or for 
structuring organisation and processes)  
• macroeconomics (e.g. for asset management decisions)  
However, when analysing the impact of CAV technology on the insurance sector, also 
additional disciplines such as accident research and production research are to be included 
in the relevant sub-disciplines of insurance-related academic research to enable a more 
transparent and holistic analysis of emerging risk exposures. To derive in-depth and 
comprehensive propositions for the implications of CAV technology to the insurance 
sector and, in particular, to the single affected lines of business, this thesis presents an 
interdisciplinary and cross-sectional analysis by combining relevant academic disciplines 
and research approaches. 
Due to the emerging character and complexity of CAV technology, a significant level of 
uncertainty and ambiguity obtains to the various technical, societal and legal aspects 
involved. Indeed, the extent of ambiguity in forecasting the impacts to the insurance 
sector is even amplified since the implications for the insurance sector rest on the 
interdependencies of different underlying triggers on a technical and societal level and as 
reliable quantitative data for the (risk) evaluation of CAV technology is scarce. Due to 
the given level of uncertainty in this field, this thesis is based on an inductive research 
approach, wherein single observations are used to generate hypotheses on the future 
impacts of CAV technology to the insurance sector. To this end, the relevant observations 
are deduced from qualitative and semi-quantitative research methods. 
In Chapter 2, current German legislation is used as a case study to ringfence any potential 
inadequacies regarding the inherent level of claimant protection (indemnity function). 
This analysis is based on a teleological interpretation of law, which describes the method 
to interpret legislative provisions in the light of their purpose and their implicit or explicit 
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socio-economic goals. With regard to the ultimate allocation of liability (preventive 
function) resulting from the current framework, the chapter uses a normative economic 
analysis of law to showcase the central role of motor insurers and a potential lack of their 
ability and motivation to forward liability costs to vehicle manufacturers. 
The same qualitative research approach of using a case study is also applied to analyse 
the legal and technical status quo determining access to in-vehicle data from connected 
(automated) vehicles provided in Chapter 3. By utilising insurance-related use cases the 
strategic relevance of the access to in-vehicle data and the current asymmetry of data 
access is illustrated. The concept of business ecosystem platforms is applied to 
conceptualise current approaches of vehicle manufacturers to broaden the scope of their 
traditional business model by also integrating (insurance-related) digital mobility 
services. Based on the findings from this analysis, a normative economic analysis of law 
is applied to evaluate the status quo from a societal and business perspective, with a 
specific focus on competition law targeting an environment of fair and undistorted 
competition.  
For the evaluation of CAV risk exposure, reliable historical data from real-world 
applications of CAV are not widely available for the determination of the potential impact 
of these vehicles (e.g. regarding accident risk or cyber vulnerability). Moreover, the high 
degree of ambiguity when forecasting the technical and social implications of CAV 
technology does not allow for precise quantification of inherent risk exposure. Therefore, 
the analysis of common-sense opinions, field testing or use of analogies from similar 
technological developments of the past, can generally be used to reduce the uncertainty 
around future projections. However, such approaches cannot be effectively applied to the 
forecast of CAV technologies risk implications as: 
• existing opinions on CAV risk-factors often appear to be biased, contradictory 
and imprecise in defining the level of automation at scope 
• each level of automation demonstrates idiosyncrasies of risk so that previously 
penetrated advanced driving assistance systems cannot necessarily be used as risk 
measures for higher levels of automation 
• existing field testing of higher automated vehicles regularly rely on human safety-
drivers assuming driving-responsibility in case of critical incidents and 
intransparency of risk-relevant data does not allow independent or objective 
assessment of risk-factors  
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• other automated systems are regularly used in delimited areas (e.g. manufacturing 
facilities) or show a significantly lower level of complexity than road traffic 
environments (e.g. rail or air traffic systems)  
 
Due to the extent of ambiguity tied to these shortcomings, this thesis does not aim to 
precisely quantify potential implications on CAV risk, but rather to provide overall 
guidance of CAV technologies´ net risk balance. As such, a qualitative and semi-
quantitative research approach is equally suitable to increase transparency about CAV´s 
overall future risk balance, enabling business and regulatory bodies to make farsighted 
decisions on a better-informed basis. For the analysis of CAV´s impact to the motor 
insurance risk exposure in Chapter 4, statistical data available from the German Insurance 
Association (GDV) and the German Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin) is 
used to assess the inherent current insurance risk characteristics of the covered risks by 
means of frequency and severity. Data on the German market is also of use to examine 
other motor insurance markets as the scope of the single risks covered under German 
motor insurance policies is similar to that of insurance policies in other countries and as 
road traffic risk, with the limitation of minor peculiarities (e.g. from diverging liability 
law), is largely comparable to equally developed countries. On this basis, a qualitative 
assessment of the accident risk of single levels of automation is based on a literature 
review and by analysing the limited available risk-indicators for human-driven and 
automated driving vehicles accident risk. This assessment also includes an analysis of 
indirect risk triggers such as a shift in societal mobility approach from possession-based 
to service-based mobility. To deduce a comprehensive understanding of risk implications, 
potentially emerging risks are also qualitatively analysed in terms of inherent insurance 
risk exposures. 
For the assessment of CAV´s potential impact on the risk of automotive product recalls 
in Chapter 5, an in-depth qualitative analysis of relevant risk drivers is conducted and 
supported by evidence from an analysis of historical product recall patterns. In this case, 
automotive product recalls due to sensors, software and electronic control units are used 
as a proxy to indicate the increasing relevance of these components for overall product 
recall activity in an era of automated driving vehicles.  
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1.7 Concluding remarks 
The insurance industry is a central stakeholder of CAV technology and (a lack of) this 
industry´s contribution could either facilitate or hamper its seamless introduction. The 
introduction part of this thesis has described the manifold strategic levels on which CAV 
technology potentially affects insurance business models which is why an holistic 
analysis of relevant implications requires an interdisciplinary research approach. At the 
same time, it has been delineated that these implications are not only relevant for insurers 
from a business perspective, but also have significant intersections with academic 
research so that both perspectives are mutually stimulating each other. Despite the 
extensive research needs in the field, the existing discourse is still limited and fragmented 
to the single underlying academic research disciplines but not merged and transferred to 
be useful from an insurance perspective. To bridge this gap, this thesis offers a 
multidimensional research approach that combines insights from different research 
disciplines and research methodologies. Thus, each of following chapters represents a 
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Reasonable, adequate and efficient allocation of liability costs for automated 
vehicles: A case study of the German liability and insurance framework 
 
Abstract 
In general, a functioning liability and insurance framework should ensure an adequate 
level of third-party claimant protection and a reasonable and adequate final allocation of 
liability costs for the involved parties. This research examines whether the liability and 
insurance framework resulting from the amendment to German Road Traffic Act meets 
these two central objectives. The article shows that a reasonable and adequate allocation 
of liability costs is inhibited because of several barriers that hinder the shift of liability 
costs from the owner of the vehicle to the manufacturer. In particular, it is highly 
dependent on the practical application of subrogation claims. The ability and the 
motivation of motor insurers to conduct subrogation claims could be negatively affected 
because of a lack of required technical and engineering know-how and because a market-
wide conduction of subrogation claims would erode the business of motor insurance. This 
article proposes changes to the current framework particularly by removing specific 
exclusions of product liability and by easing the burden of proof of a product defect.  
 
I. Introduction 
The progressive technical development in the field of advanced driving assistance 
systems (ADAS) and automated driving makes it feasible that motor vehicles with a high 
level of automation will be ready for market within the next decade. The vision of 
automated vehicles on public roads not only depends on technical progress but also 
requires an adequate liability framework to ensure legal certainty for the relevant 
stakeholders on both the demand and supply side.  
Several national legislators have recognised the need for adjustments and are currently 
discussing amendments to existing liability laws (e.g. see draft law amendment in the UK 
(Butcher et al. 2017)). The German legislative body has already implemented an 
amendment to the existing Road Traffic Act (Straßenverkehrsgesetz (StVG)). This 
amendment sets legal requirements for the operation of highly and fully automated 
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vehicles4 and mainly preserves the existing liability and insurance framework, 
characterised by a combination of strict liability of the vehicle owner5 and fault-based 
liability of the (human) driver. This liability framework is coupled with obligatory 
insurance to be maintained by the owner covering liability costs of himself, the driver and 
the titleholder of the respective vehicle. Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) are 
not directly included into the legal framework and the legislator expects that motor 
insurance companies examine and conduct subrogation claims under existing product 
liability law in the case that a defect of the automated driving system causes an accident.  
In general, a functioning liability and insurance framework should meet two central 
objectives. In the external relationship to the damaged third-party, the design of the 
framework has to ensure an adequate level of claimant protection. In the internal 
relationship between the liable parties, a reasonable and adequate ultimate allocation of 
liability costs fulfils an important incentive function for the involved parties. On a more 
abstract level, the retrospective allocation of liability costs also has a preventive function, 
aiming to achieve a balance between the level of independent and free individual action 
and the level of reasonable caution and care when exposing risks to the society (Shavell 
2007) (Faure et al. 2016).   
Because the progressive automation of motor vehicles will successively reduce the 
relevance of the owner and human driver for the occurrence of road accidents, we use the 
liability and insurance framework resulting from the amendment to the StVG in Germany 
as a case study to analyse whether this framework adequately ensures these two central 
objectives.  
This issue has already been subject to existing academic research. With regard to the 
inherent level of claimant protection, the prevailing opinion recognises the adequacy of 
the existing framework and consequently seeks to preserve the current approach 
(Schubert 2015). Referring to the adequate allocation of liability costs, Lohmann 
recognises the importance of the incentive function of liability cost allocation and 
concludes that liability costs would be fairly balanced between the owner and 
manufacturer of the vehicle by the way of subrogation claims (Lohmann 2016). That this 
 
4 The German legislative body does not follow the classification wording of SAE but uses the terminology of 
the German Federal Highway Research Institute. The equivalent levels of automation referring to SAE 
nomenclature would be conditional automation (level 3) and high automation (level 4). 
5 We use the term “owner” for the German legal term “Fahrzeughalter” and the term titleholder for the German legal 
term “Fahrzeugbesitzer”. German law distinguishes between the right of property title and the right of disposal. The 
owner of a vehicle is the person, who owns the right of disposal and has the duty to maintain the vehicle in safe 
condition. The titleholder is the person or institution formally owning the property title of the vehicle. 
31 
 
assumption could be too optimistic and not hold true in the application of current product 
liability law is only slightly touched by Vellinga (2017). By contrast, Armbrüster states 
that the question about the allocation of liability costs practically would only be of minor 
relevance. This is because liability costs would flow back to the owner of the vehicle 
anyway, either by paying the insurance premium or an additional price component when 
purchasing the vehicle (Armbrüster 2017).  
With regard to these positions, we suggest a more granular analysis of the existing liability 
and insurance framework. This is necessary to show that a reasonable and adequate 
ultimate allocation of liability costs indeed is also of practical importance, as it determines 
whether insurance premiums could shift from motor insurance to product liability 
insurance. Based on this assumption, an in-depth analysis of single provisions and the 
interrelations of the different sources of law is applied, as only this makes it possible to 
deduce whether the existing framework actually leads to a reasonable allocation of 
liability costs.  
With this approach, we also find that the existing liability and insurance framework 
broadly matches the predominant goal of an adequate protection of injured claimants. 
However, we show that the high level of claimant protection could be interrupted in large 
scale accident events.  
Assessing the framework´s ability to reasonably allocate liability costs, we find that there 
are specific exclusions and limitations of liability in the Product Liability Act as well as 
shortfalls in terms of the ability of motor insurers to conduct subrogation claims against 
a manufacturer. In addition, we also find a lacking interest of motor insurers to conduct 
subrogation claims as this successively erodes the own business model.  
Ultimately, this could impede a reasonable and adequate ultimate allocation of liability 
costs, which potentially inhibits the crucial incentive function of liability. 
 
II. Current law regarding legal liability for automated vehicles 
Due to the progressing automated driving capability of motor vehicles, the German 
legislative body has recognised the need for adjustments to the StVG. Therefore, an 
amendment was elaborated which came into force in June 2017. The aim of this 
amendment is to ensure a clear allocation of liability for highly and fully automated 
32 
 
vehicles (SAE level 3 and 4). Autonomous6 vehicles are not within the scope of this 
amendment.  
In general, the StVG distinguishes between two parties, which can be addressed when a 
third-party suffers damage due to the operation of a motor vehicle. While the StVG 
imposes strict liability on the owner of a vehicle (§ 7 StVG), the human driver is only 
liable based on fault (§ 18 StVG). This legal approach is coupled with the obligation for 
the owner to take out and maintain motor third-party liability (MTPL) insurance coverage 
protecting himself, the titleholder and the driver of the vehicle against liability claims 
from third parties caused by the use of the vehicle (§ 1 Law on compulsory insurance for 
owners of motor vehicles (PflVG)). In this respect, the damaged third-party has the 
possibility to directly claim against the respective MTPL insurer (§ 115 Insurance 
contract law (VVG)). 
 
1. Liability of the owner of the motor vehicle 
The strict liability approach of the German liability system is based on the legal logic that 
the usage of a motor vehicle opens an (abstract) source of risk to society. This introduction 
of risk is legally accepted but the individual who benefits from the usage of the risky 
object has to bear strict liability if the (abstract) risk becomes manifest. As well as for 
owners of motor vehicles, the concept of strict liability is inter alia applied to owners of 
aircraft, animals and operators of railways and power plants.  
The owner does not necessarily need to be the titleholder of the vehicle, as German law 
separates the right of property title determining the titleholder (§ 903 German Civil Code 
(BGB)) and the right of possession determining the owner (§ 854 BGB)7. The main 
characteristics of the owner are that he is the person who uses the vehicle for his own 
account and has the power of disposition. The owner regularly bears the operating costs 
and benefits from the use of the respective motor vehicle (Euler 2011).  
The owner is obliged to compensate for claims with strict liability (§ 7 (1) StVG). To 
ensure the ability to meet these financial obligations, the owner has to maintain obligatory 
MTPL insurance coverage (§ 1 PflVG). The strict liability of the owner for losses due to 
 
6 We use the term “autonomous” vehicle for vehicles which technically have the capability to self-reliantly 
fulfil the driving task in a comprehensive manner and do not require a (human) driver at all (SAE level 5). 
7 For example, in case of a credit-financed car the bank typically is the titleholder of the car as long as the 
debtor has not paid back the credit. However, the debtor still has the factual right of daily disposition and the 
duty to adequately maintain the vehicle as the owner of the vehicle. 
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the same event is generally limited to €5 million for personal injury and death of a third-
party and to €1 million for property losses (§ 12 (1) StVG). However, these maximum 
liability limits are doubled if the damages result from the use of a highly or fully 
automated driving function (§ 12 (1) StVG).  
The obligation of the owner to bear strict liability is only excluded where the accident is 
caused by force majeure (§ 7 (2) StVG) or if the driver used the vehicle without the 
knowledge and will of the owner, unless the use of the vehicle has been made possible by 
fault of the owner (§ 7 (3) StVG). The obligation to compensate a damaged party is 
excluded, if the injured party was actively engaged in the operation of the motor vehicle 
(§ 8 no. 2 StVG). With this exclusion, the liability of the owner for damages to the driver 
is regularly exempted. Assessing this exclusion against the background of automated 
driving vehicles, it is questionable, whether the (human) driver can still be classified as 
actively engaged in the operation of the motor vehicle. Because of the legal approach to 
ascribing the human (driver) the attribute of being the driver even while using automated 
driving functions in the scope of the intended use, it could be assumed that this exclusion 
will still be applicable to automated vehicles. This is because the driver is still in a position 
of latent engagement due to the obligation of an adequate level of awareness and 
supervision even if he does not actually fulfil the active steering task during automated 
mode (von Bodungen and Hoffmann 2016). However, with autonomous vehicles this 
exclusion should logically be void if no passenger in the vehicle can be considered to be 
(actively) engaged in the operation of the vehicle. 
  
2. Liability of the driver of the motor vehicle 
According to the StVG, the driver of a vehicle is liable up to equal compensation limits 
as the owner, if the damage to a third-party is due to his fault. For this, the fault of the 
driver is presumed (§ 18 StVG) but can be refuted by providing evidence.   
In the amendment of the StVG, the definition of the “vehicle driver” is not extended to 
the automated system but designates the human driver as the driver of the vehicle even 
for the time he does not technically control the vehicle by an active steering action (§ 1a 
(4) StVG). Within the scope of the intended use of the automated driving function, the 
driver of the vehicle is generally allowed to turn away from the traffic scene and vehicle 
control (§ 1b (1) StVG), but has to keep situational awareness to always fulfil his 
obligation to immediately (without undue delay) take over vehicle control  
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• if the highly or fully automated system so requests or (§ 1b (2) no. 1 StVG)  
• if he recognises or should recognise on the basis of obvious circumstances that 
the conditions for the intended use of the highly or fully automated driving 
functions no longer exist (§ 1b (2) no 2 StVG).  
Even if the amendment to the StVG does not explicitly differentiate between highly and 
fully automated vehicles, the legal requirements of the driver of the vehicle implicitly 
lead to a certain distinction. This is because not only the scope of the intended use but 
also the duration and extent of (legally accepted) turning away from the driving scene 
should increase with progressing automation.  
In addition, the driver is also liable under the general provisions of the German Civil 
Code, if he intentionally or negligently and unlawfully injures the life, body, health, 
freedom, property or another right of another person (§ 823 (1) BGB). The conditions of 
an intentional injury are that the damaging party acts consciously and willingly with 
regard to the occurrence of the damaging event. A person´s act is classified as being 
negligent if the person fails to exercise reasonable care (§ 276 (2) BGB).  
In contrast to the provisions of the StVG, the liability resulting from the BGB is not 
limited to a maximum amount. However, the damaged third-party bears the burden of 
proof that the preconditions of liability (intentional or negligent, unlawful action) and the 
causality between the action and the damage are met. 
 
3. Product liability  
The vehicle producer is not explicitly included in the liability framework of the StVG. 
However, even if the car manufacturer is not explicitly mentioned as a liable person, the 
explanatory memorandum clarifies that the respective motor insurance company has the 
possibility to subrogate claims under applicable product liability laws.  
As the provisions regarding product liability resulting from Directive 85/374/EEC are 
largely harmonised in the European Union, the following analysis focuses on the specific 
German implementation of these provisions in the Product Liability Act (ProdHG), 
acknowledging that producer liability can also result from either a contractual relationship 
or tortious claims under the German Civil Code.  
The provisions of product liability hold a producer liable for claims of a damaged third-
party if a defective product causes a person's death, bodily injury, damage to his health or 
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damage to an item of property (§ 1 (1) ProdHG). The liability resulting from ProdHG is 
strict.  
The scope of the ProdHG only covers property damage if this damage was caused to an 
item of property other than the defective product (ibid). Following from this, the scope of 
the ProdHG does not cover spreading defects which are defects to a functionally separable 
component part that lead to damage to the whole product. Hence, subrogation claims for 
damages to property items are only possible for MTPL insurance losses and not for 
insured losses to the own vehicle.  
Furthermore, the producer has only to compensate for damages if the item of property is 
of a type which is ordinarily intended for private use or consumption and mainly used 
accordingly by the damaged person (ibid). This exclusion is especially relevant for third-
party damages to commercially or publicly used property/infrastructure, such as 
commercial vehicles (buses, commercial trucks), buildings or traffic infrastructure, which 
are not covered by the literal interpretation of this provision. Assessing the wording of 
this legislation in the case of a car-to-car-accident event, vehicles mainly used for a 
commercial purpose would generally not be covered by the scope of the ProdHG. Today, 
the prevailing possession-based mobility approach highly reduces the relevance of this 
exclusion. Assuming that the progressive automation will promote a shift towards the 
usage of commercial shared-mobility services, the relevance of this exclusion could 
potentially grow in the future. Assuming this, it is questionable whether this exclusion is 
reasonable, because the commercial usage of shared passenger vehicles, except for the 
frequency of usage, does usually not materially differ from the characteristics of private 
usage. In addition, most companies that use vehicles for a commercial purpose generally 
do not have specific technical and engineering know-how before purchasing (automated) 
vehicles and therefore depend on the reliability of vehicles in the same way as private 
users do.  
The ProdHG defines a product as defective when it does not provide the safety that the 
consumer, with consideration of all circumstances, is entitled to expect. Relevant 
circumstances which have to be considered are the presentation of the product, the kind 
of use that has reasonably to be expected and the time the product was put into circulation 
(§ 3 ProdHG). For the legal interpretation of the existence of a defect, the objective safety 
expectations of a reasonable average user or consumer are used as a reference. The 
damaged party bears the burden to prove the defect, the damage and the causal 
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relationship between the defect and damage (§ 1 (4) ProdHG). As an easing of the burden 
of proof, the damaged party only has to prove that the defect existed at the time of the 
loss occurrence but not the temporal and local origin of the defect (Komescher 2011). If 
the damaged party can provide this evidence, the manufacturer has to prove that 
exclusions of liability are applicable. 
In contrast to the provisions of the StVG, the ProdHG does generally not limit the 
maximum liability amount for damages caused to an item of property. However, the 
maximum liability amount for personal injury damages caused by identical products with 
the same defect is limited to €85 million (§ 10 ProdHG). The application of this maximum 
liability amount is not harmonised within the European Union but if a member state 
decides to implement a different liability limit, the minimum threshold of € 70 million 
has to be applied (Council of the European Union 1985). Even if we assume that this limit 
is high enough to cover losses arising from single accident events, this limitation of 
liability could especially gain in relevance, because the interconnection of vehicles and 
the correlation of risk behavior of a vehicle fleet based on the same algorithm potentially 
induces accumulation risk, where multiple accidents could cause personal injury damages 
in excess of the implemented threshold. In this case, it would be unreasonable if 
exceeding loss amounts were to shift back to either the insured owner or the damaged 
third-party.  
Furthermore, the obligation to compensate for property damage under the ProdHG only 
applies if the respective damage exceeds a threshold of € 500 (§ 11 ProdHG). Hence, 
motor insurers could not subrogate property losses that do not exceed this threshold. 
Under current regulations, this is understandable as legal and procedural costs induced by 
conducting of subrogation claims could easily exceed this threshold and lead to economic 
inefficiencies. We expect that this threshold should not lead to a material inadequate 
allocation of liability costs from a macro-level view on the overall insured portfolio, as 
MTPL losses below this threshold account for only 0.43 % (2015)8 of all insured MTPL 
loss expenditure. However, from the perspective of the individual insured person, not 
being able to conduct a subrogation claim because of the minimum threshold can have 
adverse consequences because of the impact to the individual insurance premium, which 
is commonly based on a no-claims bonus system in the German market.  
 
8 Share of loss expenditures for MTPL-losses, which do not exceed the threshold of € 500, from total loss 
expenditures for MTPL-insurance in the year 2015. Source: German Insurance Association.  
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In addition to the limitation of maximum liability amounts for personal damages and the 
deductible for property damages, the liability of the manufacturer inter alia is generally 
excluded if, under consideration of all circumstances, it is probable that the defect which 
caused the damage did not exist at the time when the producer put the product into 
circulation (Article 1 (2) no. 2 ProdHG). 
This exclusion is relevant as the capability of automated vehicles will likely not be static 
but could be altered by (over-the-air) software updates so that the inherent accident risk 
exposure fluctuates over time. However, the provisions of the ProdHG generally do not 
oblige the producer to monitor the circulated product after sale. Therefore, it should be 
discussed whether the temporal attachment point of putting the product into circulation 
has to be renewed with every (material) change to the product functionality. On a 
technical side, this discussion has also to be supported by vehicle approval authorities 
with setting guidelines defining material changes to system functionality, which require 
a repeat process of type approval test. If the temporal attachment point of product 
circulation would not be renewed with every (material) change, residual technological 
development risk would fall back to the owner of the vehicle, who is liable with strict 
liability.  
In addition, the legal provision that claims based on the ProdHG expire ten years from 
the time when the producer put into circulation the product which caused the damage 
(Article 13 ProdHG) could also lead to a shift of residual technological risk to the owner 
of the vehicle. This exclusion will not be relevant in the first years with automated 
vehicles on the road but in case that an automated vehicle which is older than ten years 
causes an accident.  
Finally, the liability of the manufacturer is excluded if the state of scientific and technical 
knowledge at the time when the producer put the product into circulation was not such as 
to enable the detection of the defect (Article 1 (2) no. 5 ProdHG). To apply this exclusion 
of liability it has to be objectively referenced against the scientific and technical 
knowledge which was generally accepted and available at this time. This exclusion is 
potentially important with the progressing automation of modern vehicles because 
general standards and sufficient case law decisions for programming driving algorithms 




III. Adequacy of the existing liability and insurance framework for autonomous 
vehicles 
Based on the description of the different sources of liability of the owner and driver of a 
motor vehicle on the one hand and the producer on the other, the resulting liability and 
insurance framework is depicted in Figure 2.  
Even if a claim of a damaged third-party against the producer is legally possible, the 
dashed line reflects the associated higher financial and organisational effort required. 
Hence, the damaged third-party will rather not use this path if the claim is sufficiently 
compensated by a direct claim against the motor insurer due to the strict liability of the 
owner. 
 
Figure 2: German liability and insurance framework for losses caused by (highly and 
fully automated) motor vehicles. The figure depicts an overview of the several sources 
of liability of the involved parties in case of losses due to road accidents.  
 
Today, above 90 % of all road accidents are caused by human error. Therefore, an 
investigation of the product liability claims is very low in the (German) motor insurance 
market. However, with the progressive automation of motor vehicles and a shifting 
responsibility for the causation of accidents to OEMs and their suppliers, the 
interdependencies of the current liability and insurance framework and regulations 
regarding product liability have to be assessed and aligned to create a consistent and 
adequate framework for automated vehicles. 
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In the following, we analyse the adequacy of the existing liability and insurance 
framework for automated and autonomous vehicles based on the following criteria of 
assessment: 
• Protection of the claimant: Does the current framework adequately ensure the 
protection of the damaged (third-party) claimant?  
• Responsibility-based allocation of costs: Does the current framework 
adequately allocate liability costs to the responsible party? 
• Cost-efficiency of the claims process: Does the current framework ensure a cost-
efficient allocation of liability costs? 
Within this analysis, we make suggestions for adjustments to the liability and insurance 
framework that would ensure higher adequacy for the categories analysed.  
 
1. Protection of the claimant 
The central idea of the existing (strict) liability and insurance framework is to ensure an 
as high as practicably possible level of protection for the damaged third-party claimant. 
Claimant protection must be evaluated as a two-stage process considering the maximum 
extent of (financial) protection and the required processual effort to achieve this 
compensation. Hence, the following analysis assesses the easiness of the claims process 
(e.g. regarding the speed of the process, clarity of relevant institutions to contact and the 
burden of proof) and the material (maximum) compensation to the claimant.  
The central idea of claimant protection from a processual point of view is anchored with 
the strict liability of the vehicle owner, obligatory MTPL insurance and the possibility to 
direct claim against the respective motor insurer. The strict liability of the owner and the 
possibility to claim directly against the motor insurance company is a generally proven 
process that ensures a clear path for compensation from the motor insurer as the central 
institution, which comprehensively compensates justified liability claims for all probably 
liable parties. In fact, this strict liability approach is also practicable with automated 
vehicles, so that it can serve as a blueprint for other countries´ legal approaches, which 
are based on the fault of the human driver (Duffy 2013). That said, the strict liability 
approach has to be embedded into a well-functioning and robust insurance market to 
effectively protect third-party claimants. 
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The preservation of the current process for automated vehicles in large part will assure 
claimant-friendly processing of liability claims with respect to the speed of the process 
and clarity about the relevant institutions. This is supported by legislation, which 
generally limits the period for processing claims to three months (§ 3a PflVG). Therefore, 
speedy processing of third-party claims is supported by the legal environment. However, 
the adequacy of the current framework for autonomous vehicles will only guarantee a 
high level of claimant protection if the maximum material compensation covered by this 
process is also adequately determined.  
On the one hand, it could be argued that the current framework generally does not reduce 
the compensation of a claimant damaged by an automated vehicle. This is because the 
doubling of the maximum liability limits for owner´s strict liability increases the 
maximum achievable compensation that can be claimed without providing evidence of 
fault. The legislator inter alia rationalises the need for an increase, because the fault-based 
unlimited liability of the (human) driver may not apply where the accident is caused by a 
technical failure of the automated driving function.  
That said, it is questionable whether the increase of maximum liability amounts will 
adequately replace the unlimited fault-based liability of the (human) driver and 
adequately ensure the protection of the claimant for severe loss scenarios. This is because 
the current approach of applying the liability of the owner and (human) driver, which are 
covered by motor insurance, on a first level and the possibility to subrogate claims under 
product liability law only on a second level procedurally separates the damaged third-
party from claims against the manufacturer. This separation could turn out to be 
disadvantageous if the claimant is only compensated up to the lower limitations of strict 
liability of the owner, even if the manufacturer is held liable during the subrogation claim 
process of the motor insurer. 
With a limited financial tail-risk of single insured MTPL losses on a portfolio basis, we 
expect that the great majority of accidents will be sufficiently covered by the increased 
maximum liability amounts. However, single accident occurrences have already shown 
that possible maximum losses for MTPL insurance can greatly exceed the applicable 
threshold. For instance, this can be illustrated by the highest recorded MTPL insurance 
loss, where due to the fault of the driver, a vehicle crashed with a train, which derailed 
and crashed into another train. Ten people died and about 80 were injured leading to an 
insured loss of about € 30 million.   
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If this accident had been caused by an automated vehicle, the claimant would 
(additionally) have to claim against the manufacturer under applicable product liability 
laws for losses, which exceed the maximum compensation amounts of the StVG. This 
would expose the claimant to higher legal costs and effort. In turn, this potentially hinders 
claimants from claiming for compensation that exceeds the maximum liability limits of 
the StVG, even if those claims would be legally justified. In doing so, the current 
framework could contravene the principle of a one-stop-shop approach and hence reduce 
the level of claimant protection with regard to the required processual effort to claim for 
adequate material indemnification.  
Therefore, policy sets may be improved by a further increase of maximum liability 
amounts for owner´s strict-liability. This approach is also imperative from a societal point 
of view because the limitation of maximum liability amounts would otherwise potentially 
result in disproportionate residual legal risk and uncertainty of compensation to damaged 
third parties. From an insurance market point of view, this should not be problematic, as 
commonly sums insured in the German market greatly exceed the liability limits of the 
StVG9 anyway. 
 
2. Responsibility-based allocation of liability costs  
With automated vehicles on the road, the responsibility for the causation of road accidents 
will successively shift from the human driver to the automated system itself. Therefore, 
only accidents that are caused by inadequate maintenance (e.g. missed software-updates) 
of the automated vehicle can be attributed to the owner´s sphere of responsibility 
(Bertolini et al. 2016). With autonomous vehicles, which do not need a human driver 
anymore, the fault of the human driver will not longer be a relevant contributing factor to 
accident occurrences. The owner of the vehicle will only be left with the possibility to 
influence the risk of the vehicle through a reasonable effort to maintain the physical 
components of the vehicle and update the autonomous system´s software. Hence, it is 
expected that the share of accidents which potentially fall under the applicability of 
product liability will increase (German Ethics Committee 2017).  
That said, the preservation of the strict liability approach for automated vehicles is 
systemically consistent with the legal logic that the owner of the vehicle, from whose use 
 
9 Commonly sums insured in the German motor insurance market are limited to € 100 million. 
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the owner benefits, opens a source of risk to society. Hence, the owner of the vehicle will 
ultimately bear the residual risk of liability, which legally cannot be attributed to the 
manufacturer or other potentially liable parties. However, the owner´s only limited 
possibility to influence the risk exposure of the vehicle makes it necessary to reconsider 
the balance of liability cost allocation between the owner and manufacturer of the vehicle 
in favor of the owner. 
From a macro-level view, which does not consider the allocation of liability costs after a 
specific insured loss event, it could be argued that the owner of the vehicle will ultimately 
carry liability costs anyway, either directly by paying insurance premiums or indirectly 
through an additional price component when purchasing a vehicle. This price component 
then accounts for the product liability risk of the manufacturer (Armbrüster 2017). 
However, this argument only ensures that liability costs are adequately attributed to a 
superordinate entire portfolio (e.g. homogenous portfolio of insured or portfolio of buyers 
of certain vehicles) but not that liability costs are also adequately allocated on an 
individual basis (e.g. impact on no-claims discount on individual insurance contract).  
Furthermore, this perspective does not consider the allocation of expense inflation risk to 
the owner or manufacturer. In case that the owner pays an additional premium when 
purchasing the vehicle, the risk that the premiums are not sufficient to meet liability 
claims is shifted to the OEM. By contrast, if the owner of the vehicle is still obliged to 
pay obligatory motor insurance premiums, the risk of expense inflation indirectly remains 
with the owner of the vehicle, as it iteratively flows back via insurance premium 
adjustments. In addition, allocating liability costs to the producer, who adds these costs 
as an additional premium to the vehicle price, would ceteris paribus mean that less 
reliable vehicles are in turn more expensive, which in turn reduces the marketability of 
unreliable vehicles. In this way, the allocation of liability costs to the producer would 
support a more prudent testing approach of manufacturers before placing their vehicles 
on the market (Marchant 2012). 
It could further be argued that a responsibility-based allocation of liability costs for a 
specific accident event is generally applied by the current framework because the motor 
insurer covering owner´s strict-liability in the external relationship to the damaged third-
party can regress claims from the producer under applicable product liability laws. Where 
this subrogation claim is successful, the liability costs are ultimately born by the producer. 
In doing so, the design of the liability and insurance framework has to ensure that the 
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residual risk of owner´s liability is not inadequately increased by the design and 
conditions of the subrogation claim process. For this, the extent of reasonable and 
adequate allocation of liability costs depends on the willingness and the ability of the 
motor insurer to conduct subrogation claims under the current product liability laws.  
The current scope of MTPL insurance is only limited to the satisfaction of justified claims 
and the rejection of unjustified claims (“passive legal protection”, see § 2 (1) Regulation 
on insurance cover in motor vehicle liability insurance (KfzPflVV)). In contrast, MTPL 
insurance does not cover the owner´s interest in law enforcement against other parties 
(“active legal protection”). If a motor insurer settles a justified MTPL claim and the 
insured is entitled to reclaim damages from another third-party, the claim of the insured 
is assigned to the motor insurer to the extent that the motor insurer already compensated 
the third-party claimant (“cession of right”, see § 86 VVG). Hence, the insured currently 
has neither a legal nor contractual right within the applicable law (§ 2 (1) KfzPflVV) and 
standard motor insurance wording that would oblige the insurer to conduct a subrogation 
claim against the vehicle producer or automotive supplier. This is not problematic for 
manually driven vehicles because subrogation claims to third parties do not play a 
significant role and do not affect the overall achievable premium volume of the motor 
insurance market. Thus, conducting subrogation claims against third parties is in the best 
(economic) interest of both the insured and motor insurer, as this prevents adverse impacts 
to the individual insurance contract of the insured and also lowers claims expenses and, 
in turn, improves underwriting results of the insurer.  
This alignment of interest could decrease because the increasing relevance of subrogation 
claims successively erodes the presence of insurance risk, which is a crucial precondition 
of the motor insurance business model. Given the market-wide importance of motor 
insurance business volume, this potential conflict of interest is especially relevant in the 
case that a motor insurance company has not proactively initiated a structural change to 
reduce the dependency on contribution margins from MTPL insurance for the financing 
of companies´ overhead costs. Hence, assuming that a progressive shift of liability costs 
on a superordinate portfolio or market level decreases the overall achievable premium 
volume, the motor insurer may be less likely to conduct subrogation claims. To ensure a 
reasonable and adequate allocation of liability costs, we propose an expansion of the 
obligation of a motor insurance company to conduct subrogation claims in favor of the 
insured party. However, this would augment the scope of MTPL insurance with a certain 
degree of active legal protection.  
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In addition to the willingness of the insurer to conduct subrogation claims, the ability of 
an insurer to do so depends on the legal and technical know-how and the availability of 
relevant (telematics) data. These resources are required to be able to provide evidence 
that the conditions of product liability are met. The burden of proving the presence of a 
product defect could be difficult, especially for accidents caused by software failure of an 
automated vehicle. This problem is increased by the current limited technical and 
engineering know-how, which is required and therefore maintained by insurance 
companies to underwrite retail motor insurance business today. This could lead to the 
outcome that a subrogation claim against an OEM is not conducted due to a lack of 
technical expertise and the unknown probability of success. This, in turn, could lead to 
inadequate allocation of liability costs at the expense of the insured owner of the vehicle.  
Furthermore, the possibility of the motor insurer conducting subrogation claims against 
the manufacturer of the vehicle is also limited, if the potential exclusions of product 
liability described in section II.3 are applicable. This especially holds true for damages to 
own vehicles, which are generally not covered by the provisions of the ProdHG. 
 
3. Cost-efficiency of the claims process 
Regardless of the question of the current framework´s ability to allocate liability costs for 
accidents in a responsibility-based manner, the owner of the vehicle and even producers 
are indirectly exposed to adverse economic consequences if the process of allocating 
liability is not structured efficiently and unnecessarily causes additional processual and 
legal costs. 
Generally, the combination of strict liability with mandatory MTPL insurance and the 
opportunity to claim directly against the motor insurer is appropriate to satisfy claims of 
a third-party arising from manually driven vehicles with low processual costs. This is 
reflected by average cost ratios of about 17.9 %10 in the German motor insurance market. 
However, the efficiency of the current framework´s claims process is mainly based on the 
fact that the owner of the vehicle and the driver are ultimately almost exclusively liable 
for third-party losses caused by the usage of the insured vehicle. Therefore, the claimant 
directly contacts the respective motor insurance company as the institution, which also 
ultimately bears liability costs. Further litigation and subrogation claims11 are only rarely 
 
10 Source: Own calculation based on data from German Insurance Association (GDV) 
11 Today, subrogation claims in the motor insurance business are mainly relevant for cases where one of the insured 
parties breaches contractual obligations that have to be fulfilled before or after a loss occurrence.  
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conducted by the motor insurer after the direct claim process of the damaged third-party 
(Schroll 2015).  
However, the idea that the motor insurer is the central institution to claim and to absorb 
liability costs holds true for manually driven vehicles, where more than 90 % of all 
accidents are caused by human error, but this could change for higher automated vehicles 
if product liability becomes more relevant. Hence, even where liability costs can 
adequately be allocated through subrogation claims of the motor insurance company after 
a single accident event, the owner of a vehicle maintaining MTPL insurance still has to 
pay for internal overhead-costs (e.g. claims-handling, execution of the subrogation claim) 
and safety margins for residual legal risk. These are accounted for in the motor insurance 
premium.  
From a macro-level perspective of both the motor insurer and producer, the two-step 
approach of paying the claim of the damaged third-party first and finally allocating 
liability costs by the way of subrogation claims potentially causes significant additional 
legal costs, which have to be absorbed by either the producer or motor insurance 
company. Ultimately, these costs are carried by the consumer either as the insured or 
purchaser of a car.  
Hence, unaltered preservation of the current framework could turn out as inefficient, at 
the latest with autonomous vehicles on the road. Therefore, simplifying the process of 
conducting subrogation claims for an MTPL insurer, for instance, with a refutable 
presumption of a product defect where a vehicle caused a crash in automated driving 
mode, would reverse the burden of proof to the manufacturer and could increase the 
efficiency of subrogation claims. This is because legal costs would only incur in case that 
OEMs can provide evidence that the accident was caused by the fault of the owner or 
human driver (e.g. inadequate maintenance, unintended use, etc). Consequently, only 
those accidents which are verifiably caused by the fault of the owner would be taken to 
court. As we assume that this will be the minor share of all accidents, legal and processual 
costs should be reduced. 
In addition, we have described how a lack of insurers´ ability or willingness could lead to 
inadequate allocation of liability costs. This is the case if motor insurers, either due to a 
lack of technical and legal know-how or because of a lack of motivation, fail to prove 
producer´s liability where the conditions of producer´s liability are actually fulfilled. 
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Here, refutably presuming a product defect could also support liability costs being 
allocated based on the factual responsibility for loss causation in a specific loss event.  
 
IV. Conclusion 
Our analysis of the appropriateness of the current insurance and liability framework 
shows that it largely ensures adequate protection for third-party claimants also for 
accidents caused by automated vehicles. Hence, this approach could generally be used as 
a blueprint for other jurisdictions, which base liability on the fault of the (human) driver. 
This, in turn, would also lead to a unification of different liability systems in the European 
Union and support the cross-border use of automated vehicles and, in particular, unify the 
legal requirements for the automotive supply side. Only minor adjustments, like the 
further increase of maximum liability amounts for owner´s strict liability, are suggested 
to increase the level of claimant protection also for accident scenarios with extraordinary 
high cumulated loss amounts. With this approach, the general structure of the liability 
framework shown in Figure 2 would also be suitable for automated vehicles so that a 
damaged third-party would be comprehensively protected with the existing possibility to 
claim directly against the motor insurer12.  
Next to an adequate level of claimant protection, a central function of the liability and 
insurance framework is to allocate liability costs in a reasonable manner. In contrast to 
existing academic literature, we show that a reasonable and adequate allocation of liability 
costs is inhibited because of several barriers that hinder the shift of liability costs from 
the owner of the vehicle to the manufacturer. We outline that this shift is highly dependent 
on the practical application of subrogation claims and show that the ability and the 
motivation of motor insurers to conduct subrogation claims is potentially negatively 
affected because of a lack of required technical and engineering know-how and 
insufficient motivation to do so. This is because a market-wide conducting of subrogation 
claims would, in the long-term, erode the business of motor insurance. In addition, our 
in-depth analysis of specific provisions of the ProdHG also shows that exclusions and 
limitations of liability within this source of law potentially inhibit subrogation claims and 
thus a reasonable and adequate allocation of liability costs. In this case, the preservation 
 
12 With this approach, the procedure to directly claim against the producer shown with the dashed line in 
Figure 2 would not required with automated vehicles on the road. 
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of the current liability and insurance framework would inadequately conserve a 
predominant allocation of liability costs to the vehicle owner.  
We show this circumstance as problematic because it not only impedes the incentive 
function for automotive manufacturers to maximise the inherent safety of their products 
but also allocates an unreasonable exposure of residual liability risk to the vehicle owner. 
Thus, we forecast that changes already made through the amendment to the StVG are not 
sufficient to meet the characteristics of automated driving vehicles. As outlined in our 
analysis, we propose revising the ProdHG to  
a) increase the limitation of liability for personal injury losses;  
b) set clear legal standards for testing and validation to support a consistent 
interpretation of the exclusion that the defect was not detectable with the application 
of state-of-the-art methodologies;  
c) address the definition of the temporal attachment point of product circulation;  
d) address the threshold of € 500 for product liability losses; and  
e) amend the requirement that the damaged item has to be ordinarily intended for 
private use or consumption. 
However, we also see the point that the feasibility of proposed changes based on legal 
theory potentially conflicts with the practical enforceable legal policy, which is 
influenced by the interests of single stakeholder groups. In particular, insurance 
companies are one of the major stakeholder groups regarding the allocation of liability 
for (automated) vehicles. Here, the future legal policy to allocate liability costs is a key 
variable determining the extent to which premium volume of traditional motor insurance 
premium could decrease or shift to product liability insurance. This could be one 
important strategic business-policy related reason why insurance companies call for a 
preservation of the current framework (German Insurance Association (GDV) 2017). 
Additionally, assuming that vehicle manufacturers generally rather avoid carrying 
financial risks resulting from accidents caused by their automated vehicles, a high 
consensus of interests would indeed exist between the motor insurer and the vehicle 
manufacturer.  
However, the consensus of interests also depends on the strategic approach of vehicle 
manufacturers of transforming their business model from a product-based sales approach 
to a business model which is based on comprehensive mobility-services. Some OEMs 
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already claim that they are willing to bear liability costs which are due to accidents caused 
by their automated vehicles (Volvo Car Group 2017). This would imply carrying 
insurance risks on their own account. In addition, most of the OEMs are already actively 
involved in offering their own insurance solutions, either by own risk-carrying insurance 
entities inside the OEM groups or joint-ventures and extended partnerships with 
traditional motor insurance companies. Here, the progressive connection and automation 
of motor vehicles could induce a broadening of this business activity and increase the 













Concluding statement leading the reader to the next article: 
The research conducted in this chapter provides an in-depth analysis of the German 
liability and insurance frameworks suitability for CAV technology from the perspective 
of (motor) insurers as a central stakeholder. Considering the motivation and central role 
of this stakeholder within the claim settlement process, the research findings particularly 
emphasise the interrelations of the legal framework with the business model of motor 
insurance and outlines the strategic importance of possible changes to the framework 
from an insurance perspective. Given the research objectives described in Chapter 1, the 
access to in-vehicle data is an equally essential legal question arising with CAV 
technology which shows an extensive potential impact on (motor) insurance business 
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Abstract  
The progressing interconnection and automation of automobile vehicles have profound 
implications for society and business operations. Existing business models and revenue 
streams in the automotive and transportation sector will be affected by this developing 
technology and a potential shift of societal mobility usage patterns. These disruptions will 
also have a far-reaching impact on the automotive aftersales service and motor insurance 
sector. Existing literature on the strategic impact of connected automated vehicles (CAV) 
for motor insurance mostly focusses on questions of liability and the potential impact on 
the overall premium volume of the business. Enlarging this research focus with an 
analysis of service-based mobility approaches and the emergence of business ecosystem 
platforms in the automotive and mobility sectors, this paper finds that these developments 
have significant spillover effects on customer interfaces and the competitive environment 
of motor insurance.  
In particular, the ability of traditional motor insurers to integrate themselves in business 
ecosystem platforms built around CAV is disadvantaged due to a lack of an equal 
technical and legal access to in-vehicle data required for telematics-based services. 
Referring to this barrier, this research shows that the shift of the automobile to an 
interconnected smart device makes it necessary that automotive manufacturers (OEMs) 
open their business ecosystem platforms for third parties to maximise own value 
propositions. However, as this awareness seems not to be penetrated into adequate 
proactive action of OEMs, we suggest a timely intervention of legislative bodies to 
53 
 
achieve the common regulatory objective of an undistorted and fair competition in 
telematics-based (insurance) service offerings.  
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The continuing automation and interconnection of automobiles are expected to increase 
overall road safety and to induce other societal and individual benefits like improvement 
in mobility services for impaired people or increased travel comfort (Bunghez 2015; 
Bagloee et al. 2016; Harper et al. 2016). Connected automated vehicles (CAV) -vehicles 
that can communicate with each other and with infrastructure to provide information on 
location, speed etc.- generally have the potential to profoundly impact current business 
models and revenue streams in the automotive and transportation sectors. First, this is due 
to an assumed societal change in mobility, shifting from a possession-based mobility 
pattern to a service-based usage of shared-mobility offers (Belk 2007; Eckhardt and 
Bardhi 2012; Belk 2014). Second, the opportunity to create digital business ecosystem 
platforms around the physical core product of the automobile vehicle arises from the 
interconnectedness of modern vehicles (Fagnant and Kockelman 2015; Krueger et al. 
2016). 
These changes have far-reaching implications for the automotive and transportation 
sectors but affiliated downstream markets will be strongly affected as well. In fact, the 
insurance sector is one of the core stakeholders of the development of CAV. However, 
existing academic and practice-related research on CAV and insurance mainly focusses 
on the potential impact of CAV technology to accident liability (e.g. see (Federal 
Highway Research Institute Germany 2012; Duffy 2013; Schellekens 2015; Schroll 2015; 
Schubert 2015; Lohmann 2016; Armbrüster 2017)) and the impact of CAV´s inherent 
accident risk to the overall premium volume of the motor insurance market (e.g. see 
(KPMG 2016; Morgan Stanley and Boston Consulting Group 2016; Munich Re 2016)) 
rather than its impact on current and future business models. Analyses of insurance-
related aspects of automotive mobility ecosystems have only been partially addressed by 
practice-related literature (Morawetz 2017; Catlin et al. 2018). To tackle this gap in 
existing research on a key strategic question for motor insurers, we use the concepts of 
service-dominant (S-D) logic and business ecosystems platforms as instruments to 
analyse the impact of CAV to the future competitive environment of the motor insurance 
market.  
The concepts of service-dominant logic (S-D logic) and business ecosystem platforms 
have already been used to analyse market-structure and strategic positioning in business 
sectors such as computing software and hardware (e.g. Microsoft or Intel (Gawer and 
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Cusumano 2002) or Nintendo Wii (Inoue and Tsujimoto 2018)) or mobile telephony and 
smartphones (van Alstyne et al. 2016; Tsujimoto et al. 2018). Furthermore, digital 
business ecosystem platform strategies can also be found in e-commerce (e.g. Amazon), 
online-search (Google), mobility (Uber), hospitality (Airbnb) or bioeconomy business 
(Watanabe et al. 2018). We apply the concepts to a new business sector not yet covered 
by existing literature. This is relevant to both academic and business literature as it can 
also serve as an example of how the emergence of technology can potentially disrupt 
existing business ecosystems (Naveed et al. 2017). Also, this paper shows that the rise of 
Internet of Things (IoT) applications will fundamentally reshape business relationships 
in this sector.  
By using the concepts of S-D logic and business ecosystems we show that the rise of 
CAV will have a profound impact on future competition in the motor insurance market. 
This is due in part to changing societal mobility approaches leading to a shift in customer-
interfaces in the motor insurance market. This is because the potential shift of the status 
of the vehicle owner13 from individuals to commercial businesses (Marletto 2019) would 
transform the motor insurance market from a retail mass-market (B2C with demand-sided 
polypoly) to a more B2B market with a demand-sided oligopoly. That said, however, a 
material shift to “Robotaxi” services would require higher levels of automation (level 4 
and 5).  
Additionally, CAV will impact motor insurance competition due to new (digital) business 
ecosystem platforms using in-vehicle data for innovative service offerings. The current 
legal and technical status quo for access to in-vehicle data potentially hampers third-party 
providers such as insurance companies to offer their own telematics-based services. We 
use insurance-related use cases to show how automobile manufacturers are able to 
leverage their preferred access for their digital service offering. From a regulatory point 
of view, the use cases show that the omission of legislative intervention at this early stage 
could run contrary to the existing regulatory objective of undistorted and fair competition 
with the intention to give consumers a free choice of service (European Parliament and 
Council of the European Union 2015; European Commission 2016; Barbero et al. 2018). 
 
13We use the term “owner” for the German legal term “Fahrzeughalter”. German law distinguishes between 
the right of property title (“titleholder”) and the right of disposal (“owner”). The owner of a vehicle is the 
person, who owns the right of disposal and has the duty to maintain the vehicle in safe condition. The 
titleholder is the person or institution formally owning the property title of the vehicle. 
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These aspects are already relevant for vehicles with lower levels of driving automation 
with human individual drivers owning and using the vehicles. 
This study is particularly directed to the actors in the automotive aftersales and motor 
insurance sector and presents a strategic course of action for them to position themselves 
in a changing market environment. In this way, this paper helps to bridge the gap between 
theory and practice in the field of academic research of business ecosystem platforms as 
claimed by Gulati (1998) and provides useful recommendations for practitioners and 
policy makers. In addition, this paper fills a gap in evidence-based research in the area of 
strategy development to support the analysis of service-dominant logic and business 
ecosystems with practical evidence as suggested by Vargo and Lusch (2017). While the 
societal impact of IoT-based and data-driven services has already been assessed with 
regard to their implications on individual freedom of choice and behavior (Dotson 2012; 
Brey 2017), information overload (Rickard et al. 2017) and surveillance (Martínez-Béjar 
and Brändle 2018) discussions about regulatory frameworks for these services from an 
economic market perspective are still underrepresented. Existing research from Foldvary 
and Hammer (2016) advocates that innovation in (information) technology reduces the 
risk of market failure due to a reduced information asymmetry between actors, but this 
neglects the risk of developing monopolies resulting from preferred information access.       
The paper is structured as follows: Section II provides an overview of definitions and 
existing literature of S-D logic and business ecosystem platforms. Section III analyses the 
impact of a shift from a possession-based to a service-based mobility approach to 
customer interfaces in the motor insurance market. In section IV we assess the 
competition-related implications of emerging digital business ecosystem platforms in the 
automotive sector in relation to the strategic positioning of insurers to vertically integrate 
services into these business ecosystems. Finally, section V presents a synthesis of the 
findings and provides recommendations for the strategic positioning of motor insurers as 
well as for the relevant legal bodies to take prospective regulatory action to ensure the 
achievement of fair and equal market competition.   
 
II. Definitions & literature review  
The likely shift from a possession-based mobility approach to the usage of service-based 
individual mobility introduces a paradigm shift in the approach of how automotive 
manufacturers serve their clients’ needs. Vehicle manufacturers will not only focus on 
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the production of automobiles as physical products but create value to customers by 
offering mobility services. Thus, the shift of mobility usage patterns clearly illustrates a 
shift from a goods-centric to a service-centric business philosophy. However, the 
applicability of service-dominant logic as introduced by Vargo and Lusch (2004) is 
applied to (immaterial) services but also to physical goods. Applying this to automobile 
mobility, the vehicle is simply the physical instrument that delivers the service of mobility 
to the customer.  
S-D logic is a meta-theoretical framework for the analysis of value (co-)creation and 
exchange between various actors on markets and in other networks (Vargo and Lusch 
2016). Within this new logic of service, intangibles, such as skills, information, and 
knowledge (operant resources) become critically important for value (co)creation with 
customers and other institutions (partners and competitors) in the market (Vargo and 
Lusch 2004; Vargo and Lusch 2016; Wieland et al. 2016; Vargo and Lusch 2017).  
This framework is also the basis for the analysis of (business) ecosystems. Service 
ecosystems are defined as “relatively self-contained, self-adjusting system[s] of resource-
integrating actors connected by shared institutional arrangements and mutual value 
creation through service exchange” (Vargo and Lusch 2016). This quite abstract and 
macro-level definition emphasises the reciprocal relationships of the different actors in 
the system itself, which in their entirety satisfy customers needs by integrating and 
exchanging services in the market. In the context of automobile mobility ecosystems, the 
relevant actors integrating certain resources to the ecosystem inter alia are Original 
Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs), car dealers, repair shops, breakdown service 
providers, and motor insurance companies. However, this macro-level definition does not 
explicitly take into account the specific structure of the relationships of the different actors 
to each other while creating value for customers. In particular, the definition only 
implicitly considers competitive or cooperative relationships and the orchestrating role of 
single actors. Due to the focus of this paper on aspects of strategic positioning and market 
competition related dynamics, we use the term of business ecosystems which is intended 
to be broader in orientation. 
On a macro-level, business ecosystems can be defined as networks of loosely 
interconnected entities on a market with a competitive or cooperative relationship 
(Peltoniemi 2006). On a micro-level, business ecosystems can be defined as a network of 
rather closely interacting entities, which coevolve under the guidance of a central actor 
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with the aim of providing comprehensive service offerings to customers. Moore (1996) 
defines a business ecosystem as “an economic community supported by a foundation of 
interacting organizations and individuals [which] coevolve their capabilities and roles, 
and tend to align themselves with the directions set by one or more central companies." 
In contrast to the preceding definition by Vargo and Lusch, this definition considers the 
different roles an entity can assume while acting in a business ecosystem, the competitive 
or collaborative relationship of different companies as well as the central role of single 
actors for the set up and perpetuation of these systems. Also on a micro-level, a business 
ecosystem can be defined as “an interconnected set of services that allows users to fulfil 
a variety of needs in one integrated experience” (Catlin et al. 2018). This set of 
complementary, integrated services in the respective business ecosystem follows the 
demand-side need of the target customer base and integrates either different separate main 
services (horizontal service-integration) or various supplementary downstream services 
(vertical service-integration). With this approach, the intention is to provide the customer 
with a seamless and quality-consistent experience under one platform brand. This 
integration of a whole set of comprehensive services is intended to improve the 
convenience of the customer, enabling the producer to take competitive advantage of 
strengthening relationships with its customer base (Kandiah and Gossain 1998).  
The concept of business ecosystems is closely linked to the establishment of a platform 
that “provides the infrastructure and rules for a marketplace that brings together 
producers and consumers” (van Alstyne et al. 2016). In a more granular approach, Gawer 
and Cusumano (2014) distinguish between internal platforms “as a set of assets organized 
in a common structure from which a company can efficiently develop and produce a 
stream of derivate products” and external platforms as “products, services, or 
technologies that (…) provide the foundation upon which outside firms (organized as a 
“business ecosystem”) can develop their own complementary products, technologies, or 
services.” We will use this distinction of internal and external platform strategies in our 
empirical analysis of insurance-related services.  
Referring to van Alstyne, Parker, and Choudary (2016), a platform generally comprises 
four key actors, which are  
• the “owners” being in charge of intellectual property rights and governance, 
• the “providers” serving as the (technical) interface to the consumer, 
• the “producers” providing products and services and  
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• the “consumers” using the platform for the satisfaction of their needs. 
Iansiti and Levien (2004), define the role of value dominators, which take the “task of 
connecting network participants to one another or (…) [to make] the creation of new 
products by third parties more efficient”. In the end, these actions aim to improve the 
health and prosperity of the whole ecosystem. The authors suggest a value dominator 
strategy in a business environment that is characterised by the need for complex networks 
of asset-sharing and by turbulence in (technological) innovation. In contrast to value 
dominators, entities taking the role of physical dominators absorb the complex network 
of distinct organisations (e.g. by acquiring or functional integration) and extract 
maximum short-term value from the assets under control. This strategy is suggested for 
companies acting in a market environment that relies on complex networks of (external) 
assets but is not affected by the turbulence of (technological) innovation. Analysing the 
current approaches of automotive manufacturers, we will see both value dominating and 
physical dominating strategies applied. 
The structure of a business ecosystem is acutely sensitive to external conditions such as 
technological progress and legislative action. Indeed, technological and digital artefacts 
are best understood as operant resources (Akaka and Vargo 2013) offering a competitive 
advantage to actively create a business ecosystem to the owner (see also (Lusch and 
Nambisan 2015) and (Lusch et al. 2016)). This role of technology is also recognised by 
Peltoniemi (2006) who states that new technology used by a specific entity can either 
have competitive or complementary implications to other entities inside the same 
business ecosystem. In addition to the influence of technological aspects, Lappi et al. 
(2017) also emphasise the potential impact of governmental intervention to induce 
changes to the composition of ecosystems. Here, also Teece (2007) acknowledges the 
role of (legal) provisions imposed by regulators and standard-setting bodies to limit 
unfolding of competitive forces, which will be also outlined in the following of this 
research. 
 
III. Impact of service-based individual mobility on customer interfaces 
The ongoing automation and interconnection of automobile vehicles are generally seen 
as a catalyst for the enhanced adoption of various forms of shared-mobility services 
inducing a wider proliferation of service-based rather than possession-based mobility 
(Fagnant and Kockelman 2015; Krueger et al. 2016; Watanabe et al. 2016). This 
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assumption is supported by the decreasing importance of owning a vehicle as a symbol 
of status, especially for younger (urban) generations (Bratzel 2014). Here, the increasing 
automation and interconnectivity of vehicles are enablers to provide flexible and 
convenient mobility services while simultaneously reducing total mobility costs. This 
reduction of costs results from high fixed capacity costs of today´s owner-based mobility 
approach resulting from the typically low utilisation rate of vehicles throughout the day.  
Even if these services show high growth rates,14 the current focus on urban areas and the 
low relevance for the total mileage driven, limit the current relevance of these mobility 
approaches on the motor insurance market. However, despite the relatively low relevance 
of service-based mobility concepts for the overall volume of traffic today, the 
amalgamation of the carsharing-platforms DriveNow and car2go owned by Daimler and 
BMW (BMW Group and Daimler AG 2018) indicates the potential growing strategic 
importance of service-based mobility solutions for automobile manufacturers (Boons and 
Bocken 2018; Skeete 2018).  
If the shift from a possession-based to a service-based mobility usage pattern materialises, 
there are significant implications for customer interfaces in the motor insurance market. 
This is because of liability and insurance frameworks that apply the obligation to take out 
and maintain third-party motor liability insurance to the owner of a vehicle. This is not 
only applicable to all legal systems applying strict-liability (e.g. the Germany Road 
Traffic Act imposes liability without fault to the owner of a vehicle) but also to fault-
based liability systems like the UK, which include the liability of manufacturers into the 
scope of regular motor insurance (UK Parliament 2018). Applying this to commercial 
carsharing or (commercial) e-hail taxi services, the capacity of being the owner of the 
vehicle is legally allocated to the entity providing the commercial mobility service 
(Schubert 2015). If the progressing automation of vehicles substantially facilitates the 
usage of these mobility-services, the resulting shift of the ownership status would also 
produce a shift in customer interfaces from a business-to-customer (b2c) relationship 
between the motor insurance company and the individual vehicle owner to a business-to-
business (b2b) relationship between the motor insurance company and the (commercial) 
mobility service provider.  
 
14 E.g. the Bundesverband CarSharing e.V. (Federal Association of CarSharing providers) in Germany 
indicates a growth rate of 23 % of the registered users for flexible carsharing services to 2.11 mio. people 
between 2017 and 2018. 
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Depending on the future market-structure of the mobility service sector, the number of 
clients could significantly scale down from today´s demand-sided polypoly (resulting 
from individual ownership of vehicles) to an oligopoly structure with only few mobility 
service providers which comprehensively satisfy societal mobility demand. 
Simultaneously, the motor insurance market would shift from a b2c market with a 
demand-sided polypoly (retail mass market) to a business-to-business market with a 
demand-sided oligopoly structure. This would mean a potential increasing key-account 
risk for motor insurance companies followed by the higher market power of the motor 
insurance demand side. This could foster predatory competition amongst motor insurers 
tightening the already low profitability of the (fleet) motor insurance business. Finally, 
motor insurance companies currently focussing on the retail market will have to 
assimilate competences and expertise regarding the product design, customer-services 
and actuarial pricing of vehicle fleet insurance to adequately serve the changing customer 
requirements.  
 
IV. Emergence of business ecosystem platforms 
The following explanations focus on an analysis of different approaches of automotive 
original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) to use the interconnectivity of CAVs to build 
up platforms for the integrated satisfaction of customer needs.  
Assessing the platform strategies of two different OEM groups Mercedes and BMW, we 
find that they differ from each other with regard to their competition and collaboration 
with other ecosystem producers. Referring to their role of being platform owners, we find 
that Mercedes seems to act as physical dominator by fully integrating affiliated services 
to internal platforms (“mercedesme” service platform), while BMW gives third-party 
providers access to telematics data (e.g. see BMW CarData platform). In doing so, BMW 
allows the development of external platforms and -with limitations- tends to act as value 
dominator in the respective business ecosystem, enabling third-party providers to offer 
their own services to customers. However, this value dominator approach is limited by 
the fact that BMW also provides an internal platform for the offer of (telematics based) 
services with the BMW ConnectedDrive platform. In doing so, BMW is collaborating but 
simultaneously competing with third-party providers. 
1. Physical Dominator Approach 
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In a business ecosystem built up with a physical dominator approach, the core service 
(supply of the car) of the OEM is expanded with various complementary downstream 
services offered under the brand of the OEM, who occupies the customer interface as 
illustrated in Figure 3.   
 
Figure 3: Internal mobility business ecosystem platform.The figure illustrates a possible 
internal business ecosystem platform based on the integration of complementary 
mobility services to an OEM-owned and closed business ecosystem. Source: Illustration 
based on (van Alstyne et al. 2016) and (Kandiah and Gossain 1998). 
Given the different roles in a business ecosystem platform as defined by van Alstyne, 
Parker and Choudary (2016), the strategic opportunities and threats arising from the 
emergence of internal platforms in the field of automobile mobility and telematics based 
services depends on the respective role of the actors and the specific design of contractual 
agreements for the joint value co-creation process between the owner/provider and the 
producers of the ecosystem platform. Being a service provider in a business ecosystem 
owned by a physical dominator offers the opportunity of developing new customer groups 
and to indirectly benefit from a strong brand reputation of the platform owner (Kandiah 
and Gossain 1998). By contrast, it contains the strategic threats of  disintermediation from 
the customer and of an increasing dependency from the platform owner (Catlin et al. 
2018).  
The general competition amongst OEMs and third-party service providers in providing 
various aftersales services and especially on motor insurance is certainly nothing new. 
The need for (mandatory) insurance coverage arises with the purchase of an automobile. 
Thus, insurance companies already today face the risk of disintermediation of their 
clients, as the purchase process of the new vehicle precedes the process of taking out 
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motor insurance coverage. This, in turn, limits the ability of a motor insurance company 
to directly access a potential customer just at the moment where the need for purchasing 
motor insurance coverage arises. Already today most OEMs pursue different forms of 
collaboration (close partnerships, joint-ventures) with traditional insurance companies to 
provide own-branded insurance coverage at the point of sale when selling a new car or 
arranging a leasing contract. Nevertheless, this competition between traditional insurance 
companies and the OEM business ecosystem is largely limited to new vehicles sales or to 
the period of leasing and is less relevant for vehicles bought on the used-car market. After 
the end of the duration of financing and leasing contracts, the number of contact points 
and the intensity of interaction between an OEM and customer regularly lose traction for 
insurance-related services. 
However, the increasing interconnection of modern vehicles could be a decisive game 
changer for the competitive environment. This is because OEMs recognise the 
interconnection of modern vehicles as a facilitator of telematics-based services, which are 
used to increase customer touch points and to strengthen and extend the duration of the 
active customer-relationship and the (digital) value co-creation process (Fernandes and 
Remelhe 2016). Referring to motor insurance, the possibility to access customers via a 
digital interface in the vehicle potentially expands the already existing competition 
between OEMs and traditional insurers from the new vehicle market also to the used car 
market. 
Given the expanded competitive relationship between the actors, OEM-affiliated 
insurance companies generally have the advantage to link the stand-alone insurance 
product to a comprehensive set of (physically) perceptible products and services, which 
are based on telematics data.  
Generally, competitive threats can arise from competitors from within the insurance 
industry that have a superior service offering by leveraging business networks. 
Furthermore, companies coming from outside the insurance industry that collect data 
which also can be used for concurrent service offerings with higher customer value also 
pose risks to the insurance business model (van Alstyne et al. 2016). The following use-
cases show that a mixture of these two competitive threats will be the key driver for 
insurance-related services in business ecosystems around CAV. In these use-cases, access 
to relevant data is a precondition for fair and undistorted competition in the field of 
insurance-related automobile services.  
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In the short-term, data from sensors inside the vehicle can be used for the pricing of 
telematics-based insurance tariffs that aim to link the insurance premium to the individual 
driving pattern of the driver (“pay how you drive”). Whereas OEM-affiliated insurers 
have the possibility to use in-vehicle data transferred from telematics control units 
embedded into the vehicle (e.g. see the offer of Mercedes “InScore”15), third-party 
insurers without access to this proprietary data only have the possibility to collect data 
via devices plugged into the OBD-interface (“OBD-dongles”), telematics boxes installed 
into the vehicle or via smartphone applications. However, due to the additional costs for 
installing the OBD-device hardware, a lower convenience of the customer due to a higher 
effort for retrofitting as well as lower quality and quantity of data, these solutions do not 
allow for the offer of insurance services with equal quality. 
Furthermore, extended and more sophisticated breakdown services and a proactive loss 
management approach based on (real-time) access to in-vehicle data can be offered, for 
instance, in case of the automatic or manual triggering of an eCall16. However, even if the 
legal framework for the implementation of the eCall system includes the possibility to 
transfer the emergency service to any (certified) commercial provider (European 
Commission 2012), this opportunity is currently technically limited to the respective car 
manufacturer. This is because a technical and legal framework for the design of a 
technical interface for data access by third-party providers does not exist yet. Thus, the 
technical sovereignty of the OEMs results in unequal access to relevant in-vehicle data 
and this favours the integration of data-driven services to business ecosystem platforms 
owned by them.  
The increasing relevance of OEM-owned internal business ecosystem platforms for the 
purchase of insurance coverage and related services increases the strategic risk for the 
traditional insurance market on a macro-level. However, there is also an opportunity for 
insurance companies to co-create opportunities (Whalen and Akaka 2016) by positioning 
themselves as suitable partners integrating the insurance offerings under the brand of the 
OEM. This, however, also depends on the expertise and capabilities of the OEM platform 
owner to offer insurance products without external partners and the willingness of the 
 
15 With the product “InScore” Mercedes uses access to the integrated telematics control unit of Mercedes 
A-, E-, and S-Class to offer own-brand telematics-based insurance coverage to the customer 
16 eCall (emergency call) is an automatic emergency call system that manufacturers in the European 
Union must install in all new models of passenger cars and light commercial vehicles from March 31, 
2018. In the event that the driver does not react after a serious accident event, the eCall system 
automatically issues an emergency call. 
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platform owner to foster innovation by allowing complementary service providers access 
to the own platform (Clarysse et al. 2014).   
In addition, not all insurance companies have the same technical capabilities, know-how 
and characteristics (e.g. risk-bearing capacity) to position themselves as suitable partners. 
First, this is because of the technical integration required between insurance 
administration systems and the business ecosystem platform of the OEM (Kandiah and 
Gossain 1998). Second, the increasing automation of the vehicles´ driving capability 
could increase the risk of product liability claims against the OEM. Hence, an holistic 
partnership between an insurance company and an OEM group comprises private 
insurance products for customers of the business ecosystem platform but also commercial 
insurance for risks faced by the platform owner. However, the characteristics of this 
commercial insurance risk exposure, the demands of commercial customers and the 
required know-how for underwriting these lines of insurance business differ greatly from 
private lines of insurance business like motor insurance17. As a result, only insurance 
companies that are capable of integrating these set of insurance and risk management 
services will benefit from the emergence of OEM-owned business ecosystems platforms 
and use these capabilities as their value proposition. This is because superior value 
propositions determine how actors are willing to reciprocally share and integrate value in 
a business ecosystem environment (Frow et al. 2014). This opportunity to set oneself 
apart as a suitable cooperation partner of the platform provider could offer a possibility 
to escape from the stiff competition between homogeneous firms in the motor insurance 
market today (Teece 2007). 
As this chance goes hand in hand with the risk of disintermediation of own former 
customer relationships, the value chain owned by the respective (motor) insurer would be 
cut back to the supply of backoffice processing and risk-bearing capacity, whereas the 
customer interface would be controlled by the platform owner. For retail motor insurers, 
this is especially relevant as motor insurance is generally seen as an entry-level product 
providing opportunities for cross-selling activities to other products like life and property 
insurance.  
 
17 For instance, this is because OEM groups generally operate on a multinational basis. Thus, the risk of 
product liability and/or product recall claims can highly differ within certain jurisdictions. The insurance 
company taking over the respective insurance risk has to have adequate know-how of legal systems, 
whereas private motor insurance is predominantly characterised as a national business. 
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In addition to the risk of disintermediation, the contractual agreement on economic terms 
of a partnership between the insurance company and the platform owner depend on the 
bargaining power of both entities. Due to high competition in the motor insurance market 
and the strategic relevance of this business unit, an increasing concentration of 
opportunities to access customers on business ecosystem platforms will likely foster 
insurance companies´ competition for platform owners as key partners. Given this 
distribution of bargaining power, the platform owners will likely be in a position to 
negotiate a more favourable basis for the extraction of co-created value inside the business 
ecosystem (Frow et al. 2014). 
Given the chances resulting from superior access to in-vehicle data from an OEM´s 
perspective, the exploitation of this competitive advantage with a physical-dominator 
approach might be an intuitive but not necessarily successful strategic approach in the 
long-term. Iansiti and Levien (2004) suggest a physical-dominator approach for a 
business environment not affected by turbulence caused by technological innovation (see 
section II). This might be applicable for motor insurance and automobile manufacturing 
in the analogue era but will change with the growth of digital business ecosystems around 
the connected vehicle. Thus, OEMs have to redefine their supply-chain relationships from 
a goods-dominant to a service-dominant perspective (Metallo et al. 2018). These 
relationships today are dominated by a top-down relationship with the aim of minimising 
production costs for a defined physical product. However, successful business ecosystems 
in an era of the Internet of Things (IoT) are required to leverage the creativity and 
innovation power of third-party providers to achieve a superior value proposition to 
customers and to create an advantage when competing with business ecosystem platforms 





2. Value Dominator Approach 
In contrast to the integration of services into an internal business ecosystem platform, 
single OEM companies also provide relevant telematics data to interested third-party 
service suppliers via an OEM-own server (e.g. see BMW CarData (BMW Group 2017)). 
As shown in Figure 4, this approach generally enables third parties to independently 
leverage telematics data to create own-branded services for the vehicle owner. 
 
Figure 4: External mobility business ecosystem platform. The figure illustrates a 
possible external business ecosystem platform based on the OEM acting as the supplier 
of relevant telematics data.  
Referring to the described potential strategic shortfalls of using a physical-dominating 
approach, setting up a business ecosystem platform with a value-dominating approach 
allows OEMs to not only use the creative power of the own entity or of single preferred 
partners but from several sources integrating their services into the platform. In general, 
this enlarges the network effect of the business ecosystem and increases the attractiveness 
of services offerings for (potential) customers.  
From an operational point of view, opening the business ecosystem platform for third-
party suppliers by providing them access to relevant in-vehicle data also reduces the effort 
for OEMs to manage multiple additional business units outside the own core activity, 
especially those with low margins like motor insurance. This allows them to strategically 
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focus on crucial core activities and initiatives to effectively design the business ecosystem 
platform in its entirety.  
From a monetary perspective, providing third-party suppliers access to telematics data 
against the payment of a fee also allows the platform owner to monetarise more than only 
one reciprocal relationship with a preferred collaboration partner. However, to ensure that 
third-party suppliers are motivated to increase networking effects of the business 
ecosystem platform, the pricing structure for service-integration has to leave enough 
incentive to set-up financially successful business models.   
For third-party providers such as insurers, the emergence of external business ecosystem 
platforms generally lowers the strategic risk of customer disintermediation and lowers the 
dependency from the ecosystem platform owner, as they generally have the opportunity 
to access customers on the digital platform. However, this requires that motor insurance 
companies also apply resources to find innovative services and to build systems to enable 
them to integrate service offerings. 
From a regulatory point of view, the extent of free and fair competition between OEM-
affiliated and third-party service providers to use telematics data for own service offerings 
crucially depends on the equality of available data as well as the pricing structure for the 
transfer of the data sets. Here, a pricing structure, which significantly exceeds the OEM´s 
internal costs of data storage, data processing, and data transfer, implies that third-party 
providers can only offer same services for a higher price than similar services provided 
by the OEM. Given this, OEMs which simultaneously establish internal platforms for the 
offer of telematics based services (e.g. BMW ConnectedDrive platform (BMW Group 
2017; BMW Group 2018)) could have a competitive advantage compared to third-party 
providers.  
In addition, the commercialisation of consumer data from the vehicle implies fundamental 
ethical and legal questions of data ownership. This is because the commercialisation of 
data could contradict the right to informational self-determination that attributes the 
ownership of (personal) data to the owner or user of the vehicle (Hornung 2015; German 
Ethics Committee 2017). 





3. Applicable legal framework and regulatory objectives for in-vehicle data 
access: 
The regulatory objective of equal market-competition in the field of telematics-based 
services is generally covered in European legislative guidelines for cooperative intelligent 
transport systems (C-ITS) and also discussed in the Digital Single Market- Free Flow of 
Data Initiative (e.g. see (European Commission 2017b)). The declared objective is to 
allow customers the free choice of a provider for the supply of services. This freedom of 
choice should be achieved through an “open and undistorted competition for the provision 
of these services” ((European Commission 2016), p. 72).  
In fact, the European regulation concerning type-approval requirements for the 
deployment of the eCall in-vehicle system required to be installed in new cars from March 
2018, considers the creation of “an interoperable, standardised, secured and open-access 
platform for possible future in-vehicle applications or services” ((European Parliament 
and Council of the European Union 2015), recital 16). The regulation states that the 
Commission shall adopt a legislative initiative regarding this platform no later than 9th 
June 2017 ((European Parliament and Council of the European Union 2015), Art. 12 (2)) 
following broad consultation with all relevant stakeholders. However, despite the initial 
plan for the adoption of legislative initiative in 2017, this still has not yet been 
accompanied by adequate legislative guidelines regarding the technical and process 
design of uniform access to the respective open-access platform.  
This is, in part, due to conflicting commercial standpoints mainly from OEMs and 
insurance companies as well as other third-party service-providers during the discussions 
of the stakeholder consultation phase. The OEMs favour a technical solution, where in-
vehicle data is transferred to an OEM-own server, which is then made accessible to third-
party providers (“extended vehicle” approach as provided by BMW CarData). Third-
party providers raise concerns with regard to limited and delayed access to (time critical) 
data and the potential monitoring of their activities by manufacturers and pleaded for a 
solution to ensure direct access to the vehicle ((European Commission 2016), pp. 76 f.).  
As a result, the responsible working group was not able to conclude a common approach 
to the development and deployment of technical specifications for the interface to access 
in-vehicle data as the discussions about the technical design were driven by strategic 
commercial considerations ((European Commission 2016), p. 89). Consequently, the C-
ITS platform has also not made progress on these questions during the second phase of 
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discussions as the final report mainly just refers to the different position papers of 
involved stakeholder-groups and suggest a new attempt to find a suitable agreement 
between the involved stakeholders ((European Commission 2017a), p. 77). The fact that 
the published positions papers mainly highlight the contrary standpoints during the first 
phase of discussions within the C-ITS platform (e.g. see (German Association of the 
Automotive Industry (VDA) 2016; Insurance Europe 2016; Coalition for a competitive 
vehicle service industry in the digital era 2017)) shows that it remains questionable, 
whether the different stakeholders will be able to find a common technical solution 
without the intervention of the legislative bodies. 
We have used insurance-related use cases to show that the design and integration of 
telematics-based services, such as usage-based insurance and breakdown or accident 
services, crucially depends on access to the required data. The use cases indicate that the 
current regulatory framework and the technical design of the embedded telematics-
interfaces potentially facilitate the evolvement of OEM-affiliated internal business 
ecosystems platforms at the expense of service ecosystems, which are characterised by a 
competitive integration of services also from external downstream service providers (e.g. 
motor insurance companies). As OEMs are starting to integrate telematics-based services 
into their own business ecosystem platforms, an insufficient legal framework to ensure a 
fair and equal competition favours the development of OEM-affiliated ecosystems 
providing strategic competitive advantages to them. We have also described approaches 
of keystone-like strategies of single OEMs that provide relevant telematics data to third-
party providers. However, a lack of regulatory guidelines for the definition of the 
minimum quality and quantity and adequate pricing structures for these data sets 
potentially hinders the achievement of a fair and equal market-competition. Against the 
current background of the extensive technical sovereignty of OEMs to access relevant 
data, the achievement of the regulatory objective of a fair and equal market-competition 
has to be promoted by an adequate legal framework allowing adequate access in-vehicle 





V. Conclusion, outlook and policy recommendations 
The insurance sector is one of the key downstream markets and stakeholder of the 
development of CAV. This article provides an in-depth analysis of the potential impacts 
of changing business models in the field of automobile mobility to the motor insurance 
market. In doing so, this analysis broadens the scope of existing insurance-related 
(academic) literature concerning the implications of CAV to future business models from 
a strategic perspective. In particular, we find two major drivers impacting structure and 
competition within the motor insurance market.  
Firstly, a shift towards service-based mobility models will have a significant impact on 
customer-interfaces in the motor insurance market. This is because of a change in vehicle 
ownership from many individuals to some commercial fleet providers, shifting the motor 
insurance market structure from a retail mass-market (b2c with demand-sided polypoly) 
to a b2b-oligopoly structure. Given the still overall low relevance of service-based 
mobility for the overall mileage today, the extent of this market structure transformation, 
however, will depend on the future adoption of mobility services on a societal level. If 
effective, we show that insurance companies that today only focus on coverage of retail 
motor insurance risk will have to adjust their products and service-offerings to be able to 
position themselves as suitable partners of commercial mobility-service providers. This 
means a significant shift in an industry which is highly commoditised and focussed on 
the price of the insurance but needs to build up operant resources and strategic 
partnerships with mobility platform owners. Concomitantly, it is expected that the 
decreasing number of customers shrinking from a polypoly to an oligopoly will increase 
competition for these key-accounts in the motor insurance market.  
Secondly, we use the concept of S-D logic and business ecosystem platforms and apply 
examples of insurance-related use cases to illustrate that the increasing interconnection 
of automobile vehicles will have a significant impact on insurance-related services 
offerings and processes along the whole insurance value-chain, namely distribution and 
customer interfaces, premium calculation of usage-based insurance tariffs, active loss 
management, and breakdown assistance services. We have described different 
approaches of OEMs to leverage superior access to in-vehicle data by integrating 




With this approach, we illustrate that a lack of equal access to relevant in-vehicle data 
potentially impedes the common regulatory goal of fair and undistorted competition 
between OEM-affiliated and third-party providers. This finding reflects the fact that 
regulatory agencies have the power to apply effective measures of intervention, which 
indirectly shape the composition and structure of business ecosystems (Iansiti and Levien 
2004). From a market perspective, this gives OEMs the opportunity to leverage their 
access to data, which is a crucial strategic resource in the era of growing interconnection. 
This finding is consistent with Gawer´s statement that “platforms that make it past a 
certain tipping point tend to become really hard to dislodge (…) as market share grows, 
so also grow their own barrier to entry” (Gawer 2009). This finding is also supported by 
Chakravorti stating that the challenge to dismantle a given status quo is increasing with 
the level of interconnection and size of membership of a given network (Chakravorti 
2004). Giving this outlook, we contribute to the existing literature by using the motor 
insurance sector to show evidence on how (a lack of) legislative intervention and the 
superior access of single market-players to crucial data can influence the development of 
market structures in a certain direction. Here, we provide evidence that proactive 
regulatory intervention is required to prevent an adverse impact on market competition 
and freedom of choice for customers. Although single OEMs seem to be willing to supply 
relevant telematics-data to third-party providers, the lack of regulatory guidelines for the 
definition of minimum quality and quantity as well as an adequate pricing structure for 
this data will inhibit regulatory objectives. This also leaves basic ethical and legal 
questions considering the monetisation of data from the vehicle unsolved.  
From a strategic perspective of OEMs, we conclude that taking the role of a physical 
dominator to extract maximum short-term value from the ecosystem might be an obvious 
but not necessarily successful approach on long-term. This is because the shift from a 
goods-dominant supply-chain perspective to a service-dominant perspective will need a 
profound redefinition of OEMs´ supply-chain relationships (Metallo et al. 2018). For the 
long-term success of their business model OEMs should enable third-party providers to 
integrate dynamic capabilities and innovative service offerings (Clarysse et al. 2014). 
This would also be highly desirable from a customer point of view to maximise freedom 
of choice and content diversity of service offerings and, if recognised by OEMs in due 
time, could also prevent the need for regulatory intervention (Lee and Hwang 2018). 
Concluding statement leading the reader to the next article: 
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The research conducted in this chapter provides an analysis of the legal and technical 
status quo determining the access to in-vehicle data for different stakeholder groups such 
as OEMs and insurance entities. Given the research objectives described in  
chapter 1, this article complements the research on insurance-relevant legal factors 
emerging with the introduction of CAV technology. However, as this technology not only 
shows important insurance-relevant triggers from legal factors but also from changes of 
underlying risk-factors, the following chapters of this thesis focus on CAV technology´s 
risk aspects with a devoted focus on motor insurance risk (Chapter 4) and product recall 
risk (Chapter 5). This shift in research focus is required to contribute to the overarching 
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Abstract 
Road traffic accidents are largely driven by human error. Therefore, the development of 
Connected Automated Vehicles (CAV) is expected to significantly reduce accident risk. 
However, these changes are by no means proven and linear as different levels of 
automation show risk-related idiosyncrasies. A lack of empirical data aggravates the 
transparent evaluation of risk arising from CAVs with higher levels of automation 
capability. Nevertheless, it is likely that the risks associated with CAV will profoundly 
reshape the risk profile of the global motor insurance industry. This paper conducts a deep 
qualitative analysis of the impact of progressive vehicle automation and 
interconnectedness on the risks covered under motor third-party liability and 
comprehensive insurance policies. This analysis is enhanced by an assessment of 
potential emerging risks such as the risk of cyber-attacks. We find that, in particular, 
primary insurers focusing on private retail motor insurance face significant strategic risks 
to their business model. The results of this analysis are not only relevant for insurance but 
also from a regulatory perspective as we find a symbiotic relationship between an 
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Connected Automated Vehicles (CAV) offer both opportunities and threats to existing 
business models. Car manufacturers and automotive suppliers are under immediate 
pressure to innovate as the production of automobiles is their core business. However, 
direct and indirect downstream markets will also be affected by the ongoing automation 
and the interconnectedness of modern vehicles.  
The insurance sector is acutely sensitive to the adoption of new technology as insurers 
cover risks resulting from the usage (motor insurance) and risks arising from the 
development and production of vehicles (e.g. product recall and product liability 
insurance). In this sense, the insurance sector assumes risks on individual and societal 
levels. The motor insurance business is worth €137.5 BN annually in Europe (Insurance 
Europe 2019)  so technological changes will have major ramifications to that sector. In 
addition, a failure to adequately insure existing and emerging risks may slow the 
development and rollout of the technology and inhibit societal acceptance. 
If CAV does reduce the number of road accidents significantly, this would result in a 
material decrease in motor insurance premium volume. This path is by no means proven 
and straightforward but will herald profound changes and repercussions for the insurance 
sector. The combination of decreasing and emerging risks will reshape the volume and 
characteristics of motor insurance risk exposure. Different members of the insurance 
supply chain (insured, primary insurer and reinsurer) typically have different capabilities 
and appetite to take part of this risk exposure, therefore the shift in the underlying risk 
landscape will likely also affect the risk allocation within the insurance supply chain.  
 
There is an active and ongoing dialogue within academic literature on CAV from a 
technical, human-factor, ethical and legal perspective (Bertolini et al. 2016) (Pütz et al. 
2018) (Duffy 2013) (Lohmann 2016) (Schroll 2015). In addition, initial accident research 
on the impact of advanced driving assistance systems (ADAS) on the frequency of 
accident losses exists but, with the exception of relevant legal aspects, insurance-related 
assessment of CAV technology is largely limited to practice-related discussions (Morgan 
Stanley and Boston Consulting Group 2016) (Swiss Re and HERE 2016) (Munich Re 
2016) (Yeomans 2014). Therefore, this paper combines two separated research 
disciplines and contributes to an academic discussion of CAV´s risk aspects focussing on 
the insurance sector as a key stakeholder of this technology. As motor insurance is a 
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useful proxy of economic costs arising from motor traffic risk, this research also 
contributes to a risk understanding from a political and societal perspective (Claus et al. 
2017). We enrich this analysis with an assessment of risks that are likely to emerge with 
CAV (i.e. risk of cyber-attacks (Sheehan et al. 2018)) with a special focus on their 
implication for the overall characteristics of motor insurance risk.  
 
Even if this development takes decades due to the slow penetration pattern of CAV, this 
paper is a timely addition particularly for the early stages of strategic planning approaches 
undertaken by insurance companies. Where relevant, the motor insurance market data 
used in this paper is taken from statistics available from the German Insurance 
Association (GDV) and the German Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin). 
Data on the German market is a good candidate to examine all (saturated) motor insurance 
markets as the scope of the single risks covered under German motor insurance policies 
is similar to the scope of insurance policies in other European countries.  
 
II. Evaluation of CAV accident risk and literature review 
This section explores existing literature on the impact of CAV on accident risk starting 
from lower levels of automation. The fact that 90 % of all road accidents today are 
attributed to human error is often-used to argue that taking the human driver out of the 
driving task would causally reduce the number of road accidents. However, in a rationale 
evaluation of this figure, the high contribution of human error to accident occurrences is 
just a logical consequence from the fact that, for the time being, it is the human driver, 
who almost exclusively fulfils the driving action without the intervention of active driving 
assistance systems. Thus, the figure might indicate the high potential of CAV to further 
increase overall road safety but is useless as a proxy to quantify CAV´s potential 
decreasing impact on the overall number of accident occurrences. 769 billion kilometers 
were driven in Germany in 2016 resulting in only 5.6 accidents per million kilometres 
showing that humans are, in fact, very good drivers.18  
A high potential of CAV to increase road safety results from generally favourable 
characteristics of robotic systems like the ability to permanently keep up attention (no 
distraction) or to react faster and with predetermined action patterns. In addition, the 
 
18 We use the number of collision-related insurance claims as a proxy for the total number of accidents 
including minor accidents. The number decreases to 3,36 accidents per million driven kilometres when 
selecting only police-recorded (Destatis, 2017). 
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automated system is not exposed to accident risk due to physical and mental human 
deficiencies like drowsiness, alcohol consumption, distractions, emotional status that 
deteriorate the performance of the human driver. These factors are critical reasons19 for 
about 22 %20 of all road accidents (NHTSA 2008). In contrast, it is questionable whether 
beneficial human cognitive abilities (e.g. anticipation, adaptability or empathy) can be 
adequately replicated in software-based driving systems. This is especially important as 
road traffic is dominated by high levels of complexity and flexibility of driving decisions. 
In addition to risk arising from inadequate driving software algorithms, an automated 
driving vehicle will also be exposed to the risk of malfunction of vehicle hardware 
(sensors and electronic control units). The fact that this risk cannot be neglected can be 
indicated by increasing numbers of product recalls resulting from defects of these 
components (Murphy et al. 2019). Hence, automated driving vehicles first have to prove 
that they (statistically) increase road safety by reducing the overall number and/or severity 
of road accidents (“positive risk balance”). 
Some empirical data for an indicative evaluation of CAVs´ impact on the overall accident 
risk can be derived from two sources. First, early findings of accident research for single 
advanced driving assistance systems (e.g. for Automated Emergency Braking (AEB), 
Adaptive Cruise Control (ACC), Forward Collision Warning (FCW) or Lane Keeping 
Assistant (LKA)) can be used to evaluate the potential safety impact of these systems. 
However, these systems focus on separated driving tasks and only represent low levels of 
driving automation (level 1 automation) and this data cannot be simply transposed to 
CAV with higher automation capability. In this paper, we will describe findings of 
relevant accident research for single ADAS systems to indicate the risk-lowering impact 
of assisted driving vehicles (level 1 automation) only. 
Second, findings from real-world testing of CAV with higher levels of automation can be 
used to indicate the current technical reliability of these vehicles. For instance, companies 
testing their CAV fleet in California have to publish reports on disengagements of the 
tested vehicles, if they conduct tests on public streets. However, the transferability of 
these results is limited due to the lack of transparency of testing conditions and an only 
 
19 The methodology defines the critical reason as the last failure in a causal chain. Therefore, it may not 
reflect the (only) cause of a crash and does not necessarily imply an assessment of fault. However, it 
does imply at least a contributory factor of human failure to an accident occurrence. 
20 This share of failure due to physical or mental shortcomings could be higher because the usage of 
smartphones has increasingly become a contributory reason for distraction within the last years and 
additional factors such as alcohol and drug abuse have not been considered in this source. 
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limited statistical representativeness of data. We will detail these shortcomings when 
describing the empirical data and research findings in later sections.  
In the following, we describe the specific effects of single levels of automation that are 
relevant to CAV accident risk in terms of probability. Equally important from an 
insurance point of view will be the development of average loss costs of vehicles 
equipped with CAV technology. Even if unit costs for the development and production 
of the implemented components (e.g. radar, Lidar, GPS, cameras, ultrasonic sensors, etc.) 
will decrease over time, these components will be implemented in addition to existing 
(mechanical) systems. This will promote technology driven inflation of vehicle values. In 
addition, the implementation of sensors and on-board electronics, especially on surfaces 
exposed to damage in the event of an accident (e.g. bumpers in case of rear-end crashes), 
will lead to an increased extent and complexity of repair work that will further increase 
insured loss amounts (Liberty Mutual Insurance 2017). 
 
1. CAV equipped with ADAS systems (level 1 automation) 
In vehicles driving equipped with ADAS (level 1 automation) the human driver is 
supported by the automated system, which can control either the lateral (e.g. LKA) or 
longitudinal (e.g. AEB or ACC) steering function. Because the human driver still is 
continuously and actively engaged in all aspects of the dynamic driving task (motion 
control, tactical manoeuvre planning/display of action, monitoring of driving 
environment) the human driver and the assistance system collectively have redundancy 
and the risk resulting from the inadequate interaction of the driving automation system 
and the human driver is limited. The assistance system generally only intervenes in 
critical situations.21 In doing so, the ADAS system achieves a non-critical driving 
condition through decent countermeasures (e.g. ACC, LKA) or by fulfilling an automated 
safety manoeuvre if a time-critical intervention is required (e.g. AEB). Thus, the system 
is designed as a fall-back to the human driver. By contrast, in case of an error of the 
assistance system, the human driver generally has the situational awareness to conduct 
adequate countermeasures. Thus, the human driver and the driving automation system are 
related by a double-sided continuous redundancy. 
 
21 Relevant critical situations, for example, could be driving too close to preceding vehicle (ACC), 




Indeed, analyses of the efficiency of different ADAS systems have already shown 
significant safety benefits. For instance, Cicchino has found that Forward Collision 
Warning (FCW) enhanced with AEB systems demonstrate significant reductions of rear-
end striking crashes by up to 50 %. In contrast, the rates of receiving a rear-end strike 
were seen to grow (Cicchino 2017). A possible reason for this phenomenon can be that 
the more sudden hard braking actions of automated systems have not been anticipated by 
the human vehicle´s driver in the following car, thus exhibiting the potential conflicts 
arising from the interaction of non-automated and automated driving vehicles in the 
transition period of the single levels of automation. Besides the impact on accident 
frequency, the automated intervention of the CAV could also reduce the average severity 
of loss events within single accidents types (e. g. rear-end collisions) and lower the 
probability and severity of injuries in road accidents if the intervention of the AEB system 
proactively reduces impact speeds of crashes (Avery and Weekes 2019) (Kusano and 
Gabler 2012).   
 
Jermakian (2011) investigates the potential safety benefits of FCW, LKA, Side View 
Assist and Adaptive Headlights concluding that all systems combined could potentially 
prevent about one third of crashes with FCW being the most effective and potentially 
preventing about 20%. Similarly, Harper et al. (2016) find that FCW, LKA, and Blind 
Spot Warning are relevant to 24 % of overall accidents. However, they stress that the 
relevant share of accidents for the respective ADAS systems does not necessarily equal 
the share of accidents which are prevented. This would only be the case with full 
effectiveness and constant activation of the systems. With the same limitation, Kuehn et 
al. (2009) quantify a similar benefit to accident frequency of 25 % for AEB and LKA 
systems. The discrepancy to the findings of Cicchino (2017) could result from technical 
progress between the two studies but also from the fact that the indicated safety benefits 
vary substantially by estimation methodology and by type of vehicle. This is 
demonstrated in a literature review conducted by Yue et al. (2018) and also by Blower 
(2014)., who find that studies indicating the crash-decreasing impact of the combination 
of FCW, Braking Assist, and AEB vary between 9% and 72%. Deviations in the used 
dataset, research methodology and specific technical design of the tested systems cause 




In another example, reversing accidents can be reduced significantly with the 
development and implementation of reverse AEB systems resulting in a reduction of the 
insurance claims in the near term (Grover et al. 2015) (Highway Loss Data Institute 
2017). This type of accident causes about 40 % of all motor third-party liability and fully 
comprehensive losses (Allianz SE 2015). With passive parking assistance, which only 
warns the driver, insurance losses have not decreased (David et al. 2015) (Keall et al. 
2017) because any decrease in accident frequency was offset by an increase in average 
loss amounts.  
 
Given the high potential of ADAS systems to increase road safety by active intervention 
in critical situations, the full risk-lowering impact will only materialise if the use of these 
systems does not impair human drivers´ prudence. Otherwise, increased risk-taking of the 
human driver (e.g. omission to look over the shoulder, lowering distance to foregoing 
vehicle, etc.) would increase the number of critical situations to be solved by the ADAS 
system and at least partially offset the positive net impact of ADAS systems. This 
behavior is already observed for passive safety systems such as airbags or mandatory 
seatbelts and led to significant rebound effects offsetting the overall increase in road 
safety. This offsetting effect is also especially relevant for non-occupants of the respective 
vehicle. This is because of an additional risk exposure if they or their vehicles are 
equipped with limited or only minor safety features (Chirinko et al. 1993). The risk that 
other travelers such as pedestrians or cyclists rely on a certain expected behavior of the 
automated vehicle (e.g. automated emergency braking) may negate the risk of unexpected 
actions (Kockelman et. al 2016). 
 
2. Partial and conditional automation (level 2 and 3 automation) 
Vehicles with level 1 automation benefit from positive attributes and abilities of both the 
human driver and of the driving automation system. However, in vehicles with higher 
levels of automation, the positive attributes of the human driver have to be adequately 
reflected in the capability of the hardware and software system. In addition, Level 1 
automation functions generally work separately from each other, thus reducing the 
complexity of the vehicle infrastructure and data fusion process. Therefore, the findings 
on the risk exposure of vehicles equipped with ADAS only (level 1 automation) cannot 
be simply used as a proxy also for vehicles with partial and conditional automation. 
Indeed, redundancy between the human driver and the driving automation system also 
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applies for vehicles equipped with partial driving automation (level 2 automation) but the 
human driver now acts as an immediate fall-back to the system which assumes the 
primary task of vehicle motion control during automated use-cases. Due to the 
fragmentation of the dynamic driving task between the driving automation system and 
the human driver, the level of partial driving automation in trend introduces an additional 
source of risk resulting from the human-machine interaction as humans are generally not 
adept at keeping up an adequate level of vigilance during longer periods of passive 
monitoring.  
In vehicles with partial driving automation (level 2 automation) this risk is generally 
limited due to the limited scope of automated driving manoeuvres but is amplified for 
vehicles with conditional driving automation capability (level 3 automation). This is 
because the driver technically and legally even does not have to continuously monitor the 
driving scene but still has to be capable of taking control as a fall-back to the automated 
system (Merat et al. 2014). Here, the successive decoupling of the human driver from the 
driving task implies decreasing human driving skills and a decreasing ability to make 
decisions especially in potentially risky and urgent situations, where the automated 
system hands back driving responsibility to the human. The required duration for 
completion of this process depends on the complexity of the traffic scenario set, the level 
of distraction of the driver and the design of the takeover request (e.g. haptic, acoustic or 
visual signal). Depending on these variables, drivers on average need several seconds to 
take over the driving action from an automated system and even longer to recover full 
situational awareness (German Insurers Accident Research 2016). This risk is amplified 
by the fact, that driver distraction (e.g. use of smartphones) is an increasingly important 
trigger of accidents (Choudhary and Velaga 2017) (Kubitzki and Fastenmeier 2016). To 
limit this risk, the driving automation system not only has to perceive information from 
the external driving environment but also from inside the vehicle. Through the use of 
sensors (e.g. contact to steering-wheel or physiological information such as heart-rate, 
muscle-activity, etc.) and cameras (e.g. tracking of eye blinking and head-motion) can 
deduce the level of tiredness and distraction so that the automated system is able to 
evaluate the human driver´s capacity to take over driving responsibility (Kircher and 
Ahlstrom 2017) (Rezaei and Klette 2011).  
Due to these potential risk-increasing effects of taking the driver only partially out of the 
loop, it is questionable whether highly automated vehicles (level 3) benefit in higher 
safety and comfort and also raises difficult legal questions and could hamper societal 
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acceptance of automated vehicles. Recent announcements by some car manufacturers 
(e.g. Volvo (Volvo Car Group 2017) and Ford (Ross 2017)) have stated that they will 
skip the development of vehicles with conditional driving automation (level 3 
automation) and target the design of vehicles with (at least) level 4 capability. For this 
level of automation, the risk exposure from handing-over driving responsibility will 
abate, because the vehicle will be capable of fulfilling an adequate security maneuvers 
allowing the human driver to take over driving responsibility from a safe status.  
 
3. CAV with high and full automation (level 4 and 5 automation) 
Vehicles with higher levels of automation are already driven on urban roads but limited 
to testing purposes. As the technology is still immature and largely used in test mode 
only, caution is required when using current statistics to predict the future impact of these 
vehicles on the number of accident occurrences. Manufacturers testing fully automated 
vehicles in California are legally obliged to publish yearly disengagement reports. 
Disengagements are defined as “a deactivation of the autonomous mode when a failure 
of the autonomous technology is detected or when the safe operation of the vehicle 
requires that the autonomous vehicle test driver disengages the autonomous mode and 
takes immediate manual control of the vehicle” (see California Code of Regulations Title 
13, Article 3.7, § 227.46 (a)). For this, the vehicle manufacturers have to report the total 
number of disengagements, the total number of miles driven of each test vehicle and the 
circumstances of the disengagements including the location and reason for the 
disengagement (e.g. weather or road conditions, accidents etc.) (see California Code of 
Regulations Title 13, Article 3.7, § 227.46 (b)). 
As the human drivers´ accident risk can be measured by accident rate per driven kilometre  
a statistically reliable equivalent indicator is missing for the comparison group. Even 
though the Waymo vehicle test fleet already completed over four million kilometres 
without any accident caused by the (sole) fault of the automated vehicles is often used as 
an argument to underline the superior performance of automated vehicles (Teoh and Kidd 
2017). Also, Blanco et al. (2016) in their study (commissioned by Waymo) show that the 
Waymo test fleet only shows superior performance after (upper bound) scaling of 
accident rates.   
Given that human-drivers only cause about 3.3 (police-reported) accidents per million 
kilometres (see Figure 5 and Figure 8) indicates that the mileage of the automated fleet is 
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not yet sufficient to provide a statistically reliable comparison (Kalra and Paddock 2016). 
In addition, a comparison of accident rates has no scientific significance since information 
about testing conditions (e.g. road, traffic and weather condition) are not transparent 
enough to standardise and compare with representative traffic-scenarios. Also, the fact 
that a specially trained safety driver is taking over driving responsibility if needed makes 
it impossible for third parties to assess how many accidents the vehicle would have caused 
if the human driver had not intervened. In addition to the comparison of accident rates, 
an analysis of the disengagement reports of Waymo can be used to analyse the reliability 
of highly/fully automated vehicles in their current state of development. As 
disengagements describe critical situations, which do not necessarily lead to an accident, 
a comparison of this risk indicator with human drivers´ accident frequency rates (see 
Figure 8) only allows for an indicative assessment.  
 
Figure 5: Accident of human drivers versus disengagement rate of Waymo test fleet. 
The graph shows the development of accident rate per million driven kilometres of 
(manually) driven vehicles in Germany and the disengagement rate per million driven 
kilometres of Waymo´s fully automated test fleet vehicles tested in California. Source: 
Illustration based on numbers provided by (Destatis 2017) and (Waymo 2017). 
Analysing the number of disengagements of automated vehicles, it can be argued that 
self-driving software will successively learn from each disengagement so that actually a 
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from a testing perspective. However, given the proportion of 3322 disengagements of 
Waymo´s test fleet per (police-recorded) accident of a human driven vehicles, the 
comparison indicates that these systems (at least for the time being) are not yet capable 
of adequately replacing human driving capability (Favarò et al. 2017). However, it 
remains questionable and ambiguous whether a state of superior driving by automated 
vehicles can technically be achieved. This is not necessarily due to the bad performance 
of the technical system but due to the fact that the human driver shows very low failure 
rates measured by accidents per given mileage. Thus, the highly or fully automated 
driving vehicle first has to prove that it is capable of exceeding human performance. The 
technical system is exposed to other (partially new) risk sources like hardware and 
software failures or the risk of malicious cyber-attacks (Koopman and Wagner 2017) 
(Kockelman et. al 2016). For instance, the analysis of relevant root causes for automotive 
product recalls also stresses that these risks cannot be simply neglected (Murphy et al. 
2019). Thus, significant sources of accident risks will still persist so that ex-ante claims 
of significant decreases of road accidents remain largely unqualified and largely untested 
(International Transport Forum (ITF) 2018). It is not clear, how the frequency and even 
severity of accident events will actually develop in the future, especially given risk-
relevant interdependencies to non-automated road users (Sivak and Schoettle 2015).  
 
III. Description of the current characteristics of motor insurance risk  
Motor insurance is worth € 26.9 BN (2017) and accounts for about 40 % of the total 
premium volume (non-life) in the German insurance market. Measured by premium 
volume, it is the most important line of (non-life) insurance business (GDV 2018). In the 
following, we will describe the relevance of single risks to the overall risk exposure and 





1. Composition of the overall motor insurance risk exposure 
 
22 This factor is the result of the ratio of 111 reported disengagements of Waymo´s test fleet per million 
driven kilometres and 3.36 accidents per million driven kilometres in Germany in 2016.  
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Motor insurance can be separated into three types of insurance coverage23: 
• Motor third-party liability (MTPL): Compensates for property and bodily 
injury claims of damaged third parties against the owner, keeper, and driver of a 
car and accounts for € 16 BN premium income (59.5 %). 
• Partially comprehensive insurance coverage: Compensates for property 
losses to the insured vehicle due to fire, breakage of glass, animal-vehicle crash, 
theft, hail, storm, and flooding. It accounts for about € 1.7 BN premium income 
(6.6 %).  
• Fully comprehensive insurance coverage: Compensates for all losses covered 
by partially comprehensive insurance and in addition for property losses due to 
vandalism and (self-inflicted) own-car damages. It accounts for about € 9.2 BN 
premium income (33.5 %). 
Given the scope of the different types of coverages, we separate these single insured risks 
into the subordinate categories of accident risk, natural perils and other perils as shown 
in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Risks covered under motor insurance policies. The figure shows the risks 
commonly covered under motor insurance policies (MTPL and fully comprehensive) in 
Germany. 
Simplistically assuming that the net risk premium for the single covered risks corresponds 
with the (expected) average insured loss amount incurred for each risk, Figure 6 indicates 
the relevance of each risk for the overall (net risk) premium income of motor insurance. 
It shows that accident risk is the most prevalent driver of overall motor insurance net risk 
premium contributing to about 87 % of all loss payments. Following from this, material 
 
23 Premium figures are based on figures for year 2017 provided by GDV (2018) Statistical yearbook of 
the insurance industry 2017, available: http://www.gdv.de/wp-
content/uploads/2016/09/Statistisches_Taschenbuch_2016_Versicherungswirtschaft_GDV.pdf [accessed 
07.04.2017]. for the German motor insurance market. 
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changes to the number of road accidents induced by CAV would have significant impacts 
on the overall motor insurance premium volume.  
  
Figure 6: Split of overall insured loss per single risks covered. The graph shows the 
average share of insured losses for the single risks covered by (MTPL and fully 
comprehensive) motor insurance in the German market between 2006 and 2015. 
Source: Own calculation based on data published by German Insurance Association  
(GDV 2016). 
 
2. Characteristics of motor insurance risk exposure 
Overall, motor insurance risk exposure is characterised by a stable loss pattern. However, 
in a more granular assessment, the single risks covered show different characteristics 
regarding the frequency and severity of loss events. This can be illustrated by the mean 
annual amount, the standard deviation and the variation coefficient of annual insured 
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Type of risk covered Mean (in € 1,000) Standard deviation (in € 1,000) Variation coefficient
MTPL (property loss only) 6,903,143                 289,054                                          4.19%
MTPL (incl. personal injury) 4,536,305                 333,397                                          7.35%
Animal-vehicle crash 517,761                    46,993                                            9.08%
(self) inflicted own car damage 3,792,456                 220,320                                          5.81%
Storm, Hail 618,243                    306,011                                          49.50%
Flooding 12,061                      5,638                                              46.74%
Fire 104,922                    18,165                                            17.31%
Breakage of glass 1,147,331                 89,794                                            7.83%
Theft 498,454                    52,518                                            10.54%































Table 2: Mean value, standard deviation and variation coefficient of total insured losses 
of single risks. The table shows the mean value, standard deviation and variation 
coefficient of annual insured losses per type of risk covered under (MTPL and 
comprehensive) motor insurance in the German market between 2006 and 2015. 
Source: Own calculation based on data published by German Insurance Association 
(GDV 2016). 
 
Using the variation coefficient as the indicator of the volatility of the annual loss amount 
of the single risks covered, the value of 3.4% shows that overall motor insurance risks 
exposure is characterised by quite high stability. 
This is mainly due to the stability of annual loss amounts due to accident risk, which is 
characterised by high frequency and low severity of single loss events. The only exception 
of the only limited severity of insured accident losses is MTPL insurance, where losses 
can indeed be exposed to financial tail-risks. This is because MTPL insurance not only 
covers liability claims for a damaged third-party vehicle (property damage) but also 
further liability claims of third parties (i.e. bodily injury claims). This amount, especially 
in case of death or (severe) bodily injuries, can exceed property damages several times. 
Thus, MTPL coverage is exposed to financial tail-risks, due to potentially high loss 
amounts of single accidents (e.g. in case of permanent disability of claimants). As a result, 
MTPL insurance´s overall insured loss expenditure is indeed affected by a higher 
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Figure 7: Distribution of total insured losses per insured loss amount. The graph shows 
the distribution of overall loss expenditure per insured loss amount for MTPL, partially 
comprehensive and fully comprehensive motor insurance in the German market for the 
year 2015. Source: calculations based on data published by German Insurance 
Association (GDV 2016).  
However, even in case of a higher financial tail-risk of MTPL insurance, the still 
relatively low variation coefficient of this risk shows that the general independency of 
single insured MTPL loss events leads to a risk balancing effect in a homogenous and 
sufficiently large risk portfolio. Accumulation events are largely only limited to those 
instances where the probability of losses for (a part of) the portfolio is increased by 
external effects (e.g. black ice on the streets).  
In contrast, losses due to natural perils (NatCat risks) are characterised by low frequency 
but potentially high severity of loss events leading to a high variation coefficient of the 
annual insured loss amounts of 49.5% (storm and hail) and 46.7% (flooding). The high 
severity results from the correlation of single insured objects affected in one loss event. 
Even if the loss amount to a single insured vehicle is regularly limited to (a fraction of) 
its property value, natural perils typically affect multiple insured objects in their sphere 
of activity. Hence, natural perils regularly lead to events with high accumulated loss 
amounts. Because of this, it is more difficult to balance NatCat risk throughout a year, 
especially within a regionally limited risk portfolio. Therefore, NatCat risks have to be 
balanced within the own portfolio through time or by a (partial) risk-transfer to an external 
party (e.g. reinsurer).  
 
IV. Potential impacts on accident risk characteristics 
The low volatility of annual insured losses is mainly due to the fact that accident risk is 
only exposed to a limited risk exposure from accumulation or series loss events. However, 
with CAV on the roads, this could change due to series loss events arising from the 
correlation of software-based driving decisions and due to accumulation loss events 
arising from cyber-attacks.  
1. Correlation of accident-risk losses of CAV 
When a fleet of CAV (e.g. from the same manufacturer) is fulfilling the automated driving 
task based on the same deterministic algorithm, the driving behaviour of these vehicles is 
directly correlated with each other. This means that CAVs are programmed in the way 
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that every vehicle will decide uniformly on how to fulfil a driving-action within a given 
scenario set.  
Driving algorithms that can unilaterally adopt themselves to input from the dynamic 
environment could potentially introduce severe legal risks for vehicle manufacturers, as 
the obligation to monitor (unknown risks of) the products after bringing the vehicles into 
the market could be inadequate, complex and costly. This is because the duty to monitor 
should increase, as the potential risk resulting from the system carrying out safety-crucial 
driving actions autonomously will increase. Therefore, a centralised adjustment of the 
algorithms by the vehicle manufacturer based on the input data of the CAV fleet is a 
realistic solution and fulfils legal requirements to ensure adequate safety monitoring 
processes.  
With this assumption, series accident losses become manifest, if single vehicles of the 
affected fleet face the same risk scenario set. The extent of series loss exposure depends 
on the period of time the car manufacturer needs to discover and fix algorithmic errors by 
applying patches via (over the air) software-updates.  
In addition, the risk of accumulated accident loss events could arise from several vehicles 
jointly travelling in platoons, where accident risks might turn from crashes of single or 
two vehicles to more severe multi-vehicle crashes, This is because a cohort of vehicles is 
driving close to each other, at high speed and dependent on information received by the 
foregoing vehicle increases correlation risk.  
2. Cyber risk 
The automation of the vehicles´ driving action technically does not need to be 
accompanied by an (over-the-air) communication interface (local navigation through on-
board sensors) but the interconnection enables parts of the expected benefits of comfort 
and safety features brought by automated vehicles (global navigation of the vehicle fleet). 
In this way, the automation and interconnection of CAV are complementary and 
interrelated technologies.  
Cyber-attacks against road-vehicles are not yet common but modern vehicles already 
possess several communication interfaces that can be used as access points for cyber-
attackers. In general, these communication interfaces can be separated into (indirect) 
physical access and short-range or long-range wireless access channels (Checkoway et 
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al. 2011). Short- and long-range wireless connections (e.g. Bluetooth, WiFi, broadcast 
connection) open access points for (external) remote cyber-attackers.    
If it is possible for cyber-attackers to hack not only one, but a fleet of CAV or traffic 
infrastructure, losses to single vehicles would be directly correlated and exposed to 
accumulation risk. Depending on the probability of cyber-attacks and the financial losses 
due to each affected CAV, the loss pattern of the inherent risk could be both volatile and 
high in severity. As a result, cyber-attacks on a fleet of CAV could induce a second source 
of accumulation loss events (in addition to NatCat risk) and shift the characteristics of 
overall accident risk to higher volatility and severity of loss occurrences. In addition, 
cyber-attacks to digital infrastructure show the phenomenon that they are not only limited 
to one specific line of business (e.g. motor insurance) but could also affect several lines 
of the insurance business (e.g. business interruption). This characteristic even presents 
special challenges to enterprise risk management of  vehicle manufacturers but also 
accumulation risk control of insurance entities. Due to the NatCat-alike characteristics of 
cyber-risks, again the need for risk-transfer of motor insurers (e.g. via reinsurance 
coverage) gains in relevance but is not limited to smaller and mid-size motor insurers 
with an only regionally focused portfolio but also insurance companies with a portfolio, 
which is regionally diversified. This is because of the described phenomenon of cyber-
risks to be neither limited to single regions nor to single lines of insurance business.  
V. Effects from a shift to service-based mobility solutions 
The increasing penetration of CAV technology is generally expected to accelerate a 
change in societal mobility approach shifting away from the ownership of vehicles to the 
use of shared on-demand mobility services (Krueger et al. 2016). This shift would 
strongly affect customer interfaces because a (commercial) entity providing the mobility 
service assumes the role of the vehicle owner and is obliged to maintain adequate 
insurance coverage. This produces a shift in customer interfaces from a business-to-
customer (b2c) relationship between the insurer and the individual vehicle owner to a 
business-to-business (b2b) relationship between the insurer and the (commercial) 
mobility service provider.  
The progressive usage of shared-mobility services could also facilitate the penetration of 
CAV technology into the overall vehicle fleet because of a potential decline of the 
required fleet size (Morency et al. 2015) and because the relatively high acquisition costs 
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of CAV24 could be balanced by more efficient use of the vehicles. In turn, this would 
shorten the traditionally slow-moving penetration patterns25 of driving assistance systems 
and would catalyse the impacts of CAV technology on the overall road safety and 
insurance-specific risk exposure. 
In a potentially shrinking vehicle fleet, the extent of (insured) loss events due to natural 
perils such as storm, hail or flooding events decline in line with the reduction of the 
number of vehicles affected in the spatial sphere of activity of the respective natural peril. 
This potentially risk-lowering impact is especially relevant as the adoption of shared-
mobility higher in urban areas where the concentration of exposed vehicles in a relatively 
small area is especially high. Resulting from this, the absolute risk exposure resulting 
from NatCat events would decrease due to the indirect effects of CAV on societal 
mobility patterns, which would (partially) counterbalance or even overcompensate 
expected increases of average loss amounts to single affected vehicles due to technical 
inflation.  
By contrast, the impact of the shift to a service-based mobility approach to the overall 
accident risk exposure strongly depends on the future amount of overall driven vehicle 
kilometers (Ahangari et al. 2017). This is because of the strong correlation between the 
total mileage driven and the overall number of road accidents which can be indicated by 
a Pearson correlation coefficient r = 94%. The following graph shows that the number of 
accidents per mileage remains stable and on already very low levels with currently the 
human-driver taking over driving responsibility. 
 
24 It is assumed that vehicles equipped with CAV technology especially in the beginning of market 
penetration will be relatively expensive due to required hardware (e.g. cameras and sensors) and software 
components. 
25 For instance, the anti-lock braking system (ABS) and electronic stability control (ESC) took about twenty 
and fifteen years until more than 80% of all newly registered vehicles were equipped based on figures of 




Figure 8: Mileage-adjusted number of police-recorded accidents. The graph shows the 
development of the overall number of police-recorded accidents events per million 
driven kilometers in Germany between 1991 and 2016. Source: Own illustration based 
on numbers provided by (Destatis 2017), (Radke 2014) and (Bundesanstalt für 
Straßenwesen 2017). 
Indeed, there are different reasons why the wider adoption of shared service-based 
mobility solutions could lead to an increase of the overall vehicle mileage and thus 
increase risk exposure (Wadud et al. 2016) (Litman 2018). First, an increase in mobility 
participation for impaired or elderly people could stimulate additional mobility demand 
by these user groups. Assuming, that these groups today have to use public transport 
services, higher individualisation of mobility solutions for this cohort could increase the 
total mileage driven. In addition, increasing use of individual mobility services instead of 
centralised public mass transport could also be applicable for broader user groups that 
today satisfy their individual mobility demand with public transport services (e.g. 
commuters) if shared-mobility solutions reduce mobility costs. Second, assuming that the 
trip planning of two independent individuals is unaffected by a shift in societal mobility 
approach, the total mileage driven increases because of empty journeys of the shared 
automated vehicle between two successive users. Depending on different assumptions 
and scenarios, for instance (Trommer et al. 2016) expects increases in total mileage 
between 2.5% to 8.5% by 2035. This would mean that increased mileage would likely 
offset parts of potential safety gains in absolute terms, even if automated vehicles would 














A lack of empirical data and suitable proxies to assess the CAV impact on accident risk 
makes decisions by policymakers, society, and businesses very difficult. As a result, 
public and political debates of CAV´s future implications on society and risk tend to be 
based on simplified and biased assumptions, which are (not yet) based on scientific 
evidence. From an insurance point of view, this presents a fundamental challenge, as the 
business model of motor insurance is directly dependent on accident risk. 
Given these challenges, we have described current motor insurance risk exposure and risk 
characteristics and have used findings from accident research as well as available data on 
Waymo´s CAV fleet to qualitatively assess the (insurance-relevant) risk implications of 
this technology. In doing so, our research shows important findings for insurers and 
regulators.  
Empirical data indicates that vehicles equipped with ADAS systems of level 1 automation 
indeed contribute to road safety. However, from an insurance perspective, the decreasing 
impact on accident frequency will likely be (partially) balanced as the average loss 
amounts will increase due to technologically driven inflation and the higher complexity 
of repair work as well as risk compensation resulting from more intensive driving. We 
describe why those findings for lower levels of automation cannot just be applied 
analogously to vehicles with higher levels of automation capability and we use a 
comparison of disengagements (automated Waymo vehicle fleet) and accidents (human-
driven fleet) per million driven kilometers to illustrate that (at least the current) 
performance of automated driving vehicles does not seem to be superior to human drivers.  
From a regulatory point of view, this comparison is not able to precisely quantify the 
future risk exposure of vehicles with high and full automation but indicates that the 
promise of accident-free traffic is based on fragile grounds. We propose that CAV 
vehicles should be subject to close monitoring of their actual risk impacts. This 
monitoring should be conducted by independent and interdisciplinary institutions. Here, 
the insurance industry is one of the key stakeholders and bridging the gap between 
accident research and insurance industry knowledge can ground considerations of the 
inherent societal costs of CAV technology (Casualty Actuarial Society 2018) (Finkel and 
Gray 2018). Stating this, the current approach of disengagement reporting does not allow 
for a transparent assessment of possible risk implications and opens the risk that 
regulatory and economic decisions to introduce CAV technology are based on illusive 
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assumptions. This could turn out to be negligent if potential faulty assumptions lead to a 
reallocation of investment budgets for conventional road traffic safety strategies also 
taking into account vulnerable manual road users (e.g. pedestrians, bicyclists, 
motorcyclists, etc) in a more realistic scenario which is highly exposed to mixed-traffic 
scenes.  
Due to the surrounding uncertainty related to CAV insurance risk analysis, further 
actuarial analysis and research are needed to prepare the insurance sector for a possibly 
changing risk landscape in the future. To proactively prepare for these changes, a more 
short-term measure of motor insurance companies is to explore accident data sets of 
different ADAS systems (level 1 and level 2 automation) already covered insured fleets. 
That said, a major challenge for this is the granularity of data gathered for traditional 
motor insurance pricing, which does not always allow identification of the technology´s 
presence in vehicles (Casualty Actuarial Society 2018). With a long-term focus on 
vehicles with higher levels of automation, the adjustment of pricing models that currently 
focus on proxies to account for human-driver´s individual risk has to be replaced with a 
pricing model to reflect the reliability of the automated driving system. As transparent 
and longstanding loss data for this is missing, insurers have to build up interdisciplinary 
know-how to expand today’s actuarial driven pricing knowledge with deep technical 
know-how about CAV hard- and software vulnerability. Furthermore, as driving 
capabilities of CAV could fluctuate with newly introduced software updates, pricing data 
could be exposed to higher variability.  
 
With describing risk relevant aspects, this paper provides a qualitative but more granular 
assessment of CAV´s potential risk impact than existing quantitative forecasts of CAV´s 
impact on the motor insurance premium. The results of the existing forecasts highly differ 
from each other contingent on the publisher (i.e. consulting firms or German Insurance 
Association) indicating that a lack of empirical data leaves space for a highly biased 
debate on the issue. This paper provides additional value to the insurance-related 
discussion by broadening the scope from a focus on absolute premium volume to crucial 
strategic questions such as the characteristics of risk exposure and customer interfaces. 
Here, our analysis shows that CAV will have a significant impact on the inherent risk 
characteristics of the motor insurance business. Beyond that, a shift in societal mobility 
approach with a changing customer interface will also have a strong impact on the risk 




Referring to the possible changes of motor insurance risk characteristics, we emphasise 
the current smoothing impact of accident risk to the overall volatility of annual motor loss 
insurance loss expenses. The relevance of this risk could decrease with CAVs on the road 
but this is still uncertain and accompanied by significant adverse side effects. In addition, 
the volatility could further increase due to possible correlated accident events and the 
emerging risk of cyber-attacks as well as accumulation loss events resulting from 
platooning. A declining relevance of regular accident occurrences would just enhance this 
volatility-increasing effect. This means the required risk-capital for a given volume of 
written motor insurance premium will also increase.  
The increasing volatility of losses and the potential correlation of emerging (automotive) 
cyber-risks with other insurance lines of business present challenges for the management 
of loss accumulation risk of insurance companies. It is important that the changing loss 
pattern of the future motor insurance business adequately matches the risk-appetite and 
capacity of the risk-taking insurance company. For (smaller) insurance groups with a 
focus on retail property and casualty insurance risks and limited risk-taking capacity, risk-
transfer to reinsurers will likely be more relevant to smooth the unbalancing impact on 
the net risk portfolio. 
Given the already competitive environment of the motor insurance market in saturated 
markets together with the low profitability26 and the expected increasing volatility of 
losses, we expect the return on risk adjusted capital (RORAC) to decline and lead to a 
higher consolidation within the motor insurance market. This is even fostered by the 
described potential shifts in societal mobility leading to changing customer interfaces 
towards commercial customers. As a result, we find that primary insurers focusing on 
private retail motor insurance face strategic risks to their business model. However, the 
development and penetration of market-ready CAV especially of these with higher levels 
of automation required for fully service-based mobility approaches (level 4 and 5 
automation) take several years or even decades so that the significant changes described 
in this analysis will proceed on an evolutionary rather than a disruptive basis.  
 
 
26 The average gross combined ratio of the motor insurance business between 2010 and 2016 in the 
German market is 102,2 %. The combined ratio is the ratio of expenses for insurance operations and 










Concluding statement leading the reader to the next article: 
The research conducted in this chapter provides a granular analysis of CAV technology´s 
potential impact on accident risk exposure for the single levels of automation. 
Furthermore, this chapter provides an analysis of further relevant risk-factors relevant to 
the motor insurance business. In this sense, the research contributes to a more transparent 
and unbiased understanding of probable changes to the future motor insurance risk 
landscape.  
However, even if motor insurance is the most important line of (non-life) insurance 
business also other business lines are potentially affected by shifts in the underlying risk-
landscape. As the adequate mitigation of (liability) risks resulting from the production 
process is acutely relevant to foster innovativeness of the sector, the probable impact of 
CAV technology on the risk of automotive product recall is highly relevant for OEMs but 
also insurers. Therefore, the following chapter is devoted to the analysis of legal and 
technical drivers which emerge with the progressing penetration of CAV technology and 
which could affect the future product recall activity. In this sense, the following chapter 
complements the analysis of insurance-relevant risk-factors and contributes to an holistic 
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Abstract 
Complex Advanced Driving Assistance Systems (ADAS) and Autonomous Vehicle (AV) 
technology are increasing the number of vehicle recalls. At the same time, financial risks 
resulting from extensive product recall events can severely affect vehicle manufacturers 
and their suppliers, exposing the automotive supply chain to business continuity, legal 
and reputational risk. However, these risk implications are under-appreciated by large 
segments of the supply chain. This study shows that product recall events are increasing 
in general but recall events associated with ADAS/AV technology form an increasingly 
large percentage of these recall events. Based on this analysis, we describe ADAS/AV-
specific aspects of risk mitigation and present a multidimensional approach, combining 
production-centric risk mitigation avenues in the automotive supply chain with the 
transfer of residual financial risks via insurance. We find that this comprehensive risk 
mitigation approach benefits in higher transparency of total production costs and 
increased resilience of the automotive supply chain. Against the background of an 
increasing product recall risk resulting from the increasing automation and 
interconnectedness of modern vehicles, we therefore suggest a closer, more strategic 
cooperation between insurance companies, car manufacturers and automotive suppliers 
for the benefit of all parties.  
Keywords: RISK ANALYSIS, SUPPLY CHAIN RISK MANAGEMENT, 
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Human errors are responsible for ninety percentage of road accidents (DG GROW 2016). 
As computers progressively take more control over cars they are expected to reduce the 
number of car accidents significantly. Despite the potential benefits of these new 
technologies, associated emerging risks must be considered. In particular, car 
manufacturers face the risk of ADAS failures precipitating product liability and product 
recall losses.  
The rapid development of ADAS/AV technology has been driven by car manufacturers, 
technology companies and academic research groups. In parallel, the medium to long-
term impact on the economic value chain of the transportation and automotive sector as 
well as legal and social implications have already been covered by extensive discussion 
(Fagnant and Kockelman 2015; Bagloee et al. 2016; Harper et al. 2016; Wachenfeld and 
Winner 2016). In contrast, the impact of ADAS/AV technology to product recall risk has 
not gained the attention of industry and academic literature yet. The low level of attention 
to product recall risk is surprising, given that the cost of an extensive product recall can 
trigger heavy financial imbalances to the affected company. Here, the most significant 
recent example of the automotive supplier Takata strikingly shows that product recalls 
can directly lead to business continuity risk (Fukase and McLain 2016).  
Existing developments in ADAS/AV technology illustrate that the growing 
interconnection and complexity of the embedded vehicle subsystems is an inevitable 
requirement of further automation. Therefore, this paper looks specifically at the resulting 
impact on automotive product recall risk and combines a qualitative assessment with a 
quantitative statistical analysis of product recall activity. For this, we use recall statistics 
from the European and US-market to analyse historical events and to anticipate future 
developments in product recall activity. We find that overall automotive recall activity 
grew in both markets between 2008 and 2016. Using product recalls resulting from a 
failure of sensors, software and electronic control units (ECU) as a proxy for ADAS/AV 
technology, we find that these product recalls exceed the growth of overall product recall 
activity especially since the year 2012. We expect that increasingly complex vehicle 
infrastructure within ADAS/AV-enabled vehicles together with a potentially stricter 
recall approach by public authorities will lead to a further rise of product recall 
occurrences. This is finding is generally applicable to all levels of driving automation, but 
it is assumed that the level of complexity of the vehicle infrastructure increases with 
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higher levels of driving automation. Additionally, we analyse statistical data to evaluate 
the potential severity of the financial risk of product recall events and use this as a basis 
to propose a comprehensive risk mitigation approach combining ADAS/AV-specific 
elements of risk mitigation on a production level with risk mitigation of residual financial 
risks. 
With this approach, the paper broadens the assessment of ADAS/AV technology from a 
risk management point of view and contributes to the understanding of future expected 
changes in product recall risk exposure, which is highly relevant for the automotive, 
transportation and insurance sector. In addition, by combining the emerging issues of 
automated vehicles and product recall risk, it provides a basis for the appliance of further 
scientific methodology on this issue. Furthermore, the paper contributes to an holistic risk 
mitigation approach combining production-oriented risk mitigation with financial risk 
transfer. Thus, this research provides a link between hitherto largely separated disciplines 
of production and supply chain research and academic research related to general 
(financial) risk management and insurance. In doing so, the paper provides pathways to 
increase the robustness and resilience of supply chain and production systems. 
In the following section, a review of existing academic literature in the field of 
(automotive) product recalls, supply chain risk management and supply chain resilience 
is provided with the aim of positioning this paper in academic literature. Following from 
this, we define and categorise different types of automotive product recall events and 
describe the accompanying economic risks. Subsequently, reasons for an expected 
increase in product recall activity due to ADAS/AV technology are qualitatively deduced 
and supported by a quantitative analysis of historical product recall statistics for the 
European and US-market. This quantitative analysis and recent examples of specific 
product recall events are then used to derive inherent characteristics of product recall risk. 
Based on these findings, we finally propose a comprehensive risk mitigation approach, 
which combines elements of risk mitigation on a production level with risk mitigation of 








II. Relevance to production research and literature review 
The scope of this paper is relevant to the academic research in the fields of (automotive) 
product recall as well as supply chain risk management and supply chain resilience.  
In the field of automotive product recall, there is limited academic research existing but 
we are not aware of any research specific to product recall activity with a dedicated focus 
on ADAS/AV technology. Indeed, the research that exists generally considers 
superordinate product recall patterns (Rupp and Taylor 2002; Bates et al. 2007; Ahsan 
2013) or the impact on shareholder value (Rupp 2004; Shin et al. 2014). In general, these 
analyses show that overall automotive product recall numbers are increasing and that 
product recall events can have severe adverse impacts on the financial health of the 
affected companies. Similar results are found for other industries like toy and food 
production (Zaho et al. 2013; Ni et al. 2014; Ni et al. 2016). Existing frameworks for 
managing product recall risk generally focus on organisational and (production-oriented) 
operational measures only (Kumar and Schmitz 2010) even if literature referring to 
general corporate risk management frameworks already includes measures of financial 
risk mitigation (Miller 1992). In addition, an increasing number of product recall events 
show evidence that residual product recall risk still remains despite all preventive 
organisational and operational actions. Because of this, the limited scope of existing 
instruments to mitigate product recall risks has to be broadened by incorporating financial 
risk mitigation tools into existing frameworks. 
Suppliers often account for a high proportion of the production chain in the automotive 
sector (Ciravegna et al. 2013) therefore research on product recall and supply chain risk 
management should be closely related. Indeed, a solid number of research papers dealing 
with supply chain risk management in the automotive industry exists (see literature 
reviews by González-Benito et al. (2013) or Ho et al. (2015)). However, existing related 
research focuses on organisational aspects of risk management process implementation 
(Thun et al. 2011; Sharma and Bhat 2016; Chen et al. 2017) or the material and 
information flow integration within the automotive supply chain (Coronado Mondragon 
and Lyons 2008; Makris and Chryssolouris 2013). In addition, there is a good deal of 
work on risk assessment techniques but these do not include mitigation instruments 
(Trkman and McCormack 2009; Ceryno et al. 2015; Davarzani et al. 2015; Marasova et 
al. 2017; Zimmer et al. 2017; Prakash et al. 2018).  
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With regard to instruments for product recall risk mitigation inside the automotive supply 
chain, existing papers only occasionally cover product quality issues (Singh et al. 2005; 
Thun and Hoenig 2011). A limited number of research papers also deals with financial 
risk mitigation in automotive supply chains, but only in the context of market risks such 
as currency fluctuation or commodity price risk (Huchzermeier and Cohen 1996; 
Hofmann 2011). Some papers indeed indicate the relevance of debt and liquidity risks to 
a disruption of the automotive supply chain but do not provide approaches to mitigate 
these risks accordingly (Blos et al. 2009). Stating this, insolvency risk and proactive 
measures of risk management are examined by Grötsch, Blome, and Schleper (2013) but 
only on an organisational level not considering specific financial instruments to bridge 
disruptive events that impact financial stability. 
Research in general supply chain risk management stresses the role of suppliers in highly 
fragmented production chains, but also only occasionally tackles product recall events as 
one possible form of product quality issues (e.g. see (Li et al. 2010; Marucheck et al. 
2011; Ou and Nurmaya 2011)). Specific literature on mitigating product recall risk in the 
supply chain is still underrepresented.  
Also, the existing literature of supply chain risk management generally distinguishes 
between internal and external risks affecting a supply chain. While risks resulting from 
internal activities are generally characterised as relatively high in frequency but low in 
impact, macro-risks affecting the supply chain from the outside (e.g. natural or man-made 
risks like earthquakes, floods or war) are ascribed as being rare and potentially severe 
(Ho et al. 2015). However, this classification turns out to be unspecific and induces the 
danger of a structural misperception of product recall risk as this research paper shows 
that product recall events arising from the inside of the supply chain potentially show a 
similar severity as external disruptors.  
Finally, comprehensive literature reviews carried out by Tukamuhabwa et al. (2015) and 
Kamalahmadi and Parast (2016) show that existing strategies to enhance supply chain 
resilience focus on measures to increase flexibility and redundancy. Here, sourcing from 
multiple suppliers, back-up suppliers and keeping safety stocks are described as key 
practices to achieve redundancy inside the supply chain (Schmitt and Singh 2012; Mishra 
et al. 2016; Brusset and Teller 2017; Kırılmaz and Erol 2017). Indeed, these approaches 
are useful to increase the resilience of supply chains producing physical goods. However, 
looking at products whose key functionalities are based on software, these instruments 
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are not applicable. Consequently, considering measures to enhance the individual 
financial resilience of key suppliers will become even more important in the future.  
 
III. Key risks in case of a product recall 
The risks resulting from a product recall event can generally be categorised into financial, 
reputational and legal risks. Based on the assumption of shareholder value orientation in 
the automotive market, a simplified risk definition can be applied shortening the term to 
negative impacts on the entities´ financial goals. Hence, reputational and legal risks are 
measured as triggers of financial risk, which directly or indirectly affect either 
profitability, capital structure or liquidity of the entity (Thommen and Achleitner 2009). 
As shown in Table 3, we therefore consider reputational and legal risks as subcategories 
of cost sources, which can be distinguished into (direct) recall and repair costs, legal costs 
and (indirect) equity costs.  
 
Table 3: Cost components of a product recall event. This table categorises the different 
cost components a company affected by a product recall event. 
Recall and repair costs can also be described as direct product recall costs and include 
replacement parts, labour costs (e.g. failure investigation, solution finding, removal, and 
installation work), increased marketing and notification costs or additional distribution 
and logistics costs (Shin et al. 2014). Depending on the underlying technology failure, 
the composition of recall and repair costs can vary significantly. For example, product 
recalls induced by a software failure require costs for reprogramming software code 
whereas the costs of replacement parts apply to recall events resulting from a (physical) 
component. For ADAS/AV technology, this is especially relevant for LIDAR and radar 
sensor technology, which still have high unit costs. The marginal costs of software-based 
recalls could be lower as the costs for reprogramming the software do not depend on the 
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number of affected vehicles and with the effective use of over the air software updates 
(see section VII 1.) also marketing and distribution costs could significantly be lowered 
for software-related recall campaigns.  
Legal costs can include legal advisory fees, compensation payments to customers, legal 
or contractual obligations and punitive penalties. Equity costs are not typically related to 
direct payments or cash-outflows from the affected company but are costs that -at least 
for the short term- reduce the enterprise value. Assuming that the company value reflects 
the present value of future profits, this cost category comprises indirect costs attributed 
to losses of future income triggered by the product recall event (Rupp 2004). For example, 
equity losses can arise because no products can be produced (“loss of production 
capacity”) or sold (“loss of sale”) if error-free components are not available in stock. 
Equity losses can also arise because of reputational damages leading to a decrease in 
consumer demand or investor interest. Product recalls due to the failure of highly safety-
relevant components potentially attract higher public and regulatory attention implying 
higher reputational damage and higher impact on the company value. Hence, this cost 
component potentially could gain in relevance with ADAS/AV-enabled vehicles. This is 
especially applicable if just an accident event exhibits inadequate safety of the vehicle so 
that the affected company faces even higher reputational risk and additional legal costs 
resulting from product liability claims. 
 
IV. Reasons for increasing product recall exposure of ADAS/AV technology 
ADAS/AV technology is quickly advancing, bringing with it several emerging risks to 
be addressed and managed. Indeed, the progression from “no automation” to “full 
automation” will take time, though different kinds of ADAS technology are already 
integrated into modern vehicles. Overall, we anticipate that the implementation of 
ADAS/AV technology will be accompanied by an increasing product recall risk exposure 
resulting from a changing software and hardware infrastructure, aspects of market 
competition and production approaches as well as increased surveillance by supervisory 
authorities. 
On the hardware side, ADAS/AV-enabled vehicles will not only be equipped with 
additional hardware components (sensors and ECUs) but also with a more complex 
hardware infrastructure due to the interconnection of formerly separated subsystems 
(Stout Risius Ross 2016). Already today, the number of electronic control units and 
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cabling within cars is enormous, reaching up to about 100 ECUs and up to 10 kilometres 
of cabling. However, common driving assistance and safety enhancing systems (e.g. ABS 
or ESC systems) only activate in separated vehicle functions (Stiller 2005). In contrast, 
ADAS/AV technology will fulfil driving actions automatically, which requires a dynamic 
and proactive assessment of driving scenarios and the ability to coordinate cross-
functional control commands. These cross-functional interdependencies could lead to 
unintended feature interactions, which in turn could issue hazardous autonomous driving 
commands (fortiss 2010). Similarly, modern vehicles can already today have up to 100 
million lines of code. Stating this, the automated fulfilment of driving actions requires a 
sharp increase in extent and complexity of the embedded software. As a result, the 
changing vehicle infrastructure increases not only the number of potential failure sources 
by adding additional hardware components or lines of codes but also the susceptibility of 
failure because of higher complexity. 
Also, ADAS/AV technology will successively liberate the driver from the responsibility 
to attentively steer the vehicle. This allows the driver to use the time travelling for other 
activities such as entertainment. Although entertainment systems are not directly linked 
to the driving task, they nevertheless open gateways for product recalls resulting from 
cyber-security risks (Currie 2016). An example of this risk was shown with an 
experimental hack of a Jeep Cherokee, where hackers used the wireless interface of the 
on-board radio to remotely take over driving functionalities (Miller and Valasek 2015). 
This triggered the recall of 1.4 million vehicles.  
The competition for innovation between (traditional) car manufacturers and automotive 
suppliers themselves and technology companies from outside the traditional car 
manufacturing market is fostering a technological selection process, which increases the 
pressure on companies´ innovation capacity (Stout Risius Ross 2016). At the same time, 
the vast set of possible driving scenarios, where ADAS/AV technology has to execute 
adequate driving decisions, potentially needs a high effort of testing and validation to 
ensure functional safety. Hence, the necessary trade-off between competitive market 
dynamics and the reliability of the systems in trend evokes residual technological risk, 
which potentially materialises in an increasing product recall probability. Customer 
demand for a growing variety of products and options of product individualisation 
additionally increases the complexity of the development, testing and manufacturing 
process, while development cycles are shortened (van Venrooy 2015; Göpfert and Schulz 
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2016). This again increases the residual technological risk, which potentially culminates 
in product recall risk.  
Finally, we anticipate that regulators will demand and apply increasingly cautious and 
proactive product recall approaches because of the impact of ADAS/AV technology on 
safety-crucial functionalities. Regulatory authorities and car manufacturers will need to 
devise a strict product recall approach when required. We expect that regulatory 
authorities impose higher legal fines where automotive manufacturers do not adequately 
comply with this obligation. 
 
V. Data Analysis 
Building on the preceding qualitative analysis, we posit that ADAS/AV technology will 
increase the complexity of embedded vehicle systems, which will, in turn, increase the 
probability of product recalls. To this end, we analyse historical product recalls to 
determine overall product recall development. As software, sensors or electronic control 
units (ECU) are crucial components for ADAS/AV-enabled vehicles, we use these as 
proxies for ADAS/AV technology. 
 
1. Methodology 
We use product recall statistics from the German, European and the US-automotive 
markets. In Germany, the Federal Motor Transport Authority (Kraftfahrtbundesamt; 
KBA) publishes data of product recalls within their annual reports. European data is 
extracted from the central online database, RAPEX (European Commission n.d. ), where 
alerts on dangerous products are reported by the 31 national authorities on a weekly basis. 
The US-market data on product recalls is derived from a database provided by the 
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA n.d.). We analyse product 
recall activity between the years 2006 and 2016, as this is the longest period for which 
information is provided by the databases for the European and US-market.  
Automotive companies are legally obliged to publish information on safety-relevant 
recall campaigns (European Parliament and Council 2001rule 5 (3)) and as the respective 
authorities can generally be seen as reliable and independent data aggregators, these 
databases are the most comprehensive and reliable sets of secondary data for information 
about product recall activity. The databases do not contain data about silent recall 
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campaigns but we expect that ADAS/AV technology mainly relates to safety-
functionalities and so we do not expect this to detract from the validity of the results of 
this paper. 
The extent of available data differs widely for each market. The German market data is 
limited and only enables an analysis of product recall pattern at a high level. In contrast, 
the European and US-market data provide explanatory texts indicating the reasons behind 
the single product recall events. To analyse the automotive product recall activity in 
Europe, we extract raw data by downloading an export file with product recalls of the 
category “motor vehicles” from the Rapex homepage. We retrieved product recall data 
for the USA by importing a text data file from the website of the NHTSA. The data for 
the USA also contains product recalls not affecting the vehicle itself but automotive 
equipment such as tyres and child restraint systems, which we excluded. We excluded all 
product recalls for the years 1966 to 2005 to coincide with data for the European region. 
Also, we assume that ADAS/AV technology had only a limited role prior to 2006. In 
addition, the data set of the NHTSA contains redundant records with the same product 
recall campaign identification number where recall campaigns affect different vehicle 
models of the same OEM or OEM group or if product recall campaigns affect the same 
vehicle models with different model years. As the relevant data within each data set is 
redundant, we cleared up the data set to avoid multiple counting. 
Finally, the European and US data sets provide a narrative “description of risk” (Rapex) 
and “defect summary” (NHTSA) for each recall campaign. We analysed these by 
manually searching for recall campaigns, which are caused by software, sensor or ECU 
failure. For this, we searched for the key words  
• “software, program(ed), code, coding, algorithm” for product recalls caused by 
software failure,  
• “sensor” for product recalls caused by sensor failure and 
• “ECU, control unit, control module, control device, controller, electronic unit, 
electronic module, electronic device, computer” for product recalls caused by 
ECU failure. 
High annual variations in the data are a feature of product recall statistics and for this 
reason, we smooth the data using an annual 3-year moving average. To estimate the future 
recall activity, we base our forecast on a polynomial regression based on historical 
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The KBA reports 1,560 product recall events between 2006 and 201427. The development 
of the overall number of product recall campaigns per year gives clear evidence that 
product recall activity in the German market increased throughout the period, starting 
with 157 product recall campaigns in 2008 and ending with 192 recall campaigns in 2014. 
This development corresponds to an average annual growth rate of about 3.4 %.  
The European database (RAPEX) contains 2,107 data points for product recalls of motor 
vehicles for the period between 2006 and 2016. Of these only 1,250 data sets are related 
to passenger cars, the balance being other vehicles (e.g. bicycles, motorcycles). RAPEX 
statistics show less product recall campaigns than the KBA data28 because the KBA 
database also contains low-risk product recalls, where car manufacturers used address 
data of the KBA to inform vehicle holders about a (voluntary) product recall campaign 
(Kraftfahrtbundesamt 2016). 
The statistical data of RAPEX shows that recall activity increased within the period under 
investigation. Between 2008 and 2016 the number of product recalls per year increased 
from 81 to 173, corresponding to an average annual growth rate of about 9.9 %. This 
growth rate is larger than the German rate because of a sharp increase in product recall 
activity in 2016. Comparing the growth rate within the same period (2006-2014), the 
compounded annual growth rate (CAGR) shows a growth of 4.57 % and is more aligned 
with the KBA data.  
The automotive product recall data from the USA is based on 7,197 product recall 
campaigns for the period between 2006 and 2016.  The statistical data of NHTSA also 
shows evidence that the overall product recall activity increased within the period under 
investigation. Between 2008 and 2016 the number of product recalls per year increased 
from 587 to 831. This development corresponds to an average annual growth rate of about 
4.4 %. 
 
27 At the time of writing, KBA data set does not yet contain product recall figures for 2015 and 2016. 
28 The German statistic shows 1.560 product recalls in the same between 2006 and 2014 while the 
European data shows 900 product recalls. 
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Figure 9 shows the development of product recall activity of each region with the 3-years 
moving annual average number of product recalls per year. 
 
Figure 9: Number of product recall campaigns per year. This graph shows the overall 
development of the 3-years moving average number of product recall campaigns in 
Germany, Europe and USA between 2008 and 2016. The dashed lines show a 
polynomial regression forecast as an indication for future product recall activity. 
Sources: KBA, RAPEX and NHTSA.  
Using a polynomial regression to forecast the overall product recall pattern based on the 
development of product recall activity since 2008, we expect the number of product recall 
campaigns to increase further over the coming years. As figures from the KBA database 
for 2015 and 2016 are not available, we assume that they grew in line with the European 
market. The expected annual growth rates vary between the regions. 
 
3. Development of product recall activity due to software, sensors  
and ECU 
In contrast to the available KBA recall statistics, the RAPEX and NHTSA statistics 
contain descriptions of each product recall campaign. With these descriptions, it is 
possible to analyse the component causing the product recall. In this manner, the share of 
product recalls caused by defects or safety-risks in software, sensors, and ECU can be 
deduced. These components are crucial for further development of ADAS/AV 
technologies and are used as proxies for their associated product recall risk.  
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Within the RAPEX database 109 of the total 1,250 product recalls (8.72 %) were caused 
by software, sensors or ECU. The pattern of product recalls is not clear until 2012 when 
the trend increases, perhaps an indication that these components increasingly influence 
product recall events (see Figure 10 below). Since 2012 the 3-years moving annual 
average number of product recalls due to software, sensors and ECU increased from 6 to 
20, which corresponds to an CAGR of 37.5 %. The total product recalls grew by 10.3 % 
p.a. from 117 to 173 recalls in this period. Hence, the share of product recalls caused by 
software, sensors and ECU increased from about 5.1 % in 2012 to about 11.6 % in 2016. 
 
Figure 10: Product recall campaigns (only software, sensors and ECU) in Europe. This 
graph shows the development of the 3-years moving average number of product recall 
campaigns due to software, sensors, and ECUs in Europe between 2008 and 2016. The 
dashed line represents a polynomial forecast. Source: RAPEX 
Based on a polynomial regression, we estimate an annual 23.3 % growth rate of product 
recalls due to software, sensors, and ECU compared to an overall recall growth of  
16.9 % in Europe. We expect the share of product recalls due to software, sensors, and 
ECU to increase up to 13.7 % by 2020. 
Conducting the same analysis with the NHTSA data, a slightly different trend is observed 
as shown in Figure 11. The number of product recalls due to software, sensors, and ECU 
since 2012 increased from 62 to 88. This corresponds with an annual growth rate of 9.2 
% outstripping overall product recall activity growth of 8.1 % p.a. The share of product 
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recalls due to software, sensors and ECU grew slightly from 10.2 % 2012 to 10.6 % in 
2016.  
Comparing these findings with the Automotive Warranty & Recall Report provided by 
the advisory company Stout Risius Ross (2016), the share of product recalls related to 
software, sensors and ECU is relatively low. They analysed the data provided by NHTSA 
regarding software-related product recalls only and attributed 15 % of the overall product 
recalls in 2015 to this category. The difference can be explained by the fact that the report 
not only counts product recalls caused by software but also product recall campaigns 
caused by other components but solved with a software update. Hence, this approach 
leads to a higher share of product recalls attributed to this category. 
 
Figure 11: Product recall campaigns (only software, sensors and ECU) in the USA. 
This graph shows the development of the 3-years moving average number of product 
recall campaigns due to software, sensors, and ECUs in USA between 2008 and 
2016.The dashed line represents a polynomial forecast. Source: NHTSA 
Based on a polynomial regression, we estimate an annual 13.6 % growth rate of product 
recalls due to software, sensors, and ECU compared to an overall recall growth of 10.2 
% in the USA. We expect the share of product recalls due to software, sensors, and ECU 
to increase up to 11.8 % by 2020. 
On a more practical level, these statistics underscore how these technologies will impact 
different risk areas. We cite two examples here for indicative purposes. First, the number 
of potential access points to the data and actuator controls in a vehicle will increase the 
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probability of a cyber-attack. The risk of such an attack could include both a data breach 
and bodily injury, the latter posing potentially significant liability costs. As a second 
example, LiDAR consists of a laser beam emitter and a sensor to see what the laser beam 
is impacting. Low resolution LiDAR may need to be upgraded to match future software 
upgrades to increase safety requirements that may involve a complex recall campaign. 
 
VI. Characteristics of product recall risk 
We use the information provided by the NHTSA to analyse the possible extent of the 
resulting financial risks (“financial tail-risk”) and the average delay between vehicle 
production and failure notification (“temporal tail-risk”). Additionally, we support this 
analysis with examples of recent extensive product recall campaigns in the automotive 
sector.  
 
1. Financial tail-risk  
The data for the US-market provided by the NHTSA also indicates the potential number 
of vehicles affected by each product recall campaign. Assuming that the costs of a product 
recall campaign increase with the number of affected vehicles we use this number as a 
proxy for the financial impact of a product recall campaign. For this, 942 recalls due to 
software, sensors, and ECU since 1995 are assessed. The distribution of the number of 





Figure 12: Distribution of the number of potentially affected vehicles (software, 
sensors, and ECU only). This graph shows the distribution of the number of vehicles 
potentially affected by a product recall campaign due to software, sensors or ECU since 
1995 and the cumulative share of these product recall campaigns. Source: NHTSA 
On the one hand, we find that 86.8 % of the product recall campaigns due to software, 
sensors, and ECU affected 25,000 or fewer vehicles, which shows that a high share of the 
product recall event has likely only limited financial impact on the affected company. On 
the other hand, we also find that about 5.3 % of the vehicle recalls affected 150,000 or 
more vehicles, including 1.1 % of product recall campaigns affecting more than one 
million vehicles. Hence, the distribution of the number of affected vehicles shows that 
although there are only relatively few large-scale product recall events, these can lead to 
catastrophic losses endangering business continuity. That said, it has to be noted that the 
number of potentially affected vehicles only include vehicles in the USA. However, a 
globally active OEM group is also exposed to accumulative losses from recalls in 
different countries. 
The inherent financial tail-risk can also be illustrated by single recent automotive recall 
events. Stating this, the following examples are only a selective illustration of particularly 
extensive recent product recall events, which show the potentially severe costs of these 
events. The most recent and most significant recall event was by the automotive supplier 
Takata. Defective airbags affecting about 100 million vehicles with a cost of two billion 
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was hit by a severe recall event in 2010 as failing accelerator pedals and floor mats caused 
unintentional acceleration. Toyota anticipated costs of about 2 billion USD for the direct 
recall costs and loss of sales. In addition, Toyota was fined punitive damages of about 1.2 
billion USD in the USA. In a third example, General Motors recalled about 30 million 
vehicles in 2014 due to a series of safety-relevant failures in connection with problems of 
the ignition switches leading to costs of about 4 billion USD accounting for repair costs, 
victim compensation, and legal expenses.  
 
2. Temporal tail-risk  
Temporal tail-risks occur because of the time delay between the manufacturing process 
and the notification of the defect or safety-risk. This risk enlarges the impact of a product 
recall on the financial stability in terms of liquidity and financing options when high cash-
outflows and losses are not covered with positive cash-flows and profits from sales in the 
period where the product recall is announced. This adverse impact on the companies´ 
profitability is exacerbated because of the asymmetric profit and loss pattern. The profit 
per vehicle of high-volume car manufacturers is below 1,000 Euros (Dudenhöffer 2016), 
backward distribution costs in case of a product recall can exceed the costs of forward 
distribution by several times. Ahsan (2013) finds backward distribution costs can exceed 
forward sale distribution income by a factor of between two and three because of small 
and single quantities of replacement component shipments and the urgency of the recall 
process. Additionally, subtracting costs for error-free replacement parts and their 
reinstallation, a product recall can quickly exhaust the original profit from the sale of the 
car.  
The NHTSA database specifies the commencement date of manufacture of a model series 
and the creation date of the respective recall report. Assuming, that a vehicle recall report 
is created swiftly after the recognition of a safety-relevant product failure, we use the time 
delay between these two dates as an indicator of temporal tail-risks. This approximation 
of the average time delay is quite conservative as it does not take into consideration that 
only single model years or batches of the model production are recalled. Taking all 
vehicle recalls between 2006 and 2016 into consideration, the average time delay between 
the manufacture and the introduction of a product recall campaign is 3.0 years. 
Considering only vehicle recalls attributed to software, sensor and ECU failure, the 
average time delay between the manufacturing begin and the introduction of a product 
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recall campaign is 2.86, which implies that these failures are detected and remedied 
slightly earlier. 
 
VII. Risk mitigation avenues for ADAS/AV-enabled vehicles 
A comprehensive risk management process comprises methodologies and instruments to 
identify, evaluate, mitigate and monitor risks resulting from various internal or external 
sources (Ho et al. 2015). Instruments of risk mitigation generally reduce the risk exposure 
of an identified risk by influencing either the probability or the severity of a loss. Based 
on the timing of their effect, these instruments can be categorised in proactive or 
retroactive instruments. Proactive instruments influence the risk exposure before the risks 
occur by reducing the probability of a loss occurrence and/or by limiting the probable 
maximum loss. Retroactive instruments retrospectively reduce the risk exposure by 
limiting the extent of the loss event after the risk has manifested. We propose an holistic 
risk mitigation approach combining proactive production risk mitigation with proactive 
and retroactive financial instruments for the reduction of financial losses.  
 
1. Production risk mitigation approaches 
Product recall events basically result from failures of a product or its components. These 
failures can be attributed either to the design of the product, to defects within the 
manufacturing process or to software problems (Marucheck et al. 2011). Therefore, risk 
mitigation of product recall events is highly linked to quality management processes. The 
high proportion of production outsourcing in the automotive sector makes it necessary 
that an integrated approach to risk mitigation and quality management is not only applied 
on a corporate level but throughout the whole supply chain (Vanichchinchai and Igel 
2011). For example, the trade-off between cost and quality (Kumar and Schmitz 2010) 
also affects the purchasing behaviour when suppliers are chosen for component parts. A 
strong emphasis on quality is considered indispensable for safety not only to reduce the 
direct risk of product recalls but also as a protection from loss of consumer confidence. 
This is especially relevant for ADAS/AV vehicles, as failures in their safety-relevant 
features potentially induce higher legal and equity costs (see section III).  
In addition, a traditional instrument to decrease sourcing risk of a manufacturer is 
spreading orders among suppliers (Kırılmaz and Erol 2017). However, for ADAS/AV-
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enabled vehicles, the ability to diversify risk across suppliers may not be applicable 
because of the central role of specialised software, which has to be integrated and 
calibrated with the embedded hardware.  
Supplier contract design is also an instrument to protect from (financial) risks resulting 
from recall events. For example, cost-sharing agreements, which define an allocation 
formula between the manufacturer and the respective supplier for costs arising from 
product recall events can be used to limit costs and to increase the transparency and speed 
of cost allocation. In addition, cost-sharing agreements also contain an incentive function 
for suppliers to ensure on quality management. However, the distributed manufacturing 
process means that even though the supplier responsible for the recall is identified, the 
OEM may still be subject to financial loss. For instance, even if the supplier is liable for 
recall, repair and legal costs, the company at the end of the value chain nevertheless might 
face serious equity losses because of the adverse reputation damage.  
Kumar and Schmitz (2010) emphasise the relevance of testing and inspection procedures 
to ensure the quality of components. For ADAS/AV technology, software-centric quality 
inspections, such as code-reviews and static or dynamic code-analysis, accompanied by 
rigorous testing of the integrated hardware and software infrastructure is required. Due to 
the increasing relevance of integrated safety-relevant OEM cloud-services and V2X-
communication also the quality of these services will be crucial (Ding et al. 2014; Ding 
et al. 2018). However, the dynamic and complex environment in which ADAS/AV 
vehicles operate has a nearly unlimited number of possible risk scenarios. Therefore, a 
commonly agreed framework for testing these vehicles before market circulation would 
support the achievement of a minimum level of reliability and safety and limit the extent 
of residual risk driven by market competition (see section 4). Similarly but from a legal 
viewpoint, the application of technical standards and norms can be taken into account to 
assess if a product complies with safety requirements (European Parliament and Council 
2001rule 3). However, current standards and norms for designing and testing vehicles 
(e.g. ISO 26262 on the functional safety of road vehicles, IATF 16949:2016 as the 
standard for quality management in the automobile industry) do not necessarily consider 
ADAS/AV characteristics.  
Marucheck et al. (2011) describe the necessity for innovative solutions to address product 
recall risk in the field of product lifecycle information management and traceability. Here, 
the interconnectedness of ADAS/AV-enabled vehicles provides pathways to reduce the 
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probability and/or severity of losses resulting from product recall events. Vehicle 
connectivity increases the amount of data that can be proactively used to identify potential 
safety-relevant failures in the vehicles´ software and hardware. If effective, this 
possibility does not necessarily reduce the probability of the occurrence of a product recall 
but still can reduce the number of affected vehicles and resulting costs, e.g. reputational 
costs due to proactive recall management (Magno 2012) or logistics costs due to the 
possibility of better planning. This proactive recall approach also supports the avoidance 
of punitive damages if failures are discovered before they materialise in personal or 
property damage. Finally, the possibility to remotely carry out over the air software 
updates has the advantage of lower distribution and labour costs for installation work and 
potentially improves the traceability of defective vehicles on the market. Looking at the 
“defect summaries” and “corrective summaries” of the NHTSA-data, the share of product 
recalls remedied by software updates (9.36 %) is more than twice as high as the share of 
product recalls caused by software failure (4.78 %) between 2006 and 2016, including 
product recalls, which are originally caused by hardware failure but can be circumvented 
by a software update. 
 
2.  Financial risk mitigation approaches 
Despite existing efforts to mitigate product recall risk through production processes, the 
analysis of historical product recall activity (see section V) implies that (undetected) 
residual risk still remains and is likely to grow in the future. Because the potential 
financial instability resulting from product recall events can have a detrimental impact on 
product-flow in the automotive supply chain, a comprehensive risk mitigation approach 
has to couple production-oriented with financial-oriented risk mitigation instruments.  
Financial risk mitigation can either be applied proactively (e.g. insurance coverage or 
contingent equity capital options) or retroactively (e.g. ad-hoc capital increases, issuance 
of subordinated bonds, credit-based financing). The design of efficient financial risk 
mitigation depends on the extent of financial losses resulting from a product recall event, 
internal factors of the affected company (e.g. self-bearing capacity, solvability and access 
to capital-market) and external factors such as interest rate level and the capacity of the 
insurance market.  
Since our analysis has exhibited severe potential financial tail-risks of a product recall 
event (see section VI 1.), we propose a three-level risk mitigation approach for financial 
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risks resulting from these events, combining self-retention of lower parts of the risk 
exposure with retroactive and proactive financial risk mitigation. On a first level, risks 
beneath the threshold of a company´s self-bearing capacity, which can be carried without 
external financing, are retained at the company’s own risk. The self-bearing capacity 
determines the threshold beneath which losses can be carried without financial instability. 
As most recall losses are quite low in severity (Figure 12 shows that 86.8 % of product 
recalls affected 25,000 or fewer vehicles), we expect that a relatively high share of 
product recalls can be carried internally.  
Risks which exceed the self-bearing capacity of the affected company have to be financed 
externally either by retroactive financial risk mitigation or proactive financial risk 
mitigation through insurance. Assuming, that the cost of capital for retroactive financing 
increases with higher loss amounts and that additional margins for proactive risk 
mitigation are fixed in advance, the efficiency of proactive risk financing ceteris paribus 
increases with increasing probable loss amounts. In addition, it also has to be taken into 
account that retroactive financing may not be available in that case where the financial 
loss of a product recall may jeopardise the viability of the affected company to an extent 
that external financing options are not offered by third parties anymore. By contrast, 
proactive instruments of financial risk mitigation are paid in advance regardless of 
whether a trigger event actually occurs. As a result, proactive risk mitigation is suitable 
particularly for financial peak risks resulting from extensive product recall events 
whereas retroactive financial risk mitigation is efficient for middle layers of risk exposure. 
The distribution of the number of potentially affected vehicles shown in Figure 12 and 
the given examples of recent product recall events indeed indicate that loss events with 
severe financial tail-risks exist, so that the described layering of financial risk mitigation 
instrument is useful for efficient risk management approaches. 
Furthermore, we find synergies between insurance coverage and corporate risk mitigation 
as insurance not only increases the resilience of the automotive supply chain but also 
enhances the transparency during purchasing decisions and improves corporate risk and 
quality management by validating risk evaluation and benchmarking internal processes. 
An OEM can be affected indirectly by the product recall event on a production level if 
passing the costs down the supply chain leads to the instability of a crucial supplier. Here, 
insurance is an instrument to increase the financial stability of the production process 
preventing spill over effects due to the product recall event. In addition, the exchange of 
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the (potential) financial costs of a product recall with the payment of a fixed insurance 
premium increases the transparency of total costs of production. The contractual 
obligation to maintain insurance coverage thus helps to make informed purchasing 
decisions (Flynn and Flynn 2005) by assuming insurance premiums as an additional price 
component. 
Finally, we find close synergies in the process of risk evaluation between corporate risk 
management and insurance premium pricing. Here, the price quotation of an external 
insurance company can be used to validate and benchmark internal risk assessment. 
Insurance companies usually use quantitative methods with an analysis of soft factors 
such as the adequacy of corporate risk management structures. In this way, insurance can 
increase the validity of own internal evaluations but also serve as a benchmark for the 
adequacy of quality and risk management processes on a corporate or supply chain level 
with a suitable comparison group (“risk advisory function”). 
 
VIII. Conclusion 
Based on a quantitative analysis this paper finds that product recall risk has been 
successively increasing in both probability and severity. Combined with a qualitative 
assessment of ADAS/AV technology´s potential impact on future product recall risk, we 
show that the increasing complexity of the vehicle software and hardware infrastructure 
will increase the number of failure sources that will, in turn, increase the risk of product 
recalls.  
We anticipate that the technological drivers of product recall risk will be accompanied by 
increasing legal and reputational risks as ADAS/AV-enabled vehicles will take over 
safety-crucial driving tasks. Because of this, members of the automotive supply-side have 
to implement adequate measures of product recall risk mitigation to support the common 
societal acceptance of ADAS/AV technology and to protect themselves from financial 
risks resulting from extensive product recall events.  
We describe a comprehensive risk mitigation approach consisting of proactive and 
retroactive risk mitigation tools on a production- and financial-level. With regard to 
production-related risk mitigation, we focus on ADAS/AV-specific aspects and find that 
common standards and norms for the design and testing of this technology are necessary 
to technically and legally support a consistent level of reliability and safety in the future. 
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We also find that the connectivity of future vehicles can be leveraged in an holistic risk 
mitigation framework. However, connectivity is a double-edged sword which indeed can 
improve traceability of product failures and enable proactive monitoring as well as remote 
repair, but also increases vulnerability resulting from cyber-attacks.  
Despite all measures to mitigate the risk of safety-relevant product failure on a production 
level, residual risk remains. Hence, a comprehensive risk mitigation approach requires 
the implementation of financial risk mitigation approaches. With a special focus on 
financial risk mitigation via insurance, we find that insurance cannot only be used as an 
instrument for risk transfer but offers additional benefits, such as an increased 
transparency of purchasing decisions, the validation of risk assessments and the 
benchmarking of risk management processes. Both insurance companies and vehicle 
(component) manufacturers will inevitably be affected by the automation of vehicles and 
changing mobility demands, so we suggest a more strategic cooperation of insurance and 
automotive supply chains with a focus not only on product recall but also on product 
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Chapter 6: Research Conclusion 
While the introduction of new technology advances societal progress and economic 
opportunities, it simultaneously poses significant challenges to society, businesses, 
research, and regulatory bodies. In particular, major challenges obtain to long-term risk 
assessment forecasts and to the adequate adaption of relevant regulatory frameworks. 
As the business model of insurance is to assume and balance risks in sufficiently large 
portfolios over time, an adequate quantification of risk-factors is a strategic core 
competence determining the economic success of an insurance company. Yet, due to an 
ongoing lack of empirical data and the inherent fluctuations of technological design and 
adoption in the formative years, such risk assessment is inevitably prey to varying degrees 
of uncertainty. This effectively means that relevant stakeholder decisionality rests on 
speculative assumptions which may give rise to misjudgments in terms of 
implementation. Since the real impact of emerging technologies can only be fully 
revealed over time, an iterative approach of re-assessment is required to minimise the 
risks. As it stands, the development and real-world application of CAV technology are at 
an early stage, rendering the level of ambiguity around CAV risk factors evenly high. 
Such ambiguities around the risk-factors used during pricing processes are particularly 
challenging for insurance entities.  
In addition to the challenges posed to risk-assessment, emerging technology may also 
expose certain idiosyncrasies which have been formerly overlooked or subsumed by 
prevailing legal frameworks. The adaption of legal frameworks to the new context is, 
therefore, necessary to ensure both a smooth penetration of technology and proper 
consideration of the legitimate interests of all stakeholders involved. In terms of CAV 
technology, in particular, axiomatic legal questions concern the allocation of liability for 
accidents caused by automated driving vehicles and access to in-vehicle data. These 
matters are of equal importance to the insurance sector.  
Due to the insurance sector’s pivotal role in facilitating the penetration of CAV 
technology, this thesis presented a comprehensive analysis of the insurance-relevant 
implications from both legal and risk-factors and advances knowledge in this area through 
• a farsighted and proactive customisation of liability and insurance frameworks,  
• a farsighted and proactive design of legal frameworks which determine the access 
to in-vehicle data,  
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• a transparent and comprehensive assessment of CAV technology´s probable risk-
factors, 
which taken together contributes to an holistic assessment of CAVs´ implications to the 
insurance sector. The findings resulting from the present research objectives equip 
insurance carriers to take proactive strategic measures for adapting business models to a 
potentially changing environment and enable regulatory bodies to make proactive 
preparations for the legal frameworks which obtain to CAV technology.  
To provide a more comprehensive understanding of potential CAV technology impacts 
on the insurance sector, this thesis offers a multidimensional research approach that 
combines findings from a diverse range of academic disciplines and research methods. 
This is deemed most appropriate as the field of insurance research is inherently 
interdisciplinary. The overall contribution of this thesis is that, in focusing on CAV 
technology, it forges links between formerly segregated research disciplines and provides 
an holistic analysis of insurance-related implications from an academic perspective. The 
specific research findings and contributions to academic literature per research objective 
are as follows: 
 
• Research objective: Contribute to a farsighted and proactive customisation of 
liability and insurance frameworks for accidents caused by CAV technology 
which considers an adequate level of protection for accident victims and a 
reasonable allocation of liability costs 
Prior research on liability for automated vehicles fails to consider the central role of motor 
insurers within the claim settlement process and therefore neglects the motivational 
aspects of motor insurers. Moreover, it overlooks crucial interrelations between liability 
law and motor insurance law. As they are inextricably linked to each other, motor 
insurance law is vital to the efficient processing of motor liability claims and a 
comprehensive analysis must also include the potential shortcomings of this law source. 
As such, this thesis contributes to academic research by considering the (economic) 
interests of involved parties in order to evaluate the adequacy of the existing framework 
with an behavioural law and economics perspective.  
 
The in-depth analysis of the legal provisions of the current German motor insurance and 
liability framework in Chapter 2 consolidates existing research which states that the 
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strict-liability approach of the vehicle owner is generally capable of covering the 
peculiarities of CAV technology since it facilitates an efficient and clear path of 
compensation for third-party claimants regardless of the level of automation and the status 
of the vehicle owner (individual or mobility service-provider). However, only an analysis 
of the interrelations to motor insurance law and the motivational aspects of motor insurers 
within the claim settlement process can properly ringfence those shortcomings of the 
existing framework which have not been addressed by existing research to date. In 
particular, this thesis concludes that minor adjustments to the existing liability and 
insurance framework are necessary to maintain an adequate level of claimant protection 
for accidents caused by automated driving vehicles. This can be achieved by further 
increasing the maximum sum of the vehicle owner´s strict liability and by aligning the 
minimum sums insured determined by motor insurance law with the adjusted maximum 
liability of the Road Traffic Act.  
With reference to the ultimate allocation of liability, the assessment of motor insurers´ 
motivation shows that a material shift of liability costs by the way of regress claims 
against the vehicle manufacturing side is neither realistic nor efficient within the existing 
framework. While such a finding may comply with the legal justification of applying 
strict-liability to the vehicle-owner, it could nonetheless limit the preventive function of 
liability law which incentivises vehicle manufacturers to undertake exhaustive pre-sales 
testing. As such, the findings of this thesis are subject to normative legal valuation since 
a material shift of liability exposure to the vehicle manufacturer side could also hamper 
innovation. That said, the guiding principles for the normative legal valuation presented 
in this thesis are based on the two basic functions of liability systems, namely the adequate 
indemnity and preventive function. Contrary to this perspective, a normative legal 
valuation based on different guiding principles and considerations of political pragmatism 
could partially also lead to an opposing assessment of the given framework.  
The findings regarding the gap in claimant protection as well as the adequate allocation 
of liability costs gain practical relevance already with vehicles equipped with conditional 
automation functionalities (level 3 automation) as the fault of the human-driver might not 
be a relevant trigger for accident occurrences anymore. However, as this automation level 
is still exposed to challenging questions surrounding the retrospective reconstruction of 
specific human-machine interaction in a given accident scene, it is to be expected that a 
clear omission of human fault can only be efficiently proven with automated vehicles of 
higher levels of automation (level 4 and 5).  
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Given the shortcomings of the existing liability and insurance framework, this thesis not 
only adds to existing academic discussions but also supports regulatory bodies in a 
farsighted design of risk regulation frameworks. This is particularly the case in terms of 
the suggested adjustments to the existing framework which could be considered during 
the re-evaluation process of the German Road Traffic Act planned for 2020.  
Limitation of research does arise from the fact that the German liability and insurance 
framework is used for in-depth analysis but no similar assessment has been conducted for 
different jurisdictions. Due to this, the specific findings regarding the shortcomings of the 
framework are not necessarily applicable to other jurisdictions. In spite of this, however, 
the German framework has already proved largely applicable for automated driving 
vehicles, and this comprehensive examination clearly supports the preparation of a blue-
print framework which could be adopted by other jurisdictions in the future. This is 
particularly significant, as a certain level of amalgamation of national liability and 
insurance frameworks will be required to ensure a consistent level of legal certainty of 
users and producers of CAV technology in Europe and beyond. Despite this limited focus 
on German liability and insurance framework, the analysis of potential legal barriers in 
the Product Liability Act is generally also applicable to other European jurisdictions 
which have adopted the regulations. That said, the Product Liability Act still leaves some 
freedom in the specific adoption of legislation (e.g. regarding the limitation of liability 
for personal damage due to one and the same defect) so that the findings within this thesis 
are referring to the legislation adopted by the German legislator. 
 
• Research objective: Contribute to a farsighted and proactive design of legal 
frameworks which determine the access to in-vehicle data so as to ensure an 
undistorted and fair competition of parties involved 
This thesis presents accessibility to in-vehicle data as a core strategic question of the 
insurance sector which remains largely overlooked by academic and practice-related 
research. By examining insurance-related use cases, the present thesis raises awareness 
of the relevance of an in-depth academic discussion in this field, particularly, as the 
example of CAV and insurance holds as a proxy for a broader discussion about access to 
data from connected smart-devices in an IoT-driven business environment of the future. 
That said, the societal impact of IoT-based and data-driven services has been largely 
assessed with a focus on the implications for individual freedom of choice and customer 
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behavior, information overload and surveillance only but discussions of the design of 
regulatory frameworks for these services from an economic market perspective remain 
underrepresented. 
To redress this gap the concept of business ecosystem platforms is used for the analysis 
of OEMs` approaches to leverage their superior access to in-vehicle data as a means to 
expand their traditional business model of vehicle production with complementary digital 
services. The analysis of insurance-related use cases confirms that the increasing 
interconnection of modern automobile vehicles will significantly impact insurance-
related services offerings. This will affect services and processes along the whole 
insurance value-chain, namely distribution and customer interfaces, premium calculation 
of usage-based insurance tariffs, active loss management, and breakdown assistance 
services. Clearly then, the central strategic question of an adequate access to in-vehicle 
data for motor insurers is not yet adequately protected by legal frameworks and actively 
constrained by OEMs. Whereas this finding is generally relevant for connected automated 
vehicles of all automation levels, the relevance of the specific services in scope might 
vary by automation level. For instance, usage-based insurance-tariffs also measuring 
driver´s performance (“pay how you drive” tariffs) might be especially relevant for partial 
and conditional automation levels (level 2 and 3) but would be less relevant in case that 
the insurance risk is mainly determined by the reliability of the vehicle itself (level 4 and 
5). In addition, if higher levels of automation would induce a shift towards the use of 
service-based mobility of commercial fleet-providers, the relevance of direct customer-
interfaces between the motor insurer and individual mobility user might be trimmed 
anyway. 
An analysis of the status quo from a business ecosystem perspective underscores that 
taking the role of a physical dominator to extract maximum short-term value from the 
ecosystem might be an obvious but not necessarily successful approach for OEMs on the 
long-term. This is because the shift from a goods-dominant supply-chain perspective to a 
service-dominant perspective will also need to be accompanied by a profound redefinition 
of OEMs´ supply-chain relationships. This finding supports the resolution of contrasting 
positions of OEMs and third-party providers and facilitates an unbiased and farsighted 
approach of regulatory bodies to ensure that the inadequate advantages of single actors 




• Research objective: Contribute to a transparent and comprehensive assessment 
of CAV technology´s probable risk impacts to enable both insurance industry and 
regulatory bodies to base decisions on a firm and unbiased ground 
 
Existing literature focusing on CAV risk-factors from an insurance perspective is 
dominated by practice-related publications which are sourced from two author groups. 
On the one hand, consultancy firms’ forecasts on the impact of CAV technology on motor 
insurance market premium predict sharply decreasing premium volumes due to a 
significant expected decline in the number of road accidents. On the other hand, the more 
moderate projections of insurance-affiliated institutions (e.g. German Insurance 
Association) underline the perennial importance and economic legitimacy of the motor 
insurers’ business model. Unsurprisingly then, practice-related literature with an 
insurance-specific perspective is arguably biased by the (economic) interests of specific 
publishing parties. Apart from this literature, an academic assessment of CAV risk-factors 
from an insurance perspective is largely missing.  
Indeed, academic literature on CAV risk-factors already exists but stems from accident 
research with a focus on overall accident activity. Even if both perspectives show overlap, 
divergent research needs result from the fact that loss scenarios contributing to major 
parts of insurance loss expenditures are not necessarily relevant for accident research. 
Given that traditional pricing approaches in the (motor) insurance industry are based on 
largely stable historical loss-data, a stronger link between research disciplines must be 
established to allow for proactive and scenario-based risk-assessment approaches. This 
change in risk-assessment is imperative as retrospective risk-pricing approaches cannot 
be applied in an environment characterised by incomplete information and ambiguity of 
risk-factors. Here, a lack of proactive risk-assessment methods gives rise to the threat of 
mispricing of inherent CAV risk.  
In order to redress the aforementioned gaps in existing academic and practice-related 
research, the present thesis provided a comprehensive qualitative and semi-quantitative 
analysis of CAV risk-factors including motor and product recall insurance. In so doing, 
it contributes to a more comprehensive academic assessment of CAV risk-factors which 
supports not only insurance companies in a proactive risk-assessment approach, but also 
raises awareness of the need for proactive risk management frameworks for 
manufacturers of CAV technology. Moreover, the qualitative risk-assessment approach 
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applied in this thesis forms a credible basis for further interdisciplinary quantitative 
assessments of CAV inherent risks, which currently is still hampered by a lack of reliable 
and transparent empirical data. Due to this limitation of available data in general, the 
findings of this thesis are suitable to improve the overall risk governance in the domain 
and to provide guidance in general directions of risk mitigation but is not already capable 
of determining the precise design of specific risk management frameworks. 
This thesis contributes to a more granular assessment of CAV accident-risk by 
foregrounding the risk-relevant peculiarities of single levels of automation. Through this 
approach, the study contributes to a more precise delineation of CAV risk-implications. 
Furthermore, it lends proportion to the often exaggerated perception of increased road 
safety linked to CAVs with higher levels of automation. By so doing, the thesis 
encourages a more rational academic and public discussion of the potential benefits of 
CAV technology. Furthermore, it supports better informed and evidence-based 
decisionality on the part of regulatory bodies and business entities as a means to lessen 
the risk of missteering of (public) investments due to incomplete and/or biased 
information.   
 
• Research objective: Contribute with an holistic assessment of CAV implications 
for the insurance sector in order to support insurance entities to take proactive 
strategic measures to adapt business models to a changing competitive 
environment  
With reference to the scope of strategic implications of CAV technology to the insurance 
industry as outlined in Chapter 1, it is held that potential disruption of existing insurance 
business models could result from material changes in the 
• Allocation of liability: Does a shift of legal allocation of liability for accidents 
caused by automated vehicles lead to a significant shift of liability costs to vehicle 
manufacturers and consequently to a material decline of premium volume in 
motor insurance?  
• Future risk landscape: Does the expected increase in overall road safety lead to 
a sharp reduction of residual (financial) insurance risk?  
• Change of customer interfaces and market structure: Does a shift of societal 
mobility behaviour to a service-based mobility approach lead to a shift of 




Based on academic research approaches, this thesis provides strong links to practice-
related research questions on CAVs and insurance. In considering the perspective of a 
key stakeholder, this research approach facilitates a smooth introduction of CAV 
technology. From an insurance business perspective, this thesis contributes to proactive 
strategic planning not only by identifying the potential challenges and risks to existing 
business models of (motor) insurance but also by suggesting strategic measures to 
confront them.  
Referring to the risk-factors of motor insurance, this thesis ultimately concludes that a 
reliable quantification of future risk-exposure is not yet possible. Even if automated 
driving vehicles have the potential to decrease the number of road accidents caused by 
human-error, there is still insufficient evidence which confirms the reliability of 
automated driving systems in a real-world application. Thus, to assume a causal link 
between taking the human driver out of the driving action and the reduction of road 
accidents is a statistical fallacy since the high contribution of human fault to accident 
activity is just a logical outcome of the fact that the human currently assumes the driving 
action almost exclusively. On the contrary, the average human is a reasonably reliable 
driver. As such, automated driving vehicles must first prove comparably higher 
performances before a positive impact on overall accident activity can be scientifically 
presumed. In light of this, the present thesis contributes to a more rational and fact-based 
discussion of the probable impact of CAV technology on both road safety and motor 
insurance loss activity. Even if no disruptive impact on motor-insurance risk is 
anticipated, motor insurers must nevertheless devise adequate solutions to map the 
probability of changing risk-factors into their pricing-models since these will successively 
shift from driver-centric to technology-centric risk-factors with increasing levels of 
automation. Moreover, this is relevant as emerging risks such as automotive cyber-attacks 
potentially even introduce unprecedented catastrophe-alike risk exposures to MTPL 
insurance.  
In addition to a sophisticated understanding of future motor insurance risk, this research 
enriches the academic and practice-related analysis of CAV technology´s inherent risks 
by elucidating the impact on automotive product recall risk to the academic discussion. 
The analysis undertaken in this thesis yield important initial findings which may serve as 
a cornerstone for future interdisciplinary research in this field.  
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With regard to the existing German liability and insurance framework, this thesis 
confirms that the methodology to allocate liability based on the strict liability of the 
vehicle owner is compatible with the peculiarities of automated driving vehicles. 
However, this does not necessarily mean that the business model of motor insurance will 
remain unaffected by adjustments to future liability and insurance frameworks. While the 
central role of motor insurers within the claim settlement process generally enables them 
to absorb liability costs in order to manufacturers in order to preserve premium volume 
of the own business, for instance, if regulatory bodies come to regard this as an 
undesirable market failure resulting in an unreasonable allocation of liability costs, 
additional regulatory intervention could ensue. 
By pointing out the contrasting and synchronous interests of different stakeholders, 
namely insurance companies and OEMs, this thesis encourages market players from 
different sectors to consider the development of holistic strategic alliances with suitable 
business partners to leverage complementary capabilities to foster innovation. However, 
in order to be considered as a potential candidate for strategic collaboration, insurers must 
be conversant with emerging business models and must develop value propositions for 
potential business partners within the mobility space.  
This will be essential if changing mobility approaches lead to a material shift from 
possession-based to service-based mobility which, in turn, impacts customer-interfaces 
in the motor-insurance market. Due to a probably changing risk-landscape, especially 
insurance companies with the capabilities to provide holistic risk management services 
and risk-transfer solutions for OEMs and mobility service providers may also benefit 
from the opportunities afforded by the emerging risks of product recall and product 
liability exposures. This finding especially gains relevance with vehicles of level 3 
automation as it is expected that not only the legal risk of product liability claims by the 
way of regresses could increase -if adequate measures are taken to adjust the given 
liability and insurance framework accordingly- but also as the product recall risk exposure 
is likely to further increase. This is because of the increasing complexity of vehicle 
hardware and software but also as strict regulatory approach to recall vehicles is pivotal 
if vehicles are capable to take driving decisions independently. Therefore, it is expected 
that the finding of emerging risk exposure will progressively take effect with conditional 
automation (level 3) onwards.  
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Finally, the high level of ambiguity regarding not only the rate and extent of deployment 
but also the inherent risk levels of CAV technology during its formative years, mean 
strategic (investment) decisions to exploit potential business opportunities must be made 
under conditions of uncertainty. Given such circumstances, the holistic assessment of 
strategic implications of CAV technology on the insurance sector supports the 
identification of both challenges and opportunities and facilitates the design of more 
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